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                      The Literature of Bio-political Panic 
 
                                    Avishek Parui 
  
                                        Abstract 
 
This thesis examines selected literary representations of personal and political panic in the 
period 1899-2005, with a particular focus on the way in which literary languages are able to 
mediate issues around embodied experience. The main emphasis of this thesis is to 
demonstrate how nervous conditions, informing embodied phenomenological experience 
and existentialist insights, can be politically subversive in their un-learning of interpellated 
knowledge. In its opening section, this work studies a novel published in 1899 that depicts 
contemporary fears about nervous degeneration and offers an interrogation of the ideology 
of masculinity corresponding to the expansionist era of European imperialism. The trauma 
of First World War shell-shock and the nervous anxiety of colonial ‘white’ masculinist 
performance feature in the second and third sections respectively. These study literary texts 
that juxtapose masculinity crisis with the politics of identity and the articulation of the 
related problematic of agency. The final section studies a novel that depicts neo-Darwinism 
and genetic determinism in an age of political terrorism and counter-terrorism post-9/11 and 
before the 2003 Iraq War. It investigates the novel’s suggestion that bio-political reifications 
may be resisted by the exercise of emotional empathy and existentialist ambivalence. The 
thesis as a whole explores how masculinity and existentialist crisis can produce emotional 
and epistemic interruptions in ideologies that inform normative bodily and social behaviour. 
In order to offer deeper analyses of nervous conditions and cultural cognition, this work 
attempts to incorporate various tenets and experimental findings of modern neuroscience 
with ideas and theories from philosophy of mind. Through a study of selected literary texts, 
the thesis is offered as a small contribution to the understanding of the nature of human 
agency, empathy and identity in the changing political world of the last and the current 
century.      
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Introduction  
 
 
 
1.1 Connecting the 1900-s to Now: Kipling’s “If” 
 
If you can fill the unforgiving minute 
With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run 
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it 
And – which is more – you’ll be a Man, my son! 
 
Rudyard Kipling’s “If”1 from where the above lines are taken, was used in a 
promotional video before the men’s singles final at Wimbledon in 2007. The video 
featured the tennis superstars Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal reciting the poem 
together.
2
 Appearing also at the players’ entrance to the Centre Court in Wimbledon, 
“If” has consistently been classified as a British favourite by major public polls.3  
Kipling’s 1910 poem – a poetic tribute to the British imperialist politician Leander 
Starr Jameson
4
 and a piece of personal advice to the poet’s son John Kipling who 
was subsequently killed in the Battle of Loos during the First World War
5
 – ends on 
an absolute enunciation of ideal manliness. This appears after the poem has extolled 
the virtues of undeterred decisive action, unemotional stoicism, strong nerves and 
indefatigable energy, in ceaseless service to the nation and its imperial ‘missions.’ 
                                                          
1
 Rudyard Kipling, The Works of Rudyard Kipling (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 
1994) 605. 
 
2
 The video may be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEeLh5ItQcY. Web. 15 Feb. 2013.   
 
3
 “If” was popularly voted as Britain’s favourite poem in a 1995 BBC poll. See Griff Rhys Jones, The 
Nation’s Favourite Poems (London: BBC Worldwide Limited, 1996).  
 
4
 Kipling’s poem was historically motivated by the failed British raid in 1896 against the Boers at 
Transvaal and the subsequent betrayal suffered by its leader Leander Jameson in the hands of the 
Salisbury-led British government who had supported the raid formerly. See Peter Havholm, Politics 
and Awe in Rudyard Kipling’s Fiction (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008) 140-42.   
 
5
 The medical and historical analysis of the masculinity crisis during the First World War will feature 
in the second chapter of this thesis. His son’s death in the war had prompted Kipling to write the 
poem “My Boy Jack”.  
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Variously interpreted as inspirational as well as jingoistic,
6
 Kipling’s “If” – with its 
imperious advocacy of being emotionally indifferent to triumph and disaster alike – 
delineates manly attributes which historically may be seen to have corresponded to 
an ideal of plucky imperialist masculinity. As the video featuring Federer and Nadal 
demonstrates, such an ideal continues to connect to the concept of today’s masculine 
sporting character.  
A dramatic monologue with carefully constructed attributes of manly courage 
and productively channelized feelings, Kipling’s poem has attained the status of a 
classic in spite of its critics and detractors.
7
 Its political legacy as an imperialist 
poem and its continuing popularity as a piece of profound advice concerning the 
normative manly character in the Western world serves as the starting point of this 
enquiry, which is to examine the normative construction of heroic or idealised 
masculinity, from late nineteenth-century imperialism to twenty-first century liberal 
democracy. The Kiplingesque construct of masculinity – historically tied to the 
tenets of the contemporaneous Boy Scout Movements
8
 – emerges as an 
unequivocally well-knit body of zeal and nerves. Edward Said affirms how Baden 
Powell, the founder of the Boy Scouts in Britain, was personally influenced in his 
ideas about ‘boyology’ by the Kiplingesque character of imperial authority and 
resourcefulness. As Said puts it, Kipling and Powell appeared to have concurred on 
two major points: boys in service to the empire ought to conceive life as governed by 
unbreakable laws and secondly, service to the empire was more functional when 
thought of less as a story and more like a game.
9 It connects late nineteenth-century 
imperialist heroes to the sporting superstars of the present day by making a virtue out 
of ‘manly’ toughness, indomitable spirit, and self-effacing honour. As a literary text 
                                                          
6
 George Orwell had described Kipling as “a jingo imperialist” who is “morally insensitive and 
aesthetically disgusting” while also acknowledging Kipling’s lasting legacy as a writer. Orwell, 
“Rudyard Kipling”, Collected Essays, ed. Allan Hill (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961) 179.  
 
7
 In his review of Renuka Narayanan’s edited book A Prayer for Everyone, the Indian writer 
Khushwant Singh describes Kipling’s “If” as containing “the essence of the message of the Gita in 
English.” Singh, “A Prayer for Everyone.” Rev. of The Book of Prayers by Renuka Naraynan (New 
Delhi: Viking India, 2012).  http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?211656. .n.pag.  Web. 15 Feb. 
2013.  
 
8
 The enterprising and sporting aspects of masculinity that Kipling promoted in his poetry and fiction 
make his lines relevant to modern sports heroes. See also J.A.Mangan, The Games Ethic and 
Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986).   
 
9
 Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993) 166. 
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born out of the same political and cultural context that promoted the white man’s 
burden in the colonies for the edification of the “sullen peoples”, “Half-devil and 
half-child”10, Kipling’s “If” enacts an indoctrination of ‘manly values’ that continue 
to be circulated and consumed in the liberal Western world today. 
A study of the cultural construction of masculinity, however, must begin with 
an attempt to grasp the interiorised and affective world that inevitably runs beneath 
the masculine subject’s break from official or interpellated identities that are 
eulogised in Kipling’s “If”. The poem is a good example of an empire-text that 
articulates its political priorities as universal humanitarian concerns. “If” exemplifies 
Edward Said’s analysis of language, history and the production of knowledge11 in a 
literary text that occupies a specific historical moment of political invasion while 
appearing to articulate timeless wisdom. It addresses a subject always-already 
interpellated into the discourse network that informed imperialism and its necessary 
machinery of masculinity. The deconstruction of interpellated identities entails 
interruptions in such seamless narratives of knowledge where such cultural 
presumptions inform privilege. As this thesis will endeavour to show, the study of 
such disruptions must also comprise a study of the subjective and collective 
experience of existentialist panic that may include trauma, ambivalence and personal 
conflicts. This thesis is an attempt to understand such panic, through the study of the 
nervous masculine subject in political and emotional crisis, as it is articulated in key 
literary texts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden”, The Works of Rudyard Kipling, 334.  
11
 Edward Said, Power, Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage, 2002) 262-79.  
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1.2 Key Concerns and the Thesis of this Research  
 
This research investigates the interfaces between masculinity crises, ambivalence 
and subjective agency, with a study of selected literary texts about the male body in 
nervous conditions. The chosen texts are situated across chronological political 
contexts: late nineteenth-century European imperialism, the First World War, mid-
twentieth century British colonialism and post-9/11 Western neo-liberalism. The 
research explores selected literary narratives to reveal how subjective ambivalence
12
 
can potentially inform existentialist enquiry. Crucially, in the context of this thesis, 
ambivalence is defined by Zygmunt Bauman as a deconstruction of the dominant 
discourses that inhabit the private as well as the social realm of the modern citizen. 
In such deconstruction, informative relevance is relegated in favour of 
epistemological enquiry. Ambivalence thus emerges in Bauman’s analysis as a 
scandal in the gaze of modernity and is manifested in the political realm at an 
immediate level in the deporting of non-citizens and de-legalizing unsanctioned law 
while in the intellectual realm ambivalence is purged by de-legitimizing 
philosophically uncontrolled knowledge. The literary texts chosen for study in this 
research are interpreted in relation to their specific contemporary medico-political 
and cultural epistemes. In particular, this thesis examines the discourses of late-
nineteenth and early twentieth-century criminology, nervous degeneration, 
masculine hysteria, shell-shock, colonial mimicry and twenty-first century 
neuroscientific knowledge. The selected literary texts are studied as textual 
meditations of and epistemological enquiries into the nature of subjective human 
agency, enacted and focalized specifically through their nervous male protagonists. 
In addition, this research investigates how a self-reflective awareness of agency can 
potentially problematize apparent certitudes in medical and social science. 
 By looking at literary narratives that foreground imperialist horror, war 
trauma, colonial confusion, genetic determinism and political terrorism, the research 
                                                          
12
 Zygmunt Bauman studies ambivalence as linguistic as well as political phenomenon.  Bauman, 
Modernity and Ambivalence (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991).  
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examines the way in which nervous conditions inform phenomenological moments 
that may potentially extend into existentialist awareness. The term existential is used 
here as a nineteenth-century European category of knowledge that incorporated the 
epistemological nihilism of Nietzsche as well as the ‘presuppositionlessness’ of 
Husserl: modes of thought that saw the rational realm as essentially and discursively 
insufficient and also dangerously dogmatic in its own ontological exclusivity. One 
can trace the legacy of nineteenth-century philosophers not only on the ideological 
and political existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre, but also on the phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose inheritance of the Husserlian concept of 
presuppositionless being is immediately obvious in his affirmation of “the 
impossibility of a complete reduction.”13 The existential knowledge for Merleau-
Ponty is thus ‘already always there’ and is accessible only through the intentionality 
of the subjective frame. In his final (and incomplete) work The Visible and the 
Invisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty investigated the ‘field of the flesh’ that connects the 
subject and the object, the seer and the seen in deconstructing the ontological schema 
of vision. In locating the transcendental insight within the phenomenological frame, 
Merleau-Ponty dissolves the dualism of the Cartesian cogito and proclaims that 
consciousness is not a hermetically sealed event but an active process of 
actualization and embodied cognition whereby the phenomenon becomes the Being. 
In asserting that the phenomena through which the subjectivity of the subject is 
activated grounds all certainties, Merleau-Ponty brings together the transcendental 
and the existential realms in a dialogic exchange.
14 Such awareness, if it arises – as 
the literary texts studied in this research show – can painfully awaken the human 
subject to the knowledge of its own unique subjectivity. More significantly, 
existentialist knowledge is read in this research not only as an abstract philosophical 
category but also as a materially informed insight that constitutes the feeling body in 
dialogue with the ideological apparatus of the medical, political and social sciences. 
In such a reading, the subjectively feeling male body emerges as the political and 
phenomenological site that constitutes a liminal space between the medical gaze and 
its constituting ‘objective’ or public knowledge, and a subjectively experienced 
                                                          
13
 The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) 
xiii. 
14
 See The Phenomenology of Perception, 60-76. For Merleau-Ponty’s influence on existentialist 
thought, see The Existentialist Reader: An Anthology of Key Texts, ed. Paul S. MacDonald 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 184-90.       
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private ambivalence. Through examining selected literary texts, this thesis presents 
the textually mediated existentialist male subject as it is brought under the bio-
political gaze. The central argument of this thesis is that it is during moments of 
existentially experienced panic – ultimately constituting a heightened and nervous 
recognition of the mutability of the feeling body – that the rationale of learnt or 
official bio-political knowledge is exposed as most adequately interrogated, through 
an understanding of the specificities of subjective ambivalence.  
 
 
 
1.3 Established Research Informing this Thesis and its Original Contribution 
 
There have been several significant works on imperial masculinity and masculine 
hysteria born out of war trauma and guilt. I draw on the works on colonial and 
imperial masculinities by Joseph Bristow, J.A.Mangan, Mrinalini Sinha, Revathi 
Krishnaswamy, Michael Rosenthal, Helen Kanitkar and Nalin Jayasena, among 
others. What connects the various discourses studied by these researchers is the way 
the body of the imperial male figure was ideologically manufactured through 
character-building factories such as schools and scouts. More significantly – and this 
is especially evident in the works of Mrinalini Sinha and Revathi Krishnaswamy – 
the manliness of the imperial white male in the colonies was strategically 
perpetuated and protected by contrasting it with the projected and perceived 
unmanliness and effeminacy of the colonized man. I also draw heavily on studies in 
masculine hysteria by Janet Oppenheim and Elaine Showalter and from related 
studies in the cultural history of late nineteenth to early twentieth-century 
degeneration by Daniel Pick and William Greenslade. These works have looked at 
the male body as the ideologically manufactured site where discourses on difference, 
power and privilege are most explicitly internalized, in social, political and racial 
realms. The male body so constructed exhibits the enmeshed narratives of medical, 
political and social sciences that seek to efface epistemological ambivalences, in 
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order, in the last instance, to promote irrefutable and expansive regimes of power 
and privilege. Such research also reveals how the male body often historically 
emerged as the agonistic site where ambivalence about such discourses was most 
problematically situated, and the attempted liquidation of subjective agency 
articulated most politically. Masculinity-studies in twentieth and twenty-first century 
sociological research thus historicize the apparatus – ideological as well as 
repressive – that went into the making and unmaking of the model man in times of 
imperialist expansion, World Wars and colonial control. Such research studies the 
feeling mind and the various emotions – guilt, sorrow and shame – through which 
the desired performance of the masculine subject is disrupted under the totalizing 
medical and political gaze to which it is intended to conform. Masculinity crises 
emerge in such research as various manifestations of behavioural deviance through 
which the rationale of bio-political hegemony is interrupted and ironized. Regarded 
as a renegade who requires corrective measures, the melancholic masculine self 
embodies a nervous condition and perhaps best corroborates Marx’s theory of shame 
as a revolutionary sentiment, as a kind of anger turned inward that transforms the 
feeling subject.
15
 There is thus an ironically literal self-reflective quality in the 
disruption of imperial and colonial masculinity as the male subject – previously a 
producer and perpetuator of the desired discourse – steps out of line due to an inward 
turn enacted by the feeling mind in the politically predicated space.  
There has been an increasing interest in recent years in cognitive and critical 
neuroscience in the significance of understanding the role of affects in the 
functioning of the human mind. This is immediately evident in the works on human 
consciousness and the unmappable agency by neuroscientists such as Antonio 
Damasio and V.S.Ramachandran, whose works feature frequently in this research. 
Likewise, there have been attempts on the part of cognitive narratologists such as 
Andy Clark and literary theorists such as David Lodge and Patricia Waugh to look at 
the literary narrative as the site where human feelings and cognitions are most 
ambivalently articulated in all their epistemological complexities. This research will 
also refer to the works of Catherine Malabou and Susan Sontag about the human 
body in pain and the ontology of crisis. In particular, this research is interested in the 
                                                          
15
 Karl Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher”, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_03.htm. Web. 4 Oct. 2012.  I also draw 
on Martha Nussbaum’s work on shame and legality in the politics of the body.   
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growing bridge between the medical science of the brain and a philosophical and 
sociological understanding of the mind. This has evolved into a new genre of 
research classified as critical neuroscience that seeks to study the anthropological, 
social and political underpinnings of the workings of the human mind. Critical 
neuroscience is thus essentially a dialogic discourse and argues how studies in affect 
and emotion may offer greater depths in scientific inferences on neural behaviour 
Such studies of the mind are increasingly interested in the role of emotions in 
consciousness – as unmappable categories of knowledge – in their analyses of 
human cognition. In their attempts to weld the discourses of cognitive neuroscience 
to the politics of social behaviour, psychologists and philosophers such as Shaun 
Gallagher believe that “the relationship between critical theory and cognitive 
neuroscience is a two way street” and that “cognitive neuroscience and cognitive 
science more generally may be able to tell us things about human behaviour that 
need to be accommodated by critical theory, or that can even support the aims of 
critical theory.”16 There is thus an increased interest among researchers of the mind 
to combine the greater potential for epistemological ambivalence and philosophy of 
mind with the informative certitudes of medical science. One might argue that this 
entanglement has contributed to the demise of a strict biological determinism – most 
immediately and unequivocally voiced in the DNA-centric model of the human 
system and the theory of the hard-wired brain – that has now given way to a more 
complex and less deterministic understanding of the biologically grounded human 
self. Such shifts have helped to expose the ideological biases that have historically 
informed scientific claims for objectivity. The human being and the human mind 
emerge in such studies – that combine medical science with phenomenology and 
philosophy – as not genetically pre-determined or neurally pre-wired but as meaning 
and goal-driven as well as epistemologically oriented processes capable of subjective 
altruism, ambivalence and intentionality.  
This thesis combines a sociological study of masculinity in various medical 
and political contexts with a study of the changing representation of the mind in 
literary texts in order to investigate the experiential moments that challenge 
assumptions about power, privilege and knowledge. It features a focus on the 
                                                          
16
 Shaun Gallagher, “Scanning the Lifeworld: Toward a Critical Neuroscience”, Critical 
Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience, ed. Suparna 
Choudhury and Jan Slaby (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2012) 86. 
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analysis of representations of the male body and masculinity from the late nineteenth 
century to the twenty first. The male body emerges in my study as the site where 
political prerogatives and medical tenets are perpetuated as well as problematized. 
Nervousness is seen to constitute unlearning and an inward turn that enacts the 
movement from objective certainty to subjective ambivalence. The nervous 
conditions that inform existentialist enquiry in the selected literary texts demonstrate 
the historical dialogues between medical science, political knowledge and the feeling 
mind across the last hundred years. This research is a study of such dialogues and 
explores – through a selection of self-reflective male protagonists in literary texts – 
how it feels to be unsure, uncertain and ambivalent about one’s location in historical 
time.           
 
1.4 Literary Texts Chosen for this Research 
 
I begin by looking at the last years of the nineteenth century – the high point of 
European imperialism – and end at three years into the twenty-first century, at the 
political moment before the beginning of the 2003 Iraq War, albeit in a text 
published in 2005. The primary literary texts selected for my study are Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1922), George 
Orwell’s essays on colonial Burma and the novel Burmese Days (1934) and Ian 
McEwan’s Saturday (2005). These works offer rich analyses of late nineteenth-
century imperialist misadventures and private melancholia, the shock principles in 
the post-First World War modern metropolis, the claustrophobia of the colonial 
contact-zone and postmodern postcolonial notions of terrorism, dissidence and 
discontent. However, what has also factored into my selection of these particular 
texts is the manner in which these themes cut across and connect all these narratives, 
despite their different locations in historical time. Thus Conrad’s novella appears 
curiously pre-Modernist as well as postcolonial in its ambivalence about the notions 
of race, masculinity, language and empire, issues that connect Conrad to the later 
works of Orwell on colonial Burma.  
10 
 
Likewise, McEwan’s Saturday deliberately revisits Modernist modes of 
writing in its depiction of phenomenological experientiality under totalitarian 
medical and political surveillance. Saturday’s similarities with Mrs Dalloway are not 
limited to the medico-political settings foregrounding the male body in crisis but are 
also evident in McEwan’s stylistic appropriations of the Modernist epiphany and the 
feeling frame. There are thus discursive dialogues across the literary texts that 
historicize the politics of masculinity by opening up questions on intentionality, 
affect and information.
17
 The thesis that emerges at the end exhibits how literature 
and the fictional world of literary narratives can enact the blend of the objective and 
the subjective, the physical and the phenomenological realms of understanding 
experienced by the human subject at times of and in political and cognitive crisis.  
The texts chosen all depict the male body in nervous negotiations with 
contemporary masculinist codes and bio-political discourses.  More significantly, the 
texts articulate the ambivalence that ensues after the human subject realizes the 
constructed quality of hegemonic political and medical knowledge. In each of the 
texts chosen, the emphasis of the narrative is on the ambivalence experienced by the 
feeling masculine subject who strives to enact his intentionality through an 
affirmation of agency. The novels selected are thus about efforts to recover agency in 
cultures of coercion and control where information is ideologically filtered and 
formalized. What connects the works of the primary authors chosen – Joseph 
Conrad, Virginia Woolf, George Orwell and Ian McEwan – is their effort to illustrate 
what it takes to be painfully human in times of political crisis and medico-scientific 
materialism. The texts selected are appropriately set in political situations that seek 
to efface subjectivity as well as bodily mutability, where sovereign violence often 
operates at the threshold between law and nature, inside and outside.
18
 The chosen 
literary narratives also demonstrate the dangers and difficulties of reaffirming 
subjective agency and the chastisements – emotional, political and corporeal – that 
often follow such process.  
                                                          
17
 The thesis of affect as information is also gaining grounds in the emerging discourses in psychology 
and brain science as scientists claim that “affective feelings” convey information on value through 
“bodily experiences”. Carol L. Gohm and Gerald L. Clore, “Affect as Information: An Individual-
Differences Approach”, The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence, 
ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett and   Peter Salovey (New York: The Guilford Press, 2002) 90.  
 
18
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998) 64.  
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The male body in its break from the apodictic
19
 medical and political norms 
of its day is revealed as essentially dislocated and disrupted in relation to the 
discourses of normalcy and respectability. This thesis theorizes such disruption as 
giving onto a liminal condition that comes to embody new forms of cognition and a 
new order of agency, bodily felt as well as politically articulated. This supports my 
primary contention that the disrupted male body is a politically problematic space 
where subversion is instantiated interstitially, through gaps in learnt ideologies that 
interpellate the individual. My study heightens awareness of such interstitiality by 
choosing to focus on male figures in fictional genres that more easily embody 
dominant forms of masculinity: as imperial agents, war soldiers, colonial officers 
and medical scientists.  The arguments are expounded by tracing how these figures 
move from their comfortable locations in situations of social and political 
respectability, to the melancholic discomfiture that emerges after existentialist 
awakening. The discomfort of the male protagonists in the fictional narratives about 
real historical events is characterised by various combinations of guilt, trauma, 
apathy and ambivalence that ironically inform true agency. The fictional frames 
through which the historical settings are focalized underline both the 
phenomenological quality of existential awareness and the meta-reflective quality of 
human subjectivity as it strives to transcend interpellated identities in politics and 
medical science. In essence my research is a study of how the masculine subject – 
formerly an insider to the normative narratives – becomes the outsider through the 
epistemology of the inward turn. I investigate the nature of this inward turn and try 
to demonstrate how the literary narrative can locate as well as dislocate masculine 
identities, bio-political entities and the feeling self, in complex stories about the self-
reflective human mind and its re-cognitions in time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 I use this term to convey the unquestionable quality that often informs the arrogance of biopolitical 
epistemes sanctioned by a massive investment of industry and capital.   
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1.5 The Bio-political Background to this Research 
 
 
 
The social situatedness of scientific and political systems of knowledge is of special 
significance in my study of masculinity crisis and bio-political panic. Bio-politics as 
analysed in this research derives principally from the Foucauldian notion of 
biopower as “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of 
the human species became the object of a political strategy”.20 Foucault’s study of 
late nineteenth-century “State racism”21 as a vital instrument of bio-political 
optimization whereby racial purity replaces racial struggle is directly germane to my 
study of imperial masculinity and its discontents. In addition, Foucault’s analysis of 
the birth of bio-politics as contemporaneous with the emergence of political 
liberalisation
22
 relates directly to the conclusion of this thesis which connects the 
bio-political gaze in the twenty-first century Western world of liberal democracy to 
neo-imperialist politics and its control of terrorism. The hyphenated bio-politics in 
this study of masculinity crises in literary texts thus suggests the merging of medical 
and political narratives that historically have informed notional constructions of 
body, race, imperialism and culture. As Edward Said affirms in his analysis of 
culture and imperialism, “although there is an irreducible core to human experience, 
this experience is also historical and secular, it is accessible to analysis and 
interpretation, and – centrally important – it is not exhausted by totalizing theories, 
not marked and limited by doctrinal or national lines, not confined once and for all to 
analytical constructs.”23 Said’s analysis of the human subject and its contemporary 
cultural narratives supports the central argument in this thesis: that the feeling mind 
is informed by the material conditions of its existence while also endowed with an 
agency essentially unmappable by the material gaze. Such a study exposes the 
                                                          
20
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78, ed. Michael 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 1.  
  
21
 Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, trans. David 
Macey (New York: Picador, 2003) 261.  
 
22
 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, ed. Michael 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 319.   
 
23
 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 35.  
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constructed quality of the boundary between the natural and the political realms 
which itself emerges as “an effect of political action.”24  
 
Along with Foucault – whose work on biocratic control and interpellated 
identities under the medical gaze will feature throughout my work – the major 
sociologists, philosophers and literary theorists who study the ethical ambivalences 
and manipulations of bio-political modernity include Giorgio Agamben, Hannah 
Arendt, Zygmunt Bauman, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. Like Foucault, 
Agamben, Arendt and Bauman see the bio-political system as essentially marked by 
an anxiety to produce, protect and purify its controlled subjects as citizens. For 
Agamben, twentieth century bio-political panic historically manifested itself most 
immediately in eugenics and its project of selective reproduction. Such a project 
desired a seamless contiguity between the subject and the citizen, nativity and 
nationality. Such cultural narratives of contiguity – in Agamben’s view – were 
permanently broken by the First World War that heralded an unprecedented 
masculinity crisis
25
 that is taken up in the second section of this thesis.  Likewise, 
Bauman studies the discourse of artificial genetic selection at the end of the 
nineteenth century – practised by Ernst Hackel and the Monist Society – as a direct 
demonstration of the bio-political strategy of racial purification.
26
 The world in 
Bauman’s analysis emerges as one of production and biological waste characterised 
by compulsive and addictive designing.
27
 In her work, Hannah Arendt studies the 
macro-narratives of biocratic control that are formalized by the sovereign state in its 
surveillance of its collective subjects and interpellated identities. Arendt’s work 
reveals how the birth of every new subject contains the possibility of the unique body 
through subjective intentionality of agency.
28
 As Arendt affirms, the most dangerous 
form of totalitarian control proceeds through a culture of ultra-information that 
ultimately legitimizes and naturalizes authority by appearing to efface unilateral 
control in favour of collective accessibility and collateral responsibility.
29
 Inherent in 
these analyses are the medical as well as cultural forms of control that the bio-
                                                          
24
 Thomas Lemke, Bio-Politics: An Advanced Introduction, trans. Eric Frederick Trump (New York 
& London: New York University Press, 2011) 31-32.  
25
 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 131-32. 
26
 Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, 31.   
27
 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 10.  
28
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998) 178.  
29
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 1968) 461-62.  
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political realm assumed, informing the increasing schism between the human 
condition and human nature.
30
 Such a schism emerges as structurally similar to that 
between masculinity and the male self as analysed in my study.   
 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt’s work on late twentieth-century bio-
politics breaks from the realms of research above inasmuch as they do not read 
modern bio-political coercion merely as forms of corporeal control and military 
genocides but as a more insidious and sophisticated structure of alliances between 
capitalism, economics and borderless production. This corresponds to a condition in 
bio-politics where the human genetic code is perceived as the computer chip 
containing inscribed information that cannot be re-written
31
 and where “the body is 
conceived of as an informational network rather than a physical substrate or an 
anatomical machine.”32 In their co-written work entitled Empire (2000), Negri and 
Hardt delineate the forms of immaterial labour that replace industrial labour in the 
last decades of the twentieth century, characterizing global capitalism with its bio-
political mode of centreless control. Immaterial labour, as opposed to industrial 
labour, is geared towards manufacturing immaterial products such as knowledge, 
information, emotion and affect.
33
  In a structure of consumerism with “no external 
standpoint” and where “nothing escapes money”34, bio-political cognitive capitalism 
as studied by Hardt and Negri creates an empire of limitless mobility, compulsory 
cooperative ability and affect-absorption. In a later work following on from Empire, 
Negri studies the “narration of global fantasies” in a culture where the “documenting 
of war becomes a video game.”35 Crucially, in the very same work, Negri reads the 
Vietnam War as the first phenomenon of political violence that triggered the 
demystification and dissimulation of political reality. The Vietnam War is significant 
in this research as the political event of violence that first classified war neurosis as a 
real medical condition. It was only after the Vietnam War that masculine war trauma 
was medically classified as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Vietnam War may 
also be studied – as Jon Turney does – as the event that bolstered the DNA-debate in 
the USA with the “much-heralded advent of human genetic engineering and its 
                                                          
30
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 10. 
31
 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London: Penguin, 2000) 117. 
32
 Lemke, Bio-Politics, 118.    
33
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) 293.  
34
 Empire, 32.  
35
 Antonio Negri, Empire and Beyond, trans Ed Emery (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) 64.  
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relation with eugenics, about the possible impact of a wider biological revolution on 
economy and society, and about the growing commercialization of science.”36 Such 
demystification is classified as the real viruses that paradoxically contain the anti-
dote to the epidemic of neutralization. In my study, I will try to illustrate how such 
political demystifications and epistemological disruptions in literary texts are 
enacted by representations of experiences in feeling that break bio-political control 
and desired masculinist performances.  
 
 
 
1.6 An Overview of how the Chosen Literary Texts are Read in this Research 
 
This research on the literature of panic derives from the varying notions of bio-
political control as elucidated above. The first chapter – on Joseph Conrad, 
masculinity crisis and late nineteenth-century tenets of degeneration – corresponds to 
the Foucauldian notion of biostatistical control inflected through anthropology, 
criminology, race and empire. The section on Heart of Darkness studies how 
masculinity was historically manufactured in late nineteenth-century European 
imperialism and how the manufactured masculinity cracked up in the imperial space. 
Especial emphasis is placed on Conrad’s use of language and narrative strategy as a 
means to articulate the epistemology of ambivalence that blurs the borderlines 
between inside and outside, subjective and objective realms of understanding. This 
relates to Jonathan Culler’s analysis of the phenomenal field as postulated by 
Merleau-Ponty, where the feeling self is both an object which is a part of the 
surrounding world and a subject who articulates the same. Culler’s analysis on the 
location of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in relation to structuralism offers 
interesting readings of literary and cognitive competence. 
37
 I analyse ambivalence in 
language and the defamiliarization enacted by the narrative method as vehicles for 
the articulation of a nervous cognitive condition, by historicizing Conrad’s work in 
                                                          
36
 Jon Turney, Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1998) 189.    
37
 Jonathan Culler, “Phenomenology and Structuralism,” The Human Context 5.1 (Spring 1973): 35-
42.  
16 
 
relation to the discoveries of the neurology of his day. Conrad’s narrative in Heart of 
Darkness is studied as a classic example of the cognitive and the linguistic collapse 
that enacts a break between the borderlines between subject and object, 
phenomenological and ontic realities.  
 The second chapter, on First World War masculinity and shell-shock, 
directly relates to the bio-political control of the male body in crisis. The analysis of 
Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway corresponds to Agamben’s and Arendt’s notions of 
totalitarian tyranny and informative control that constituted twentieth-century 
eugenics and bio-political hegemony. I read Woolf’s novel as a literary text that 
illustrates – again through the use of the nervous language of the unmappable human 
agency – how the ambivalence experienced by the melancholic masculine subject 
combines guilt, trauma and existentialist awakening. The shell-shocked First World 
War soldier in Mrs Dalloway – as analysed in this section – embodies the blend of 
political violence, medical hegemony and phenomenological knowledge that 
characterised the traumatic masculine subject of post-war modernity.   
This condition is extended in the colonial scene where masculinity as 
imperial performance emerges enmeshed in a discourse network of deception that 
consumes the human subject by invading its free human agency. The selected essays 
of Orwell and the novel Burmese Days exhibit how the agony of agency in the 
colonial contact-zone is materially informed by bio-political narratives of racial 
privilege and difference. I look at how imperial masculinity was historically 
manufactured and discursively disseminated in Orwell’s England through public 
schools, boys’ weeklies and scout movements. The study reveals how the human 
agency of the masculine colonial controller was eventually overdetermined by 
imperialism’s ideological apparatus that promoted plucky masculinity and chastised 
the feeling man. Through a study of literary texts about masculinity crises in the 
colonial contact-zone, this section illustrates how the attempt to articulate agency 
that is phenomenologically perceived is a painfully subversive act that constitutes 
existentialist ambivalence, guilt and shame. Shame emerges in my analysis as an 
embodied awareness that disrupts the seamless structure of expectations in the 
colonial space bio-politically produced and perpetuated.  
17 
 
My final section draws on Negri’s notion of the global biopolitical empire 
that appears to allow limitless movement and complete cognitive control to its 
informatively interpellated subject in the twenty-first century Western metropolis. In 
its analysis of Ian McEwan’s Saturday, the final section investigates how the 
medical certainties of neuroscience and the political certainties of Western liberal 
democracy are both problematized by phenomenological subjectivity that extends 
into an existentialist awareness of ambivalence. Such ambivalence also contains the 
knowledge of finitude amidst the seemingly infinite possibilities of medical science 
and liberal democracy. The analysis theoretically situates itself against the arguments 
that affirm that biological and biosocial agency in the twenty-first century can be 
controlled by the individual who changes from being a patient to a consumer in the 
wealthy Western world of liberal democracy.
38
 Classifying what it sees as the post-
Foucauldian biopolitics of the twenty-first century, such theories about the capitalist 
consumption of biology in the wealthy West appear to augment human agency and 
choice in the process of the self’s own biological decisions. My research reveals that 
just as the political agency that liberalism promises to its subjects is ultimately 
contained within invisible narratives of surveillance and control, so too, the 
biological agency that postmodern bioscience promises to its subject emerges 
problematically interpellated by broader structures of control that govern 
masculinist, political and medical behaviour.  
My study eventually illustrates how the fictional frame of the literary 
narrative that contains historical events, is especially suited to articulate the 
ambivalence that underpins the existentialist understanding of the human self.  The 
final section looks back at the opening of the thesis by investigating how issues on 
masculinity, degeneration and political ambivalence are situated over a hundred 
years after late nineteenth-century imperialism and Social Darwinism. By looking at 
the pre-modern fault-lines of Conrad and the post-modern pluralities of McEwan, I 
aim to bring together Darwinist and neo-Darwinist, imperial and neo-imperial 
discourses in politics and medicine in an ironic juxtaposition that reveals disturbing 
similarities despite differences in historical time. The thesis that emerges out of my 
study of bio-political panic shows how what constitutes the human self contains an 
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 See Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Subjectivity and Power in the Twenty-
First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 9-41.  
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epistemological complexity that may never be mapped, despite the certainties of 
discourses of political and medical science. McEwan’s Saturday – with which this 
research ends – articulates this ambivalence, which also loops back to the first novel 
selected for this study – Conrad’s Heart of Darkness – where the narrator affirmed 
that “The inner truth is hidden—luckily, luckily.”39  
 
                                                          
39
 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (New York & London: W.W.Norton & Company, 1963) 36. 
Further references to this text will be made parenthetically as HD.   
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    CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
Degeneration, Masculinity, and Cognitive Crisis in Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness 
 
 
 
2.1 The Bio-political Background to late Nineteenth-Century England 
 
Genius is a disease of the nerves. 
Max Nordau
1
 
 
 
Degeneration panic emerged in the late nineteenth century as a cultural phenomenon 
that was informed by anthropological and bio-political constructions of class, body 
and race. The fear of degeneration has variously been studied as a 
psychopathological drama unfolding at a time that also witnessed Britain’s economic 
and imperialist expansion. The panic of the possibility over de-evolution – informing 
the intellectual, medical and literary imagination in the late nineteenth-century 
Britain – might be read as evidence of what Freud described as the biological blow 
to the universal narcissism of man (the other two being the cosmological one of 
Copernican theory and the psychological one rendered by psychoanalysis itself).
2
 
The Englishman in the post-Darwinian cultural climate was forced to confront the 
scientific fact that “Man is not a being different from animals or superior to them, he 
himself is of animal descent, being more closely related to some species and more 
                                                          
1
Quoted in Max Nordau, Degeneration, trans. George L. Mosse (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1968) 23. Henceforth cited parenthetically.  
2
 Freud, “A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis”, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works, ed. James Strachey, Vol. 17 (London: Hogarth Press, 1956) 140-41. 
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distantly to others.”3 It is obvious that the problematic proximity to the animal 
kingdom disturbed the anthropocentric ideology of the European Enlightenment, 
intellectually underpinned by the legacy of Cartesian dualism.
4
 The knowledge of the 
fundamental biological entanglement with the higher mammals fertilized 
devolutionary fantasies of the civilized Englishman’s retrogression to an inferior 
phase of civilization. This fear was voiced in the works of leading late nineteenth-
century English zoologists such as Edwin Ray Lankester who suggested the perilous 
possibility of human beings drifting back “to the condition of intellectual Barnacles 
or Ascidians” whereby “it is possible for us—just as the Accidian throws away its 
tail and eye and sinks into a quiescent state of inferiority—to reject the good gift of 
reason”.5 The loss of reason threatened to return to an atavistic anarchy, and such 
fears of retrogression were presented also in late nineteenth-century popular English 
novels such as Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde (1885), H.G.Wells’ The Time Machine (1895), and Bram Stoker’s Dracula 
(1897).   
 
Unsurprisingly, the late nineteenth century in Britain also witnessed an epoch 
when medicine and medical knowledge began to be inflected with racialized 
assumptions and the new anthropological studies started to systematize difference by 
correlating physiognomic attributes and civilizational values. For this was a bio-
political culture, as Foucault affirms, marked by a class struggle as well as a “race 
                                                          
3
 Freud, “A Difficulty”, 141.  
 
4
 Gillian Beer points out how Darwinian theory “renounces a Descartian clarity, or univocality” and 
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(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 6-7.  
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 Edwin Lankester, Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (London: Macmillan, 1880) 60. Cited in 
William Greenslade, Degeneration Culture and the Novel 1880-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) 33. Lankester’s book was translated into Russian and received profound 
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optimism.” Lewis S. Feuer, “The Friendship of Edwin Ray Lankester and Karl Marx: The Last 
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war” that received “biological transcription.”6 This included the institutionalization 
of psychiatry as well as a “dynamic racism”7 which weaved those bio-social 
discourses through which the human subject would be politically interpellated.  The 
1890s was the decade when cultural anthropology in Britain – in the works of figures 
such as Edward Tylor, Louis Henry Morgan and James Frazer – emerged powerfully 
as a discipline following on from the Darwinian and Spencerian maxims of 
nineteenth-century evolutionism.
8
 Cultural anthropology, as it emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, was a systematic study of difference among human races and 
was quick to assume political significance.
9
 Indeed, the evolutionary theory based on 
the dichotomy of the civilized and the non-civilized, the developed and the 
degenerative species, seemed, in particular, to be discursively suited to underpin the 
legitimization of ideologies of imperialism and territorial control over other races.  
 
The different social and civilizational stages delineated by such ‘scientific’ 
study “led to a self-congratulatory anthropology that actively promoted belief in the 
inferiority – indeed, the bestiality – of the African.”10 Writing in 1890, the American 
anthropologist D.G.Brinton argued: 
  
The adult who retains the more numerous fetal, infantile or simian traits is 
unquestionably inferior to him whose development has progressed beyond 
them [. . .] Measured by these criteria, the European or white race stands at 
the head of the list, the African or the Negro at its foot [. . .] All parts of the 
                                                          
6
 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 60-61.  
 
7
 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1990) 125. As Thomas 
Lemke asserts, it is only since late nineteenth century that the term racism acquires its current 
meaning. See Lemke, Bio-Politics, 40-41.  
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body have been minutely scanned, measured and weighed in order to erect a 
science of the comparative anatomy of the races.
11
   
 
Pervasive in Brinton’s argument is the systematic assertion of racial difference that 
was produced through a medical measurement of anatomy. The works of these 
anthropologists – heavily influenced by the Spencerian maxim of the survival of the 
fittest
12
 – affirmed that human societies, like human selves, progressed at varying 
paces from savagery to civilization. The panic of degeneration was largely informed 
by the pseudo-scientific possibility of evolutionary reversal into pre-civilized 
atavistic states that late nineteenth-century anthropologists ascribed to non-European 
races.  
Anthropology in the late nineteenth century was thus overdetermined by an 
evolutionism that can be interpreted “as the ideological reflection of economic 
exploitation and class conflict in an age of rapid capitalist economic development 
and imperial expansion.”13 ‘Scientific studies’ on the human race at the end of the 
nineteenth century were often marked by eugenics and racist divisions that endorsed 
extermination of the perceived inferior people. Works such as Benjamin Kidd’s 
Social Evolution (1894) and Karl Pearson’s National Life from the Standpoint of 
Science (1901) – both well-received by their contemporary audiences – were 
representative of an anthropological culture that offered scientific “justifications for 
genocide as well as for imperialism.”14 However, in the wake of the Darwinian 
evolution which scientifically proved the interconnectedness of all animal species, 
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 D.G.Brinton, Races and People (New York: N.D.C.Hodges, 1890) 48. In the works of E.D.Cope, 
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the late nineteenth-century notion of racism was characterised by a biological 
monism whereby the threat to the race came not so much from without but from 
within. Consequently, late nineteenth-century England, with its fear of degeneration 
and de-evolution, fostered “the internal racism of permanent purification”, one that 
also bred “the basic dimensions of social normalization.”15 For the nineteenth 
century may be broadly conceived as the moment, as Foucault contends in his study 
of medical politics, when “the relation between the visible and the invisible—which 
is necessary to all concrete knowledge—changed its structure, revealing through 
gaze and language what had previously been below and beyond their domain.”16  
 
Darwin’s discoveries and their impact on the culture of the time were tied not 
only to their contemporary zoological and medical theories but “profoundly unsettled 
the received relationships between fiction, metaphor, and the material world.”17  As 
Stephen Jay Gould argues:  
 
The concept of evolution transformed human thought during the nineteenth 
century. Nearly every question in the life sciences was reformulated in its 
light. No idea was ever more widely used, or misused (“social Darwinism” as 
an evolutionary rationale for the inevitability of poverty, for example). Both 
creationists (Agassiz and Morton) and evolutionists (Broca and Galton) could 
exploit the data of brain size to make their invalid and invidious distinctions 
among groups.
18
  
 
Gould’s statement (as well as the title of his book) points to the way medico-
scientific discourses that emerged as ramifications of the Darwinian narrative were 
essentially aimed at legitimizing and systemizing difference on the basis of 
physiognomy, culture and race. The evolutionary knowledge of the human condition 
that is constantly and helplessly mutable undermined the confidence previously 
enjoyed by the capitalist notion of self-help that was publicised by the Smilesian 
doctrines in mid-nineteenth century.
19
 Unlike the intentionalist vocabulary of 
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Lamarckian zoology that had emphasized the importance of the role of will and 
agency in its evolutionary narrative, the Darwinian plot was darker and pointed more 
towards biological determinism, conflict and coercion.
20
  
 
2.2 Degeneration and Criminology in Popular Cultural and Medical Discourses 
 
Janet Oppenheim’s study of British medical panic over degeneration and its 
anthropological implications points to the broader cultural climate in the late 
nineteenth century. In popular discourses on public health and medicine, heredity 
emerged as the subject of the anxious traffic of ideas around bodily and nervous 
deterioration at a time focussed on racial and ethnographic hygiene and purity. 
Oppenheim studies the gradual transition from the older hereditary theories of 
nervous disposition to the new discourses of degeneration that emerged in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. While the former did not assume an automatic 
deterioration of the nervous system, the new discourses were different:  
  
Nervous degeneration was something altogether more frightening and more 
disgraceful. Once set in motion, virtually everyone assumed that it was an 
irreversible process, dragging entire families into an inexorable downward 
spiral of declining physical and mental powers.
21
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The irreversibility of the process was part of its biological menace and contributed to 
the popular panic about the same. Late nineteenth-century medical and 
anthropological discourses were increasingly and anxiously obsessed with the 
uncontrollability of the human nervous system and the disorder of nervous 
degeneration. One can see a demonstration of the idea of fatal irreversibility in the 
popular perception of degeneration evident around the trials and afflictions suffered 
by Oscar Wilde whose “drastic transformation”, as Joseph Bristow contends, “from a 
dandified art critic whose plays entertained thousands of theatre-goers to a debased 
pervert gathered such momentum in the late 1890s that there seemed no way of 
reversing the process.”22 I will return and draw heavily on Bristow’s study of 
masculinity in nineteenth-century England as produced and perpetuated by the Boy 
Scout Movements and public school discipline, especially in the chapter on George 
Orwell and the white man’s nerves in the colonies. It is interesting that Wilde 
himself, in July 1896, petitioned the Home Secretary for his release from prison on 
grounds that his homoeroticism was a pathological syndrome characteristic of the 
degenerate artist of a particular literary temperament and ought to be treated by a 
physician rather than punished by the law.
23
 In his persuasive analysis of the richness 
of the political content of Wilde’s life and works, Christopher Hitchens argues that 
The Importance of Being Earnest is couched in the coded contemporary vocabulary 
of homosexuality that manifested also in proper names in the play. Thus Cecily was 
a common code for transvestite rent-boys and Bloxham may have been an allusion to 
Jack Bloxham, editor of a homosexual magazine who was Wilde’s personal friend.24 
More significantly, such theories of degeneration through de-evolution, as embodied 
by Wilde in popular medical perception, were also tied to the emerging discourse of 
criminology in the late nineteenth century where the medical gaze was again 
increasingly inflected by pseudo-scientific notions of physiognomy, biology and 
race.   
Max Nordau’s Entartung (1892), which was translated into English as 
Degeneration and published in 1895, can be seen as fairly representative of the 
various cultural and pseudo-scientific tracts produced in the last decade of the 
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nineteenth century that expounded for the common reader the principles of nervous 
degeneration and entropy. Nervous entropy as Nordau presents it emerges as a 
ubiquitous condition attributable to a range of factors from the wear and tear of daily 
lives to thermodynamic theories of solar freezing. Nervousness according to Nordau 
was essentially the construct of a culture in which “steam and electricity have turned 
the customs of life of every member upside down, even of the most obtuse and 
narrow-minded citizens, who is completely inaccessible to the impelling thoughts of 
the times” (Degeneration 37). Nordau’s study includes an analysis of masculine 
hysteria in the late nineteenth century, a disease that is attributed to excessive 
emotionalism, morbid imagination, compulsive propensity to imitate and heightened 
self-love. More importantly, Nordau’s theorizing of hysteria includes interpretations 
of creative writers and artists as well, and he classifies the writing of Ibsen, Zola, 
Wilde and Nietzsche as hysterically degenerative. In a similar vein, Nordau connects 
Charcot’s medical research on visual degeneration to the Impressionist school of 
painting by Manet which is described as a “diseased constitution” of the “brain and 
nervous system” (Degeneration 31).  The hysterical man and artist – as described by 
Nordau in his medico-cultural analysis – emerges as an inward-looking melancholic 
with pathological as well as criminal propensities, thus exemplifying the fin de siècle 
fear of the “caesuras within the biological continuum.”25 A popular guide to the 
panic of degeneration and the symptoms of degenerative minds, Nordau’s Entartung 
“was one of the most widely read pieces of cultural criticism in western and central 
Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”26 Unsurprisingly, 
Nordau’s scientific and cultural criticism of degeneration and degenerate artists at 
the end of the nineteenth century drew heavily on contemporary discourses on 
criminology and anthropology.  
 
One of the most influential of the criminological discourses that emerged at 
the end of the nineteenth century, one that made its presence felt in the popular and 
literary narratives of the period, was that offered by Césare Lombroso whose The 
Man of Genius (1893) was a study of degeneration and criminality. Equating 
homosexuality, moral insanity and morbid criminal degeneration with literary 
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propensities to use epigrams, assonance and puns, Lombroso theorized deviance 
using a set of physiognomic and mental attributes. Thus Lombroso popularized a 
medical gaze whereby criminals and degenerates would be identified by 
“exaggerated mutism or verbosity, morbid vanity, excessive originality” as well as 
by “prominent ears, deficiency of beard, irregularity of teeth [and] excessive 
asymmetry of face and head”.27 Emerging as it did in a cultural climate of Social 
Darwinism and bio-political panic, Lombroso’s criminology “viewed criminals and 
psychiatric patients as degenerates, evolutionary throwbacks often identifiable by 
physical stigmata: low brows, jutting jaws and so forth.”28 The fears of recapitulation 
to earlier and less developed civilizational states – in a ‘scientific’ culture that 
studied ‘savages’ as a bridge between the gorilla and the gentleman29 – were almost 
always associated with the fear of criminality that the Lombrosian discourse 
analysed. This was evident in the popular literature of the day, especially crime-
literature that dealt with deviancy from civilized behaviour, which frequently 
appropriated Lombrosian vocabulary.
30
 
 
 Lombroso and his physiognomic vocabulary of criminology and 
degeneration found many supporters in Britain, such as the psychiatrist Henry 
Maudsley who, in his 1895 work The Pathology of Mind, advised prospective 
husbands to check for ostensible physical signs “which betray the degeneracy of 
stock [. . .] any malformations of the head, face, mouth, teeth and ears. Outward 
defects and deformities are the visible signs of inward and invisible faults which will 
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have their influences in breeding.”31 With his metonymically formulated 
physiognomic vocabulary, Lombroso pronounced a gaze where intelligence is 
quantified and measured by the size of skulls. Criminality, genius and degeneration 
were thus discursively inflected through physiognomic features.  Lombroso’s 
analysis mixed artists of genius and degenerates into one seam of dangerous 
subversion that was easily translatable into criminality. In effect, Lombroso 
represented an anthropological analysis that was derived from anthropometric data 
and classified criminals as evolutionary degenerates.
32
 Lombrosian criminology 
sought to construct a systematic study of deviancy through a structure of 
physiognomic signifiers. Such a study – as Michel Foucault argued – exemplified the 
bio-political culture in which dispersed objects could be transformed into a discourse 
that could “speak.”33  
 
As cultural historians such as William Greenslade and Daniel Pick show, the 
discourse of degeneration – as articulated by cultural historians by Nordau and 
Social Darwinists such as Francis Galton
34
 and Ernst Haeckel
35
 – reached its peak in 
                                                          
31
 Henry Maudsley, The Pathology of the Mind: a Study of its Distempers, Deformities, and Disorders 
(London: Macmillan, 1895) 536. Cited in Greenslade, Degeneration, 102.  
 
32
 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 153.  
 
33
 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge , trans. A.M.Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1972) 44.   
 
34
 Late nineteenth-century medicine was supported by the emergence of biostatistics, most 
immediately evinced in the late nineteenth century in the work of Francis Galton (1822-1911), 
Darwin’s cousin who combined the nineteenth-century attributes of a polymath, as a geographical 
explorer, anthropologist, eugenicist and statistician. Galton’s active support of the journal Biometrika 
paved the way for his subsequent interest in Darwinian hereditary model which was readily 
appropriated for his model of eugenics that sought to improve the condition of human species led to 
the publication of The Hereditary Genius in 1869. In that work, Galton sought to quantify the number 
of brilliant and stupid men in England in the 1860s using the demographic data available to him 
through official records. Conducting biostatistical research on the physique of boys in English public 
schools of the 1870s, Galton sought to systematize a sociological formula that stated that smaller 
families of intelligent and successful men in cities led to an overabundance of hereditarily weaker 
populations in the rural areas.  See Ruth Cowan, “Francis Galton’s Statistical Ideas: The Influence of 
Eugenics”, Isis 63.4 (December 1972): 509-28. Galton’s biostatistical research was quick to assume 
anthropological and racial politics and exemplified what Foucault classified as the “enunciative 
modality” in biopolitics whereby “Qualitative descriptions, biographical accounts, the location, 
interpretation, cross-checking of signs, reasoning by analogy, deduction, statistical calculations, 
experimental verifications and many other forms of statement are to be found in the discourse of 
nineteenth century doctors.” The Archaeology of Knowledge, 55.   
 
35
 In his work on recapitulation, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) affirmed that 
individual biological features of an organism reiterate that of its species.  Haeckel’s phrase ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny usually suggests that as an embryo of an advanced organism grows, it will 
 29 
 
the late nineteenth-century popular medical and political vocabulary. This 
dramatized “a deep pessimism about man’s capacity to ameliorate the social and 
political order, a political conservatism, a disenchantment with man’s ethical 
capacity, and a scepticism of the claims of rational – particularly scientific – 
thought.”36 The fin de siècle notion of hysteria took up medical as well as political 
ramifications and involved changing analyses of body, race, empire and social 
hygiene.
37
 Analysing the British political context of the panic of degeneration, 
Alison Hennegan persuasively argues that this was a time when  
 
Fears of invasion, literal and metaphorical, were in the air. The British and 
the French watched Germany’s growing military power with apprehension [. 
. .] Britain’s, and especially London’s, rapidly growing immigrant population 
raised anxieties about cultural ‘invasion’, fears that native-born Britons 
would become aliens in their own land.
38
 
 
In its literature of degeneration and criminality, and in its anthropological theories on 
class, stock and race, late nineteenth-century Britain witnessed a bio-political panic 
that anticipated the apparatus of twentieth-century “State racism” whereby “the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
pass through stages that look very much like the adult phase of less-advanced organisms. For 
example, at one point each human embryo has gills and resembles a tadpole. Although further 
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theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle.”39  A complex cultural climate 
that contained economic growth through imperialism as well as the panic of 
decadence through de-evolution and nervous entropy,
40
 this was thus also a time 
when anxieties about the productive male body, masculinity, and bio-political 
identities readily emerged in public and popular discourse.  
 
 
2.3 Nineteenth-Century English Masculinity and Its Anxieties 
 
 
The late nineteenth-century European bio-political discourses on degeneration might 
also be viewed as marked by anxieties about masculinity. Such masculinist 
discourses sought to retain and reify hygiene, health and nervous order in a way 
intimately connected to the production and preservation of empire. As Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak asserts in her critique of postcolonial reason, “it should not be 
possible, in principle, to read nineteenth-century British literature without 
remembering that imperialism, understood as England’s social mission, was a crucial 
part of cultural representation to the English.”41 Thus unsurprisingly, all-pervasive in 
the dominant medical discourses on nerves and nervous breakdown in the late 
nineteenth century, were issues of upbringing, stock and class, as medicine and 
Social Darwinism were closely collaborative in their constructed notions of eugenics 
and hygiene.
42
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The idea of masculinity as produced and popularized in late nineteenth-
century Britain combined the ability to carry imperial attributes that would inform 
colonial control while simultaneously constructing its discursive otherness out of the 
original inhabitants of the sites of imperialism itself. Shannon Sullivan’s analysis of 
the naturalization of hierarchical difference and the politics of ‘Other’-formation 
particularly points towards the ethnographies that informed European imperialism. 
Thus  
 
The story that Europe told itself and others as it colonized huge parts of the 
world was that it had discovered wild spaces that needed taming. And not 
just spaces, but people also, that lacked civilization since the spaces one 
inhabited determined what sort of person one was. [. . . ] This reciprocal 
definition of wild and savage spaces was then used to justify the horrific 
treatment of those such as Native Americans and Africans who were deemed 
uncivilized.
43
 
 
Sullivan’s work is significant inasmuch as it demonstrates the discursive quality of 
racial supremacy that is most heavily operative precisely at the point which seems to 
depart from discourse. The ideology of racial supremacy, as Sullivan studies it, 
worked by strategies of naturalization and a “style of transacting with the world in 
which the white domination is consciously embraced and affirmed.”44Thus 
Sullivan’s analysis also emphasizes the cultural and moral economy that historically 
informed imperialist ideology and its increasing internalization through language, 
medicine and body.  
 
Linda Martin Alcoff contends in her remarkable study of visible racial 
identities, the politics of racialization corresponded closely and was almost 
contemporaneous with the politics of map-making in a cultural climate where: 
 
[t]he expanding geographical areas of the globe “discovered” by Europeans 
were given order and intelligibility in part through their association with 
racial types. Thus, the labeling and mapping of conquered terrain, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
as zogo and how each zogo uniquely corresponds to a particular form of illness. Rivers, Medicine, 
Magic, and Religion (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1924) 29.   
 
43
 Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006) 150-51.  
44
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 5.  
 32 
 
naturalist classifications of life forms of all types, and the typologies of 
“natural races” were all practices that enjoyed an analogical similarity and 
emerged in the first period of European conquest, no doubt motivated by 
Europeans' need to comprehend and manage their suddenly enlarged world.
45
 
 
What is most immediately pervasive in the evolution of European socio-medical 
discourses from the late nineteenth century to the First World War is an increasing 
anxiety to produce and perpetuate an ideal masculinist body that would correspond 
closely to the ideology that informed imperial expansion. This issue ran across 
cultural as well literary movements and was as pervasive in boy’s fiction stories and 
adventure magazines as in scout movements that fostered a spirit of masculinist 
adventure. As Joseph Bristow contends, “literary representations of imperial 
maleness belonged to wider discussions of the moral and physical well-being of 
boys, especially in relation to schooling, health, and military recruitment.”46 In a 
related work on the fear of effeminacy, Bristow studies how the 1885 Amendment of 
English Criminal Law – classified as the Labouchere Amendment – imposed 
prohibitive legislation on public as well as private homosexuality. 1885 emerges as a 
significant date in Bristow’s study of English masculinity and the impact of the 
Amendment was almost immediately palpable in the tribulation and eventual 
retribution meted out by the state to the most celebrated writer of the day, Oscar 
Wilde, whose trials demonstrated spectacularly “that effeminacy and empire at this 
point stood in violent opposition.”47 The hurried equation of effeminacy and 
degeneration that was present in public vocabulary and dramatized in the public 
trials and the eventual doom of Oscar Wilde is also manifested in the homophobic 
tirade against him that continued well into the twentieth century. Thus Arthur 
Symons attacked Wilde in a vocabulary that constituted visceral aversion as well as 
intellectual antagonism: 
 
Wilde’s vices were not simply intellectual perversions, they were 
physiological. [. . . ] As he grew older the womanish side of him grew more 
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and more evident. Lautrec saw him in Paris, and in the appalling portrait of 
him he shows Wilde, swollen, puffed out, bloated and sinister. The form of 
the mouth which he gave him is more than any thing exceptional [. . .] it is a 
woman’s that no man who is normal could ever had had. The face is bestial. 
A man with a ruined body and ravaged mind and a senseless brain does not 
even survey the horror of this hideous countenance in a mirror: this thing is 
no more a thing gazes into a void.
48
 
 
The popular perception of Wilde’s body, as a disturbing symbol of 
degeneration and abject indeterminacy, may be interpreted as the masculinist fear of 
the uncontainable and mutable corporeality of the fleshy frame. At once revolting as 
well as dangerously seductive, Wilde’s body and his intellectual excesses became the 
major signifier of decadence and degeneration under the dominant bio-political gaze 
of the day. Such a gaze – informing the ideology of the empire – constituted a 
positivist medical knowledge which was “the ultimate discourse of the real, seeking 
to produce an authoritative account of an unproblematically of the real world of the 
human body and mind.”49 Under such masculinist and positivistic medical control of 
the libidinal economy that was directly dialogic with the episteme of the empire, 
Wilde embodied an effeminacy that constituted the “fear and cross-over between 
sexual perversion and intellectual and moral subversion.”50 Wilde’s personal 
background as an Irishman attempting to locate himself in the British intellectual 
scene also becomes significant in the context of the colonial politics of the British 
Empire.
51
 This background informs a reading of Wilde’s subversion of the English 
language through an efflorescent wit in social satires that were pitched against the 
patriarchal principles of the day. The dialectic of Wilde’s body of work and work of 
the body thus deconstructed the discourses that went into the making of masculinity 
and behavioural propriety in the late nineteenth-century English culture which “was 
working out the political meanings of these definitions in a colony thousands of 
miles away.”52  
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2.4 Conrad in his Cultural Climate: Heart of Darkness in its context  
 
As Ian Watt affirms, “Conrad grew up in the heyday of evolutionary theory; Alfred 
Wallace was one of his favourite authors; and several aspects of evolutionary 
thought are present in Heart of Darkness.”53 Conrad’s writing betrays an interest in 
the possibility of ethical altruism in an age overdetermined by bio-political 
pseudoscience and anthropological speculations on racial characters. More 
specifically, his writing on empire is characterised by his protagonists’ felt 
ambivalence about agency. The ambivalence in turn informs the existentialist 
dilemma that is caught between the need for selfishness and the desire for self-
effacement.
54
 Degeneration features heavily in Conrad’s narratives, not as a 
reductionist epidemiological principle or anthropological theory, but as a complex 
combination of political presuppositions and privately experienced feelings of horror 
and guilt. “Impressively well-read in contemporary science”,55 Conrad’s reception of 
craniology, although dismissive of its stereotypical excesses, reflects the 
ambivalence of a creative writer who was sensitive to the scientific theses of his 
times when “the borders between criminality, insanity and genius [. . .] were 
constantly blurred.”56 What emerges more immediately from Conrad’s attitudinal 
reactions to the progress of empirical science in the nineteenth century was that 
“heartless secrets which are called the Laws of Nature” were unconnected to the 
“deepest human concerns”, and the belief that the increasing dominance of the 
natural sciences of his day contributed to the crisis of the human sentient self.
57
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Conrad’s personal familiarity with the major and dominant scientific 
discourses and debates of his day is abundantly evident not only in the content of his 
prose fiction but also in his letters to contemporary writers and journalists. Thus in 
his letter to Cunninghame Graham, written in 14 December 1897, Conrad alludes to 
his knowledge of the second law of thermodynamics while describing Singleton in 
The Nigger of the “Narcissus” (1897) and writes: “Nothing can touch him but the 
curse of decay—the eternal decree that will extinguish the sun, the stars one by one, 
and in another instance shall spread a frozen darkness over the whole universe.”58 As 
Redmond O’Hanlon suggests, Conrad was fascinated by James Clerk Maxwell’s 
1873 lectures – on the indestructibility of matter and molecules – to the British 
Association and was intrigued by the invention of radiology during his stay with Dr 
John McIntyre in Glasgow.
59
 As Conrad’s biographer Frederick Karl contends, 
Conrad was personally connected to the anthropological study of his day through his 
old tutor Izydor Kopernicki, who also happened to be a social scientist and had 
written a treatise on craniology entitled Comparative Studies of Human Races, Based 
on Types of Skulls.
60
 Moreover, the vocabulary of nineteenth-century science, with 
its tenets of Darwinism and its associations with medicine and anthropology had too 
big an impact on popular culture not to engage creative writers and intellectuals 
alike. Thus Gillian Beer argues:  
In the mid-nineteenth century, scientists still shared a common language with 
other educated readers and writers of their time. [. . .] Together with other 
scientific writers such as G.H.Lewes, Claude Bernard, John Tyndall, 
W.K.Clifford, and even so far as his early work is concerned Clerk Maxwell 
(writers whose works ranged through psychology, physiology, physics and 
mathematics), they [Lyell and Darwin] shared a literary, non-mathematical 
discourse which was readily available to readers without a scientific 
training.
61
 
Conrad’s reaction against the increasing overdeterminism of mechanistic 
science over the will and agency of man is evocatively depicted in his 1897 letter to 
Cunninghame Graham:  
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There is a—let us say—a machine. It evolved itself (I am severely scientific) 
out of a chaos of scraps of iron and behold!—it knits. I am horrified at the 
horrible work and stand appalled. [. . .] You cannot by any special lubrication 
make embroidery with a knitting machine. And the most withering thought is 
that the infamous things has made itself; made itself without thought, without 
conscience, without foresight, without eyes, without heart. It is tragic 
accident—and it has happened. . . . It knits us in and it knits us out. It has 
knitted time, space, pain, death, corruption, despair and all the illusions—and 
nothing matters.
62
  
The “severely scientific” attitude that Conrad refers to in the letter exists in 
opposition to individual agency and human will.  The automatic knitting machine 
emerges as a symbol of the seamless narratives of knowledge produced by the late 
nineteenth-century discourses on natural science.
63
 Emerging as it did from a culture 
that contained the pride of imperialist expansion as well the panic of degeneration, 
increasing territorialisation as well as the anxiety of entropy and solar death
64
, 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is a complex commentary on imperialism, masculinity 
and Enlightenment logic as those constructs featured at the end of the nineteenth 
century. As Ian Watt points out, Conrad’s novella was written at a time marked by 
international political conflicts and contradictory notions of imperialism in Africa, a 
period that witnessed “the discovery of gold in the Transvaal”, and an “increasing 
resentment at German imperialism” (one recalls that the very name of Kurtz in Heart 
of Darkness means “short” in German, ironically resonating with his Lombrosian 
length and anatomical excesses), “final adoption of an imperialist programme” as 
“the leadership of the Liberal party passed from Gladstone to Rosebery in 1894”, a 
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move that was accentuated by the Conservative Lord Salisbury’s coming into power 
next year, the Jameson Raid in 1895 and the Fashoda Incident on 1898.
65
 In its 
ambivalent interpretation of imperialism and its horrors, Heart of Darkness 
illustrates the inadequacies of late nineteenth-century bio-political ideologies, while 
at the same time being awkwardly embedded in the same.  As Edward Said suggests, 
Conrad’s novella contains an “uncompromising Eurocentric vision” which 
paradoxically also constitutes “the felt tension between what is intolerably there and 
a symmetrical compulsion to escape from it”.66  
 
The spectre of soulless science embodied in the image of an automatic 
knitting machine returns in Heart of Darkness in the figures of the symbolic women 
at the entrance to the office of the Ivory Company in Brussels (a city that reminds the 
nervous narrator Marlow of a white sepulchre). The female figures knit away in an 
automaton-like manner as Marlow embarks on the corporate rituals and gets grafted 
into the imperial enterprise that was “going to run an overseas empire and make no 
end of coin by trade”(HD 13). The section is remarkable in the manner it juxtaposes 
the mythical realm with that of the menacingly mechanical: 
Two women, one fat and the other slim, sat on straw-bottomed chairs knitting 
black wool. The slim one got up and walked straight at me—still knitting 
with downcast eyes—and only just as I began to think of getting out of her 
way, as you would for a somnambulist, stood still, and looked up. Her dress 
was as plain as an umbrella cover, and she turned round without a word and 
preceded me into a waiting-room. I gave my name and looked about. (HD 
13) 
The movements of the woman – who appears initially in Marlow’s eyes as a 
somnambulist – may be interpreted as the automatic ambulation67 that characterised 
the anti-social hysteric as well as the hyper-social mechanical behaviour of the 
agency-less subject inside a corporate space. The protocols of being baptised into the 
imperialist enterprise are depicted selectively and nervously with the image of the 
Congo on the map appearing to Marlow’s panicky cognition as “an immense snake 
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uncoiled” (HD 12) thus bringing the biblical scene of seduction and its associated 
connotation of Fall into a nervous juxtaposition with the imperialist architecture of 
the unnamed company’s office in Brussels. The strategy of selective communication, 
one that runs throughout the narrative of Heart of Darkness and is perhaps most 
spectacularly evident in Marlow’s eventual and dramatic lie to Kurtz’s Intended at 
the end of the novella, is anticipated in Marlow’s succinct account of his signing of 
contract with the Company that is never named in the narrative: 
In about forty-five seconds I found myself again in the waiting-room with the 
compassionate secretary who full of desolation and sympathy made me sign 
some document. I believe I undertook amongst other things not to disclose 
any trade secrets. Well, I am not going to. (HD 14) 
The precision of clock time belies the emotional intensity and movements that are 
described in the passage. Marlow’s withholding of the company’s trade secrets (a 
company that seeks to maximise profit by ivory trade in the Congo) from his 
European audience that comprises a lawyer and an accountant, is not incompatible 
with his eventual withholding of the truth about the horror of imperialism from the 
supposedly naïve European female in the white metropolis.  
The nervousness of Marlow at the moment of being baptised into the 
ceremony of imperialism that emerged with immediately commercial as well as 
archetypically mythical undertones is spectacularly evident: 
I began to feel slightly uneasy. You know I am not used to such ceremonies 
and there was something ominous in the atmosphere. It was just as though I 
had been let into some conspiracy—I don’t know—something not quite right, 
and I was glad to get out. In the outer room the two women knitted back wool 
feverishly [. . .] She [the older woman] glanced at me over the glasses. The 
swift and indifferent placidity of that look troubled me. [ . . .] An eerie 
feeling came over me. She seemed uncanny and fateful. Often far away I 
thought of these two, guarding the door of Darkness, knitting black wool as 
for a warm pall, one introducing, introducing continuously to the unknown, 
the other scrutinising the cheery and foolish faces with unconcerned old eyes. 
‘Ave! Old knitter of black wool. Morituri te salutant.’ Not many of those she 
looked at ever saw her again—not half—by a long way.  (HD 14)  
The uneasiness of Marlow at the moment of incorporation into the reifying imperial 
enterprise is compounded by the masculinity crisis he encounters during his shudder 
under the Medusa-gaze of the automaton-like woman who feverishly knits black 
wool. As soon as he is framed by the narrative of imperialism, Marlow begins to 
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discern the decadence associated with its machinery, a decadence that is immediately 
evident in the pervasive sense of mortality that Marlow’s narrative can no longer 
conceal.  Unsurprisingly, on being taken in by the machinery of imperialism, 
Marlow is subsequently sent to be examined under its medical gaze, one that 
proceeds by detection and interrogation of hereditary insanity and criminal history. 
The following scene is delineated through the “simple formality” of seeing the 
company’s doctor who “produced a thing like callipers and got the dimensions back 
and front and every way, taking notes carefully” (HD 15).  Keen to measure 
Marlow’s cranium for the sake of medical science, the doctor quizzes him on any 
familial history of madness, asserting that it would be “interesting for science to 
watch the mental changes of individuals on the spot” (HD 15).  Appearing as he does 
in Marlow’s eyes as “a harmless fool”, the facile figure of the doctor confesses that 
he “always ask[s] leave, in the interest of science, to measure the crania of those 
going out there” (HD 15), and thus subscribes to the Lombrosian tradition of 
measuring men that derived its data from “a sample of 383 crania from dead 
criminals, plus general proportions measured for 3,893 among the living.”68  
While in the Congo Marlow tries to comprehend the meaning in the 
wilderness he sees around him. The passage, in which he describes his equivocal 
understanding of the silences and sounds around, is evocative in its felt ambivalence: 
A great silence around and above. Perhaps on some quiet night the tremor of 
far-off drums, sinking, swelling, a temor of vast, faint; a sound weird, 
appealing, suggestive, and wild—and perhaps with as profound a meaning as 
the sound of bells in a Christian country. (HD 23) 
Marlow’s narrative thus bears signs of an attempted understanding of the cultural 
signifiers around while also betraying the blankness in comprehension as Africa, 
with its “stamped-in network of paths spreading over the empty land” (HD 23) 
changes from a geographical landscape to the ‘Other’ space in Marlow’s European 
imagination. Thus, before long, he too subscribes to the notion that Africa brings out 
the atavistic nature of the European man and feels he himself “was becoming 
scientifically interesting” (HD 24). He travels along the Congo and enters the heart 
of what he perceives as the African darkness, where the human voices he knows are 
replaced by sounds and signs he does not understand and decodes mistakenly. Thus, 
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later, in the face of real and immediate physical predicament, the Lombrosian 
vocabulary returns to the mind that had formerly rejected it, as Marlow contemplates 
the effects that the African wilderness may have had on Kurtz, ostensibly turning 
him bald. Thus, “it had taken him, loved him, embraced him, got into his veins, 
consumed his flesh, and sealed his soul to its own by the inconceivable ceremonies 
of some devilish initiation”(HD 49). The language of possession operative here, 
points to an absolute anarchy, which, like the medical context of the novella, appears 
to appropriate a moral rather than scientific vocabulary. 
 The dialectic of the psychic and the somatic realms with which the anatomy 
as well as the character of Kurtz is constructed in the narrative appropriates both the 
Lombrosian and Nordauian vocabularies, as well as pointing to their inadequacies. 
Thus Kurtz is described through his “lofty frontal bone” (HD 49) that, in the 
discursive vocabulary of Nordau, is a pointer to high intelligence as well as 
degeneration of the other psychic faculties, resulting in a clear and strong propensity 
towards degeneration.
69
 While Marlow clearly explicates how Kurtz’s “nerves went 
wrong” (HD 50) in Africa, leading him to participate in savage rites, Kurtz’s 
appearance of being “at least seven feet long” (HD 59) also corresponds to the 
Lombrosian anatomy of excess. As William Greenslade argues, “Conrad’s 
deconstruction of the mind here yields a simple but crucial insight, quite outside the 
limited imaginative scope of degenerationist pathology: the man ‘gone wrong’ is not 
‘out there’ to be labelled by positivist science, he is, of course, the man within.”70 
Thus the borderlines between savage and civilized, sane and insane, determined and 
independent, appear as precariously contingent categories in Conrad’s narratives, 
manifesting the fault lines in the Victorian structures of faith while also looking 
nostalgically and somewhat enviously back at the more comfortable notions of 
nosology and political optimism.
71
  
In his study of Conrad’s appropriation as well as deconstruction of the 
Lombrosian system, C.T. Watts argues that Kurtz, with his gifted musical attributes 
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and charisma of political potential, represents the “Pied Piper attribute”72 of the 
degenerative type: embodying the potential for seduction as well as annihilation with 
“the power to charm or frighten rudimentary souls into an aggravated witch-dance in 
his honour” (HD 51). Yet Conrad does not characterize Kurtz using any neat 
discourse of difference that bases itself on contemporary anthropological 
assumptions. The hysteria at the heart of darkness is as much localized in African 
otherness as in the finest European attributes, for “all Europe contributed to the 
making of Kurtz” (HD 86). Thus making and unmaking, evolutionary progress and 
regression, are trapped in the same dialectic of nihilism and enlightenment in 
Conrad’s novella about political and personal panic. The Thames and the Congo 
ironically emerge as similar symbols in Marlow’s stream of consciousness, both 
being historical pathways for the traffic of imperialism and places of darkness 
outside the civilized world, at different points in human history.
73
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2.5 Conrad’s Location as a Pre-Modernist Writer 
 
 
Erich Auerbach’s analysis of the narrative aesthetics developed by Modernist writers 
such as Woolf and Proust underlines the significance of the sentient self in the 
construction of the narrative process. Thus, in his study of the characterization in 
major Modernist narratives, Auerbach argues:  
 
One comes upon the order and the interpretation of life which arise from life 
itself: that is, those which grow up in individuals themselves, which are to be 
discerned in their thoughts, their consciousness, and in a more concealed 
form in their words and actions. For there is always going on within us a 
process of formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own 
self. We are constantly endeavouring to give meaning and order to our lives 
in the past, the present, and the future, to our surroundings, the world in 
which we live.
74
  
 
Auerbach takes as the model text of Modernist mimesis Virginia Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse (1927) where he states “The world of objective facts has almost 
completely vanished, almost everything stated appears by way of reflection in the 
consciousness of the dramatis personae.”75 Similar structures evolve in Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness as well, which emerges as a meta-fictional narrative about the 
self-reflexive human consciousness, where the borderlines between subjective 
background and intersubjective foreground, impression and reality, are constantly 
questioned and hollowed out. It is also a novel about political scepticism and private 
doubt where the cognitive crises correspond closely to the masculinity crises in an 
age of imperialism. In its intellectual essence and narrative complexity, Conrad’s 
novella anticipates the Modernist novels of Woolf and Joyce which grew out of turn-
of-the-century scientific and philosophical debates on the epistemology of the self, 
cognition and mimetic representation.
76
 The Modernist worldview as it appears in its 
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most representative works of fiction, emerges as an ambivalence about “the 
subjectivity of perception and cognition, a subjectivity that calls into question the 
unity of the observing subject as well as its relationship with the outside world.”77 
Conrad’s fictional frames and their narrative techniques anticipate such ambivalence.    
 
As a pre-Modernist who is essentially unclassifiable and “floating uncertainly 
somewhere in between Proust and Robert Louis Stevenson”78, Conrad’s writing 
epitomizes the existential enigmas and epistemological uncertainties of the European 
mind politically situated in the late nineteenth century. Conrad had evinced his 
interest in the “regions of memory” in the human mind that “know nothing of 
time”79, thus offering a model of consciousness in his narratives with its 
epistemological contingency, flux and fluidity. Thus, in a typical Conradian 
narrative, David Lodge contends:  
 
[t]he gratifications of the conventional adventure story are deliberately 
frustrated, inverted, problematised, by complex time shifts, shifts of point of 
view, elaborate framing devices, and a densely written, syntactically 
complicated, metaphorically rich prose style—all of which together retard 
and obstruct the delivery of simple narrative excitement.
80
  
 
Lodge’s analysis of the convergence between Modernist literature and the 
discoveries in modern twenty-first century neuroscience carries special relevance to 
the argument of this chapter which seeks to situate the narrative method of Conrad 
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within the broader realms of scientific and philosophical debates on self and 
cognition.  
The political insight articulated in Conrad’s stories about imperialist horror 
emerges out of phenomenological experiences that challenge presuppositions in 
dominant structures of knowledge. While the crisis of normative European imperial 
masculinity is most immediately evident in a later text Lord Jim (1900) which 
emerges as “a defining tale of doubt which threatened the project of European 
expansion”81 as well as a neo-Gothic narrative about the “threat of engulfment posed 
by the feminine,”82 Heart of Darkness is possibly Conrad’s darkest depiction of the 
failure of normative imperial masculinity and the consequent crisis in cognition and 
narration. Conrad’s narrative efforts to make the reader hear, feel and see, and the 
corresponding difficulties faced by his narrators to communicate their crises, 
correspond closely to the larger epistemological uncertainties in his fictional worlds. 
As David Lodge argues: 
In a world where nothing is certain, in which transcendental belief has been 
undermined by scientific materialism, and even the objectivity of science is 
qualified by relativity and uncertainty, the single human voice, telling its own 
story, can seem the only authentic way of rendering consciousness.
83
 
 
The tension between subjective experience and ontic reality, between private 
perception and communal communication, and between familiar experiences and 
defamiliarized expressions runs across the entirety of Conrad’s oeuvre. Thus, in 
Conrad’s writing, narration often emerges as a backward process whereby objects 
are decoded post-perception.
84
 Such perspectival positions in the narratives of 
Conrad rely less on what actually transpires in the physical landscape of change than 
on how such events impressionistically affect the consciousness of the perceiver. 
Crucially, the narrative style that Conrad deploys – one that anticipates Modernist 
                                                          
81
 Elleke Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) 59.  
82
 Padmini Mongia, “‘Ghosts of the Gothic’: Spectral Women and Colonized Spaces in Lord Jim”, 
The Conradian: Conrad and Gender, ed. Andrew Michael Roberts (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1993) 
1.  
83
 David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, 87.  
84
 Christopher L. Miller, “The Discoursing Heart: Conrad’s Heart of Darkness”, Joseph Conrad, ed. 
Elaine Jordan (London: Macmillan, 1996) 89-90.  
 45 
 
experiments of communicating pure human consciousness in language – appears 
deliberately destabilized as a way of capturing an altered and altering world.
85
  
 
In one of his autobiographical asides, Conrad himself had spelt out the 
location of the sentient self that oversees the creative process at work:  
 
In truth every novelist must begin by creating for himself a world, great or 
little, in which he can honestly believe. This world cannot be made otherwise 
than in his own image; it is fated to remain individual and a little mysterious, 
and yet it must resemble something already familiar to the experience, the 
thoughts and the sensations of his readers.
86
   
 
Conrad’s narratives of difference offer not so much the pleasure of masculinist 
adventure tale along the lines of Henry Rider Haggard’s fiction but rather showcase 
the “dialogic tensions and interpretive indeterminacies incompatible with the 
uncritical reproduction of Victorian ideologic (and generic) norms and goals.”87 
Essentially containing the irresolvable aporia between phenomenological experience 
and logical knowledge, private ambivalence and political presupposition, Conrad’s 
works problematize the narratives of imperial romance that contained the Social-
Darwinist rhetoric of civilizational supremacy used to legitimize imperial 
territorialisation.
88
 More significantly, with its experiments in language that sought 
to capture the human thought processes, Conrad’s writing instantiates “the tensions 
of a split heritage, divided between the demands of the adventure and the ‘literary’ 
novel.”89 The literariness in Conrad’s writing emerges as a self-reflexive awareness 
of its own epistemological process – thus reflecting the ambivalence of the self-
reflecting human mind – as well as “the rhetorical strategy of negation by which 
Western writing conceives of the Other as absence, emptiness, nothingness, or 
death.”90 But what problematizes the politics of narration furthermore is the manner 
in which the nothingness and excess that the perceiving mind seeks to project onto 
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the ‘Other’, comes back to consume itself. Such a reversal is enacted through 
articulation by unsure and nervous narrators, who flag up their failures to negotiate 
with their narratives, in inconclusive tales of guilt and unresolved melancholia.  
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2.6 Existentialist and Cognitive crisis in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
 
2.6.1 Conrad and his Contemporary Discourses on Nerves 
 
It needs to be borne in mind that Conrad was writing at a time when neurology was 
first being scientifically systematized in medical analyses. As the Nobel Prize 
winning neuroscientist Eric Kandel elucidates in his research on the modes of 
memory, the 1890s were the time when the notion of the nervous system was first 
being formulated through empirical medical discourse and most notably in the works 
of Santiago Raman y Cajal, a Spanish painter turned neuroscientist who was the first 
to offer a standardized knowledge of the shape of the nerve cell and the nature of 
neural transmission.
91
 Arguably the most influential neuroscientist who ever lived, 
Cajal elucidated the primary principles of the nervous system that revolutionized 
neuroscience. His description of the nervous system as an information circuit based 
on sending and receiving signals in set patterns across neurons was radically novel, 
replacing the model of anarchic interaction that was previously used to describe the 
brain.  
Cajal delineated three different types of neurons: the Sensory Neurons that 
connected the stimulus from the outside world to the various sense organs in the 
human body, the Motor Neurons that connected to muscle and gland cells, and the 
Interneurons that served as relays between the other neural transmissions. Most 
importantly, Cajal proved that neural transmissions took place between the axon of 
one neuron and the dendrite of the next, through a gap which was subsequently 
named (by the British neurologist Charles Sherrington) synapse, from the Greek 
synaptein meaning to bind together.  The synapse as taken up by Sherrington was the 
chief integer in the integrative structure of the nervous system that he subsequently 
described in medical vocabulary. The synapse was a space between two neurons 
where signals passed. It might also be read as a symbol for the space of nervous 
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negotiation that integrated the neural network of the human body. Cajal was actually 
introduced and made famous in England by Sherrington who, in his memorial to 
Cajal in 1949 stated that the latter  
[s]olved at a stroke the great question of the direction of the nerve-currents in 
their travel through brain and spinal cord [ . . .] [by showing] that each nerve-
path is always a line of one-way traffic only, and that the direction of that 
traffic is at all times irreversibly the same.
92
  
 
Sherrington himself in his influential work entitled The Integrative Action of 
the Nervous System analyzed the neural activities determining the human reflex, 
inferring that the normal functioning of the human nervous system was dependent 
upon the successful integration of the inhibition and excitation of neurons under 
stimuli. In a more elegant extension of Cajal’s inference, Sherrington discovered the 
mode of nervous transmission that Cajal himself had not anticipated in his largely 
anatomical study of the nerves. Rather than theorizing an unconditional flow of 
neural transmission, Sherrington inferred, after more extensive research, that certain 
neurons acted as inhibitory sites inasmuch as they stopped the flow of signals from 
emerging out of their presynaptic terminals. Thus the Sherringtonian synapse was a 
complex site of nervous negotiation which saw the relay of transmission as well as 
non-transmission, akin to telegraphic communication where signals are passed or 
withheld. Sherrington ascribed the power of integration of inhibition and excitation 
to the motor neuron that “totals up all the excitatory and inhibitory signals it receives 
from the other neurons that converge upon it and then carries out an appropriate 
course of action based on that calculation.”93 Sherrington’s concept of the synapse as 
a neurological unit of interaction helped formulate a structure of nervous 
transmission and an analysis of the neural behaviour associated with nervous 
perception and action.
94
  
 
Sherrington’s synapse immediately suggests parallels with the blank spaces 
in telegraphic transmissions; the sites where one transmission ended and the next 
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began.
95
 The corollaries between the human nervous system and telegraphic 
transmission were not unnoticed even by the natural scientists of the nineteenth 
century. Herbert Spencer, an important influence on neurologists such as John 
Hughlings Jackson, argued in his Principles of Psychology, that the evolutionary 
development of scientific intelligence was structurally and functionally comparable 
with the traffic of telegraphic transmission.
96
 In a similar vein, the American cultural 
critic George Prescott asserted that the telegraphic system, “in its most common 
form, communicating intelligence between distant places, performs the function of 
the sensitive nerves of the human body.”97 Functioning as a symbol for national 
integration as well as imperial expansion, the telegraph network was quickly 
correlated with the neural network of the human body. More significantly, the health 
and contingencies of both networks emerged as issues that reflected the broader 
anxieties, merging the body technologic and the body neurologic, the medical and 
the political realms of panic. It is therefore hardly surprising that nerves were such a 
significant site of contention in the late nineteenth century, a bio-political moment 
obsessed with eugenics and racial hygiene.   
 
Although there is no conclusive evidence for Conrad’s direct knowledge of 
the discoveries of the new neurology, it may be noted that Heart of Darkness was 
first published in 1899, the same year in which Cajal’s massive treatise Comparative 
Study of the Sensory Areas of the Human Cortex, was published to great critical 
acclaim. In his work on Conrad’s personal history of nervous illness, his fictional 
works and his contemporary medical culture, Martin Bock studies how the nervous 
experiences in Conrad’s fiction problematize nineteenth-century notions of hysteria 
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and its gender constructs. As Bock suggests, “Conrad lived at the moment of the 
birth of modern psychoanalysis and was also treated by physicians who were proto-
Freudian.”98 Freudian psychoanalysis may be read as the defining moment of 
hysteria’s transition from a typically female malady to a psychic disturbance that 
grows out of unresolved fear, shock or guilt. The masculine hysteria so pervasive in 
Conrad’s fiction corresponds – as Elaine Showalter suggests – to the unreliable 
narration of his male protagonists, and occupies the same historical moment when 
“Freud was exploring the unconscious.”99 In an interesting analysis in the same 
work, Showalter situates Conrad’s unreliable narration in its contemporary socio-
medical context, particularly in relation to Nordau’s definition of the degenerative 
hysterical subject consumed by emotionalism and excitability. A frequent sufferer of 
nervous breakdowns, Conrad’s personal familiarity with his contemporary popular 
discourses on nerves is evident in his letters to friends and colleagues.
100
 Connected 
to this was the issue of masculinity, as Conrad lived and suffered at a time when 
hysteria was changing from a typical female malady to a masculine condition. His 
fictional narratives – especially those that correspond to journeys to the ‘Other’ 
places of European imperialism – frequently depict nervous male protagonists in 
private and political panic.  This panic emerges in Conrad’s writing as a “narrative 
self-consciousness”101 that interrogates dominant and standardized bio-political 
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knowledge, while also incorporating the painful perceptions of changing self, body 
and language.   
As a cognitive condition that is re-experienced in the retrospective narrative, 
delayed decoding takes the reader “directly into the observer’s consciousness at the 
very moment of perception, before it has been translated into its cause.”102 Delayed 
decoding as a narrative strategy thus corresponds to a nervous condition painfully 
connected to the slowness of the cognitive process, drawing attention not only to the 
act of perception but also to the very act of narration itself while also defamiliarizing 
both. It is thus no surprise that Conrad’s narratives have attracted formalist critics 
who seek to study the politics of ostranenie.
103
 The aesthetics of defamiliarization in 
Conrad is most immediately evident in his Preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus” 
where he asserts his aim as an artist was “by the power of the written word to make 
you [the reader] hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, is to make you see.”104  The 
evocation of the human senses of percipience and perception that Conrad makes in 
this part of his Preface further corroborates the claim laid out here about the merging 
of the narratological and the neurological codes of cognition. Such a merging is of 
course further problematized by Conrad’s interrogations of the cognitive self through 
a communicative method that proceeds through “the connection between 
epistemology and narrative technique”.105 
The unreliability in the narrations of Conrad’s protagonists may also be read 
as the pointer to the nervous experiences that constitute the characters’ transition 
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from interpellated identities to ambivalent feeling subjects who recognize their loss 
of agency in a world of bio-political determinism. Such transitions in Conrad’s 
characters inform their existentialist realm of understanding through the 
phenomenological experience that also constitutes political scepticism. Nervousness 
in the Conradian narrative – manifested in deceptive appearances and delayed 
decoding – thus emerges as the panic that merges privately perceived political 
ambivalence with sensory instability. Such nervousness connects not only to the 
masculinity crisis in Conrad – whereupon the imperial masculine identity is 
deconstructed – but also informs the inward turn that opens the subject to an 
inconclusive existentialist enigma that may never be fully reported or articulated. 
The existentialist realm in Conrad’s narration is an extension of the embodied 
narration enacted by his characters, a mode whose “motivation is existential [as] it is 
directly connected with his [the narrator’s] practical experiences, with the joys and 
sorrows he has experienced, with his moods and needs.”106 The embodied nature of 
Marlow’s narration in Heart of Darkness – a “parabolic text”107 that incorporates a 
process of unveiling – is further heightened by a self-reflective quality “firmly 
constituted by the natural parameter of human consciousness, of experientiality.”108 
This experientiality – a cognitive category of the subject’s knowledge of its own 
unique subjectivity – is thus a phenomenological process as well as a biological one, 
and Conrad’s narrative method combines the two realms through its embodied 
narrativity. A study of Conrad’s narrative technique in Heart of Darkness as a 
decelerated defamiliarized sensory process may be made by locating the text in its 
contemporary scene in neurology as well as by interpreting it with current theories 
that seek to bridge phenomenology and cognitive science.  
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2.6.2 Conrad’s Delayed Decoding as the Narration of Nervous Experience 
 
 
In a letter to H.G.Wells on 30 November 1903, Conrad commented on his view of 
writing thus: “[F]or me, writing—the only possible writing—is just simply the 
conversion of nervous forces into phrases.”109 Pervasive throughout Conrad’s 
narratives – especially in Heart of Darkness – is the manner in which the nervous 
experience and the traumatic encounter of the human subject are translated into 
language. As Richard Ambrosini argues, “Heart of Darkness is the furthest point in 
Conrad’s attempt to communicate his intended effect through a suggestive language 
paralleled by an extra-fictional communication.”110 Part of the difficulty and density 
of expressions in Conrad’s writing can thus be attributed to the efforts on the part of 
his narrators to communicate what Virginia Woolf classified as the language of 
illness which is “more primitive, more sensual, more obscene”, a form of expression 
in which “things are said, truths are blurted out”.111 In its effort to articulate 
embodied experientiality, Conrad’s writing curiously connects also to the “nerve 
language”112 described in the memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber, the German judge 
who suffered from dementia and was posthumously (and textually) interpreted by 
Freud.
113
 Conrad’s writing thus corresponds to the embodied expression whereby the 
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knowledge of the self can only arise from a heightened awareness of the self’s 
unique subjective presence that resists symbolic realms. More importantly, the 
delayed nature of his protagonists’ decoding supports the idea that increasingly 
interests researchers in cognitive phenomenology, one that states that“time comes 
into being as a function of our embodied interaction with the world.”114 
First used by Ian Watt and described as the “forward temporal progression of 
the mind, as it receives messages from the outside world, with the much slower 
reflexive process of making out their meaning”115, Conrad’s delayed decoding has 
received ample attention from literary critics who have seen it as a strategy of 
narrative apprehension, of a deliberate frustration of linear temporality and politics 
of perception.
116
 But few have drawn attention to the neurological dimension 
suggested in Conrad’s use of this narrative technique. As the “gap between 
impression and understanding”117, delayed decoding may be interpreted as much 
through neurological theories as narrative ones. It entails the representation of a 
nervous and incomplete interpretation of the immediate source of stimuli. The 
feeling and speaking subject thus attempts to negotiate between the perception of the 
sent stimulus and its articulation. The delayed decoding in Conrad and the strategy of 
seeking to speak to the senses, are both premised on the failed attempt to 
communicate subjective experience in language, in the complex framework of 
narratives within narratives.  
 
Points of view emerge as pivotal in an understanding of the stream of 
consciousness within Heart of Darkness. The novel depicts complex conflations and 
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super-impositions of several points of view: Marlow’s on Kurtz’s, Marlow’s on the 
various reporters on Kurtz, the inset narrator’s on Marlow, the inset narrator’s on 
Marlow’s point of view on his immediate audience which also includes the inset-
narrator. There is thus a self-reflexive circuit of points of view within the narrative 
that is a story of repression, entropy and loss. Such traffic of perspectives brings into 
play various varieties of reference within the narrative which disturbingly depicts 
how the subject’s objective conception of its environment also constitutes a detached 
notion of itself as an object in the same perceptual field.
118
 Heart of Darkness is 
unique in the manner in which the subjective experience of shock is brought into 
being through language and how language therefore informs experience rather than 
simply describing it.
119
 Moreover, as Bruce Johnson contends, Conrad’s delayed 
decoding “resembles the attempt of Hemingway and before him of Mark Twain to 
recognize that there is no such thing as an isolated and meaningful fact or event or 
object. Meaning [. . .] is a function of connectedness.”120 The cognitive complexities 
of Conrad’s narrators correspond closely to their emotional crises that collectively 
point to the panic of agency. The linguistic crisis – manifested in clumsy expressions 
and self-conscious unreliability – suffered by Conrad’s nervous male protagonists 
ironically underline the existentialist insight they eventually and painfully attain out 
of their subjective experiences in panic and doubt.  
 
An obvious pointer to the existentialist crisis faced by the masculine subject 
in a defamiliarized space time, the delayed decoding so characteristic of the 
Conradian narrative emerges as a nervous condition that showcases a slowing down 
of the cognitive process. This is evinced in Heart of Darkness in Marlow’s travel up 
the Congo where the forests around appear as effects even before their objectivity is 
cognized by the perceiving mind. A narrative as well as a cognitive principle of 
perception, delayed decoding can offer rich analogical responses to readings in 
neuroscience as a deliberation on the neural flow in the human machinery of 
cognition. This also expounds the close correspondences between the nervous and 
the narrative economy that characterize Heart of Darkness as Marlow travels 
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through the Congo between various telegraphic stations and famously sees the effect 
of the shower of arrows on his senses before decoding their materiality. The passage 
deserves to be quoted in full in order to depict the deferral in the cognitive process 
involved in the act:  
 
Then I had to look at the river mighty quick because there was a snag in the 
fairway. Sticks, little sticks, were flying about, thick; they were whizzing 
before my nose, dropping below me, striking behind me against my pilot-
house. All this time the river, the shore, the woods were very quiet—
perfectly quiet. I could only hear the heavy splashing thump of the stern-
wheel and the patter of these things. We cleared the snag clumsily. Arrows, 
by Jove! We were being shot at!  (HD 45-46) 
 
The representation of the cognitive process in operation here moves from the 
effect to the cause, from the unsettled impression of the object to the solid 
materiality of the same. As the phenomenological break between seeing and 
understanding, the delayed decoding in Heart of Darkness emerges as miscognition 
as well as a deliberate narrative misrepresentation that retrospectively attempts to 
transform a subjective moment of cognitive crisis into an intersubjective experience 
through language. The politics of narration in Heart of Darkness is premised on the 
effect that is conveyed through “juxtaposition between a story of ‘what happened’ to 
Marlow and a tale of the effect that those events had on him.”121 Marlow seeks to 
secure his original moment of confusion by retaining its real sensation within his 
narrative frames. His narration thus problematizes the classic hermeneutic reading of 
the subject’s use of retention as a form of intentionality where content is no longer 
real sensation but an intentional presence.
122
 The deliberate misrepresentation of 
objects by retaining the original moment of confusion recurs in Heart of Darkness in 
Marlow’s report of his mistaken analysis of the shrunken heads on poles in Kurtz’s 
island, heads that had initially appeared through his binoculars as decorative or 
totemic balls. As he remedies his earlier misrepresentation, Marlow reports: 
These round knobs were not ornamental but symbolic; they were expressive 
and puzzling, striking and disturbing—food for thought and also for vultures 
if there had been any looking down from the sky [. . .] They would have been 
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even more impressive, those heads on the stakes, if their faces had not been 
turned to the house. (HD 57) 
 
 Marlow’s misinterpretation at a point in the past is thus reported in its original 
temporal structure in the present time to his listeners. In his analysis of Conrad’s 
narrative mode and its delayed decoding, Edward Said suggests that the “details of 
reality” in Conrad, “are realized by the recollecting mind” which retraces “the 
designs of experience.”123 The double-helical narrative and the repetition of the same 
event with different interpretations articulate the panic perceived in the past that 
lingers into the present. This narrative strategy of communicating nervousness 
through repetitions thus connects to the broader masculinity panic that Marlow is 
subjected to in the heart of darkness. Patricia Waugh analyses the shrunken-heads 
episode in Heart of Darkness and argues how it exemplifies the convergence of 
cognitive and narrative planes in the novel at a temporal level, a convergence that 
informs the epistemological enigma in Conrad’s story about negative enlightenment 
and existentialist crisis: 
The narrating Marlow, of course, has known all along the identity of the 
round balls, but has chosen to inhabit the perspective of the experiential 
character. Reader and listener share his slow approach, with some trepidation 
and much anticipation, to Kurtz’s station, awaiting the first signs of the 
embodiment of that Voice heard though Marlow’s narrative. [. . .] Because 
the reader experiences Marlow’s original sensory confusion, his current 
interpretative problems appear to be simply one more layer of 
epistemological uncertainty.
124
    
    
Delayed decoding as a narrative strategy appears also in The Shadow Line 
(1916), “an elaborately-structured text involving various forms of distance and 
mediation.”125 This features most immediately in the novella where the narrator 
describes the rain, first by its effects on his senses, and then by its material and real 
presence. The passage from the novel (where the word ‘delayed’ itself emerges with 
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its palpable effect on the cognitive brain) depicts the difficulties of description as 
well as the self-reflective process of cognition: 
I became bothered by curious, irregular sounds of faint tapping on the deck. 
They could be heard single, in pairs, in groups. While I wondered at this 
mysterious devilry, I received a slight blow under the left eye and felt an 
enormous tear run down my cheek. Raindrops. Enormous. Forerunners of 
something. Tap. Tap. Tap. . . . . [. . . ] Suddenly—how am I to convey it? 
Well, suddenly the darkness turned into water. This is the only suitable 
figure.
126
 
The passage problematizes the normal process of cognition in which conscious 
experience is integrated in the brain through the process of decoding allowed through 
a nervous system which also works as “an information network [. . .] [that] generates 
and transmits information in accordance with definite natural codes.”127 This 
problematization is done by a deliberate defamiliarization of the cognitive process as 
well as by situating the sentient self in the drama of its own delayed decoding. Thus 
the difficulty of communication becomes the core content of the passage as the tap 
sounds turn into rain and the darkness turns into water. More significantly, the 
moment of cognition merges with the moment of embodiment in this passage, 
whereby the raindrops are recognized only when those touch the subject’s body. The 
embodied cognition triggers the meaningful experiential process through which the 
subject becomes its self through an integration of information and awareness.
128
 The 
emergence of the corporeal fleshy frame as the site of cognitive certainty in this 
description by Conrad connects to the phenomenological view of the body’s 
“double-belongingness to the order of the ‘object’ and to the order of the 
‘subject.’”129 This passage is remarkable in the manner in which the awareness of the 
object emerges as subordinate to the awareness of the process of awareness itself. 
Secondly, its phrase – “How am I to convey it?” – illustrates how the crisis of 
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intentionality is mapped onto the crisis of language as the subject struggles to find 
the appropriate metaphor that would connect to the irreducible cognitive process.
130
  
Perhaps the darkest passage containing delayed decoding in Conrad occurs in 
The Secret Agent (1907) in the scene where Winnie Verloc stares at the corpse of her 
husband whom she has hysterically murdered to avenge the death of her brother 
Stevie. After the murder and standing in the stillness of her drawing room that looks 
perfectly respectable and domestic, Winnie perceives the increasing presence of a 
ticking sound in the room that cannot possibly have emerged from the wall clock that 
has no audible ticking mechanism. The passage tracks the flicking eye that seeks to 
trace the sound and decode it through a series of cinematic close-ups that represent 
the characteristic process of cognition: 
By the position of the body the face of Mr Verloc was not visible to Mrs 
Verloc, his widow. Her fine, sleepy eyes, travelling downward on the track of 
the sound, became contemplative on meeting a flat object which protruded a 
little beyond the edge of the sofa. It was the handle of the domestic carving 
knife with nothing strange about it but its position at right angles to Mr 
Verloc’s waistcoat and the fact that something dripped from it. Dark drops 
fell on the floorcloth one after another, with a sound of ticking growing fast 
and furious like the pulse of an insane clock. At its highest speed this ticking 
changed into a continuous sound of trickling. Mrs Verloc watched that 
transformation with shadows of anxiety coming and going on her face. It was 
a trickle, dark, swift, thin . . .  Blood!
131
 
The passage, with its delayed decoding, enacts a double defamiliarization. Firstly, 
the deadness of Mr Verloc is almost effaced with images of domesticity and 
respectability such as the carving knife and Mr Verloc’s waistcoat. Secondly, the 
depiction of the dripping sound of blood (that is decoded after much delay) is first 
correlated with the sound of the ticking clock, again a perfectly domestic drawing 
room device. What modern neuroscientists classify as the distinction between simple 
awareness and reflexive awareness is amply evident in Conrad’s depiction here, 
where the immediate cognitive function of language is compromised by a painfully 
heightened attention of the mind to its own process of cognition.
132
 As a novel with 
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an overt and a covert plot where “there are troubling resemblances between the 
world of the authorities and the world of subversion” and where the two realms 
“blend, part and blend again”133, Conrad’s The Secret Agent is about the panic of 
human agency in a world of bio-political terrorism.
134
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
analyse how the units of consciousness (qualia) proceed by forging links between the self and objects, 
a link that emerges as compromised due to exposure to defamiliarized paradigms of experience that 
Conrad’s narrators undergo. Alluding to the work of Damasio on the cognitive role of emotions, 
Solms and Turnbull argue that “consciousness consists of awareness of what is happening around us, 
grounded in a background medium of self-awareness” (93). In Conrad, this background medium of 
self-awareness is painfully heightened to such a degree through the characters’ inward turn, that the 
awareness of what is happening around is compromised. Thus it may be argued that the epistemology 
of narration in Conrad is synchronic with the slippage between the narrative self and its awareness of 
its own emerging consciousness. 
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2.6.3 Reading the delayed decoding in Heart of Darkness with current theories 
in Cognitive Neuroscience 
 
It is interesting to interpret the human experience depicted in Heart of Darkness with 
some current theories of cognitive neuroscience that investigate what makes or un-
makes the human subject’s awareness of its own self. In particular, it is intriguing to 
see how Marlow’s autobiographical self – the form of “extended consciousness” that 
constitutes complex concepts and language – is both compromised and informed by 
the unresolved experiences embedded in his proto self, normally characterised by 
“interconnected and temporarily coherent collection of neural patterns which 
represent the state of the organism.”135 The unresolved nervous experiences 
embodied by Marlow manifest not only in his physical state of “shuddering wonder, 
like a passage through some inconceivable world that had no hope in it and no 
desire” (HD 70) but also in the traumatic repetition of nervousness in failing 
language. Conrad’s novella actually situates language as the space that self-
reflexively foregrounds subjective proprioception that the neurologist Charles 
Sherrington had classified in 1906 as the “sixth sense.”136 The epistemology of the 
feeling and speaking self in Heart of Darkness exhibits how the crises of embodied 
experientiality and temporality are connected and disconnected through failures in 
cognition, narration and articulation. Such failures in Conrad’s narrative emerge in 
connection to broader structures of private ambivalence and political panic.   
 
The anthropological debates prevalent in modern neuroscience offer 
interesting interpretations of the truly complex phenomena of delayed decoding 
evidenced in Conrad’s fiction. Stephen Levinson argues that “linguistic patterns 
point to some systematic differences in the cognitive style with which individuals of 
different cultures deal with space.” This idea offers the context-specific attributes 
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that can be neuroscientifically taken up in order to arrive at an integrative analysis of 
various material and aesthetics cultures and creating a condition whereby “cognition 
is the intermediate variable that promises to explain cultural propensities in spatial 
behaviour, and language may offer us more than privileged access to it.”137  
Language itself emerges in Conrad’s narratives less as a signifier of stable 
communicative ontology than as an epistemological process that attempts to 
articulate meanings that lie not embedded inside but perpetually extended outside the 
narrative, “enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out the 
haze, in the likeness of one of those misty halos that, sometimes, are made visible by 
the spectral illuminations of moonshine” (HD 9).  
 
In his analysis of the contexts in Heart of Darkness, Cedric Watts delineates 
four principal strategies of narration in Conrad apart from delayed decoding: 
empirical hyperbole, reductive reification, dwarfing perspective and the frustrating 
context. These strategies play up the experientiality of the sentient subject over and 
above the purely functional frame of language.
138
 The impact of the spoken word on 
the senses of the hearer is frequently described by Conrad as a complex cognitive 
process in the brain. The narrator of The Shadow Line thus insists:   
 
The word ‘Delay’ entered the secret chamber of my brain, resounded there 
like a tolling bell which maddens the ear, affected all my senses, took on a 
black colouring, a bitter taste, a deadly meaning.
139
  
 
The passage depicts Conrad’s attempts at connecting cognition with narrative 
technique, showing the effect of a spoken word on the sensory signals across the 
brain. Through the slowness of sensory reception that draws attention to the process 
of perception itself, this passage reveals “the complex cascade of [neural] processes 
[that] underlie our capacity for understanding.”140 More significantly, the passage 
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demonstrates how the normal brain processes through which the familiar spoken 
word is perceived are compromised during heightened feelings and nervousness. 
Remarkable in Conrad’s description here is the manner in which the aural register is 
informed by the visual as well as the gustatory registers as the sound of the word 
“delay” takes on a black colour and a bitter taste. The confusing convergence of the 
different realms of sense in this passage – the word “delay” is reported to have 
affected all senses – may be analysed as a disturbance of what modern 
neuroscientists describe as the “telepathic activity” involved in speaking and hearing, 
whereby the sense of hearing carries also a “mental image.”141 Such disturbance and 
cognitive confusion in Conrad’s narratives emerge as a nervous condition that 
underpins the existentialist crisis of the feeling subject. Delayed decoding in Conrad 
emerges as a unique language of deferral and as a metonymy of (mis)-cognition, 
reversing the normative model of perception located at the site of nervousness and 
nervous masculinity. This is amply evinced in Heart of Darkness in Marlow’s 
admission of his own failure to narrate the complete effect of one of his 
“inconclusive experiences” (HD 11) to a group of Londoners reposing at the heart of 
the Thames, enacting a process where “the telling, rather than the event itself, 
generates meaning.”142    
Many twenty-first century theories in neuroscience – especially those that 
study synaptic plasticity – place extra emphasis on the effect of the surroundings and 
social impact of the nature of cognition and the epistemology of the cognitive self. 
According to such research:  
The self can be understood in terms of brain systems involved in learning and 
storing information, in explicit and implicit systems, about things that are 
significant in people’s lives. The processing by these systems always occurs 
in a physical and social context (a situation) and is performed by networks 
that function the way they do because of both genetic inheritance and past 
experience.
143
     
Cognition is thus a function of inherited ideologies as well as social situations and 
the difficulty and delay in decoding the immediate environs around him puts Marlow 
in the crossroads between cognitive inheritance and acculturation. In a section 
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entitled “Synaptic Trace and Psychic Trace”, the neuroscientists Ansermet and 
Magistretti study the manner in which images from memory are re-coded through a 
“synchronous synaptic activity” through which perception is registered through 
linguistic signifiers pre-known to memory and the social self. The authors offer the 
example of a skyscraper at night that is gradually and incrementally lit up by 
hundreds of little lights that eventually form a huge Christmas tree. It is interesting to 
compare this image with that of Marlow’s vision of showers around him in the ship 
along Congo before decoding those as arrows. In the case of the scene in the 
skyscraper, a “synchronous synaptic activity is activated when the memory of a 
Christmas tree materializes: there is a synaptic coding of the representation”.144 
Conversely, Marlow’s experiences in the Congo involve an exposure to an 
unfamiliar symbolic system that re-situates his synaptic structure, thus 
problematizing his erstwhile synaptic coding and resulting in his delayed decoding 
of the external referent. The indeterminacy of sensory interpretation that Marlow 
experiences in his voyage up the Congo, seems to support the modern neuroscientific 
theory which suggests that learning and unlearning are both processes of “emotional 
associations [that] are formed by synaptic changes in the brain system involved in 
processing the stimuli.”145 Conrad’s narrative thus highlights the context-sensitive 
nature of the neural cognitive process and conflates the crisis of cognition with that 
of the existentialist self. The narrative process in Heart of Darkness is further 
complicated by the non-linear temporal movements between the lived disturbance 
and its articulation. The narrative of defamiliarization and delayed decoding in 
Conrad’s novella thus corresponds closely to the true idiom of a life which is a 
“permanent shuttling back and forth between the moment (when the primary sensory 
systems are in action) and the recall of representations (when the memory systems 
are active).”146 
Modern neuroscientists have come to classify the cognitive process involved 
in recollection as constituting an explicit memory system (one that encodes 
information and later integrates the same into memory), an imagery system, a 
language system and a narrative reasoning system (one that is instrumental to the 
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production of narrative from events in memory).
147
 Thus the cognitive psychologist 
William Brewer defines narrative discourse as a system that “attempts to embody in 
linguistic form a series of events that occur in time [. . .] the cognitive structure 
underlying narrative is the mental representation of a series of temporally occurring 
events that are perceived as having causal or thematic coherence.”148 What is 
emphasized in Brewer’s analysis is the link between language and cognitive ability 
and how narrative reasoning reflects the cognitive processes whereby the 
narratological politics extends the constructions of cognitive processes. Likewise, the 
cognitive theorist Jerome Bruner asserts the importance of narrative as a mode of 
thought in itself, one that attempts to “locate the [cognitive] experience in time and 
space.”149 Delayed decoding in Conrad emerges as a phenomenological convergence 
of the cognitive and the narrative realms of reasoning that is extended into an 
existentialist awareness of the limitations of the constructed self. Conrad’s narrative, 
in showcasing “the workings of the human mind attempting to come to terms with 
the flux of experience”150, reveals the fractures in time and space in a narrative 
consciousness that attempts to inscribe an awareness of its own incompletion. The 
complex communication that emerges in the narrative of Heart of Darkness seems to 
borrow mechanisms of nervous as well as telegraphic circuits, creating in turn 
nervous communities of whisperers and over-hearers in a novel about the failure in 
communication, one that famously flags up Conrad’s private belief that “realism in 
art will never approach reality.”151  
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2.6.4 Heart of Darkness and the Crisis of Representation 
 
Attempting to narrate his nervousness to a European audience “moored with two 
good addresses like a hulk with two anchors, a butcher round one corner, a 
policeman round another” (HD 48), Marlow realizes the futility of the process. 
Along with the more ostensible themes of degeneration panic and imperialist 
territorialisation, Heart of Darkness, with its aporetic apperceptions and delayed 
decoding, holds up a mirror to Conrad’s own theorizing on the nature of writing. It is 
most abundantly explicated in his Preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus” — a 
passage that “remains by default the most reliable and the most voluntary, single 
statement of Conrad’s general approach to writing”152— where he states that the 
appeal of art to be effective  
[m]ust be an impression conveyed through the senses [. . .] All art, therefore, 
appeals primarily to the senses, if its highest desire is to reach the secret 
spring of responsive emotions. It must strenuously aspire to the plasticity of 
sculpture, to the colour of painting, and to the magic suggestiveness of music, 
which is the art of arts.
153
  
The sensory quality of art advocated here by Conrad appears similar to the works on 
embodied emotions by psychologists in late nineteenth century who emphasized the 
cognitive role associated with in the affective sensory process.
154
 Marlow in Heart of 
Darkness emerges as an unreliable and nervous narrator who, with “the stammerings 
of his conscience and [. . .] the outspoken consciousness of the difficulties of his 
work”155 points to the phenomenological break between inadequacies of normative 
narratives and cognitive codes of his day.  
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More significantly, the difficulty and delay in decoding the signs around, also 
points towards the broader issue of the location of the sentient subject in modernity. 
This is strongly suggested by Michael Levenson who argues:  
[a] condition that persists all through Conrad’s work, a radical disorientation 
that obliterates any stable relation between the self and the world, and that 
raises the question of whether there is a world to go to which the self 
belongs. The fragility of identity, the barriers to knowledge, the 
groundlessness of value—these great Conradian (and modern) motifs appear 
most often in terms of sensory derangement that casts the individual into 
unarticulated space, a space with no markers and no boundaries, with nothing 
behind, nothing above, nothing below.
156
  
 
Among the several points of interest in Levenson’s analysis is the manner in which 
language (with its epistemology of lack) in Conrad emerges simultaneously with the 
politics of space and its absence in Heart of Darkness, a novel about the loss of 
agency, whose narrative “seemed to shape itself without human lips in the heavy 
night-air of the river” (HD 30).  
 As Judith Ryan argues, “interior monologue, developed towards the end of 
the nineteenth century as another mode of expressing subjectivity, was increasingly 
infiltrated by non-vocal particles as the influence of empiricist psychology made 
itself felt.”157 Conrad’s interest in the physics of his day is well-known,158 but what 
emerges as fundamental in Heart of Darkness is the speaker’s “seemingly endless 
pursuit of the quality of solidity in things”159 in a world where a white fog “very 
warm and clammy, and more blinding than the night”, stands all around the feeling 
subject “like something solid” (HD 41). It is this enquiry into the ontology of solidity 
that invests Conrad’s novella with the futility that fascinates even as it frustrates, as 
                                                          
156
 Michael Levenson, Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelists from 
Conrad to Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 6. While enunciating the general 
signifiers of the crisis of modernity in Conrad’s narratives, Levenson’s analysis also draws attention 
to the spatial annihilation that accompanies the process, thus arguing how collapse of linguistic 
systems in Conrad is indissolubly interwoven with the collapse of spatial systems while the speaking 
subject is subjectivized by a defamiliarized world. 
157
 Ryan, The Vanishing Subject, 229.  
 
158
 For Conrad’s interest in Maxwell’s theories, see Redmond O’Hanlon, Joseph Conrad and Charles 
Darwin, 11-15.  
 
159
 Bernard C. Meyer, Joseph Conrad: A Psychoanalytic Biography (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1967) 32.  
 68 
 
evinced by Marlow’s exclamation of narrative anguish at the terror of his narrative’s 
translucence in Heart of Darkness:   
Do you see him? Do you see the story? Do you see anything? It seems to me 
I am trying to tell you a dream—making a vain attempt, because no relation 
of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of absurdity, 
surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, that notion of 
being captured by the incredible which is the very essence of dreams [. . .] It 
is impossible. We live, as we dream—alone . . . (HD 30) 
 
Marlow’s agony over his inability to narrativize his experience corresponds to the 
sense of loss and lack that the sentient self experiences in its arrival in the realm of 
the symbolic. What emerges self-evident from the passage is Conrad’s strategy of 
undermining the narrative structure of imperialist adventure romance with Marlow’s 
interruptions which “are meant to question the very possibility of investing the 
words with concrete details.”160 Situated as it is in a complex bio-political culture of 
anxiety and panic, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness articulates “the restiveness about 
representation in the later nineteenth century – a restiveness shared, and crossing to 
and from, between physicists, philosophers, and poets.”161  More significantly, the 
crisis in representation here points also to the crisis of intentionality – the “directness 
upon an object, the hallmark of intuitive mental states”162 – that characterises 
Marlow’s struggle in articulation.  
The crisis of the object in his story – one that relates directly to the 
masculinity crisis in the real political space
163
 – does not allow Marlow to translate 
his subjective experientiality into an intersubjective narrative. The lack of solid 
objects in his story – a lack that Marlow is increasingly and painfully aware of – 
emerges as a failure to trigger “meaningful construals” that proceed by interpreting 
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“how the objects and actions depicted in language relate to embodied 
possibilities.”164 As modern medical scientists and practitioners increasingly affirm: 
The symbolic/story-making process is not an abstract one that goes on 
somewhere in the intellect, or solely in the white and grey matter of the 
cortex. Rather, that in relay with the brain, narratives are processed and 
programmed into the rest of the body: the musculature and autonomic 
nervous system; that whole domain of feelings: of rage, of pain, of joy, the 
felt responses to information that we ceaselessly call emotions.
165
 
Marlow’s narrative crisis corresponds to the distinction that Arthur Frank makes 
between lived chaos and its retrospective narration. While Marlow’s story notionally 
occupies the retrospective frame recounting events from the past, he does not gain 
the introspective distance that is required to organize the chaos into a verbally 
meaningful shape. What emerges in Marlow’s tale is thus “an anti-narrative of time 
without sequence, telling without mediation, and speaking about oneself without 
being fully able to reflect on oneself.”166 The attempt to make the story seen 
corresponds to Conrad’s own stated project in the Preface to The Nigger of the 
“Narcissus” but in the case of Marlow in Heart of Darkness, it emerges as the 
slippage between narrative and epistemic experience. Such slippage informs the 
absurd quality that Marlow discerns as characterising his own narrative, a quality 
that emerges out of the subject’s self-reflexive encounters with otherness as Marlow 
returns from the heart of darkness to the European metropolis. He thus carries with 
him and invests into his narrative “the shock waves of his encounter with Kurtz in 
the wilderness.”167  
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In his study of emotional experiences, William James takes up the 
irremediable sense of the absurdity of life and connects the same to the responses of 
the subject who undergoes psychological conversion. James’s theory of emotional 
change can offer interesting parallels with the existential crisis that characterises 
Marlow and his narration in Heart of Darkness. Thus, James argues: 
The mind is a system of ideas, each with the excitement it arouses, and with 
tendencies impulsive and inhibitive [similar to the Sherringtonian 
excitation/inhibition transmission paradigm], which mutually check or 
reinforce one another. The collection of ideas alters by subtraction or by 
addition in the course of experience, and the tendencies alter as the organism 
gets more aged. A mental system may be undermined or weakened by this 
interstitial alteration just as a building is, and yet for a time keep upright by 
dead habit. But a new perception, a sudden emotional shock, or an occasion 
which lays bare the organic alteration, will make the fabric fall together; and 
then the centre of gravity sinks into an attitude more stable, for the new ideas 
that reach the centre in the rearrangement seem now to be locked there, and 
the new structure remains permanent.
168
   
Marlow’s initiation into the horrors of imperialism in Heart of Darkness is akin to 
what James classifies as a conversion that comes with the existentialist knowledge of 
the uselessness of rituals that had previously served the subject. It thus appears as an 
aporia in the process through which the subject situates itself in relation to its 
surrounding world. Marlow’s continuous reference to “hearing” the voice of Kurtz 
appears to resonate with what James classifies as that emotional experience that 
changes previous structures of sentience that had characterised the subject. Thus 
Kurtz appears to Marlow as  
A voice. He was very little than a voice. And I heard—him—it—this voice—
other voices—all of them were so little more than voices—and the memory 
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of that time itself lingers around me, impalpable, like a dying vibration of one 
immense jabber, silly, atrocious, sordid, savage, or simply mean without any 
kind of sense. (HD 48-49)  
 
The impalpability of Kurtz is personal and sensory, as well as political and 
ideological, and Marlow’s voice-hearing in Heart of Darkness is characteristic of 
what Conrad himself had classified as a condition where the subject loses “all sense 
of reality in a kind of nightmare effect produced by existence.”169  
In his analysis of Conrad’s use of space and spatial politics in the narrative of 
The Secret Agent, Con Coroneos offers the term Enuncleation to suggest both the 
medical sense implying the removal of the core from a substance as well as a process 
of enunciation.
170
 This is most immediately evident in the description of Marlow’s 
narrative in Heart of Darkness as a scooped outside of a kernel, enveloping the tale 
which brought it out. The metonymic construct of Kurtz – he had been “educated 
partly in England [. . .] His mother was half-English, his father was half-French. All 
Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz” (HD 50) – if characteristic of the product 
perfected and manufactured by the industries and ideologies of European 
civilization, is also in itself a pointer to the impalpability that Marlow experiences as 
a narrator attempting to describe Kurtz’s presence. The indeterminacy that 
characterized the construct of Kurtz is rendered more explicit in the end when 
Marlow receives varying reports on Kurtz’s political and personal abilities from his 
various acquaintances and relatives. Marlow’s confusion about Kurtz, who remains 
more a voice and a spectral presence, is evident as he confesses: 
[t]o this day I am unable to say what was Kurtz’s profession, whether he ever 
had any—which was the greatest of his talents. I had taken him for a painter 
who wrote for papers, or else a journalist who could paint—but even the 
cousin (who took snuff during the interview) could not tell me what he had 
been—exactly. (HD 71) 
As an indeterminable quasi-physical presence that affects his existence, Kurtz 
emerges as a phantom limb in Marlow’s imagination, an amputated part of the past 
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that haunts the lived present.
171
 In his permanent condition of incompleteness and 
mystery, Kurtz remains for Marlow what Derrida had classified as an inaccessible 
articulation that instantiates the interstitial play between the spirit and the revenant, 
between disappearance and repetition. For Derrida, analysing the apparition of the 
inapparent: 
For there to be a ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body that 
is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenic process corresponds therefore to 
a paradoxical incorporation. Once ideas or thoughts (Gedanke) are detached 
from their substratum, one engenders some ghost by giving them a body. [. . 
.] a more acute specificity belongs to what could be called the “second” 
ghost, as incorporation of autonomized spirit, as objectivizing expulsion of 
interior idea or thought.
172
   
 
Derrida’s analysis of hauntology and the Freudian Unheimlich as a political 
as well as a bodily presence – a phenomenological construct that is reconfigured 
through an abstraction that is also a reification – is particularly pertinent to the figure 
of Kurtz in Heart of Darkness that emerges as an incomplete exorcism of the 
spectres of imperialist horrors. With his dialectic of the apparition of the body 
(appearing more as a voice than a living body that is always described through 
abstractions) and the body of the apparition (the posthumous voice that constructs its 
unique body against time), Kurtz appears to embody Derrida’s “second ghost” that is 
impossible to exorcise but must be mourned forever in a manner that rehearses a 
process of fetishisation.
173
 It is interesting to analyse how this process of fetishisation 
operates at a level of abstraction in Heart of Darkness. Thus Kurtz in Heart of 
Darkness embodies what Marlow at the beginning of the narrative had classified as 
an “idea”, “something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to” 
(HD 10), that desperate clinging on to an abstraction in an attempt to redeem the 
vulgar materiality of the machinery of imperialism. The almost mystic-religious 
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vocabulary of Marlow is important inasmuch as it relates to the contingency and 
crisis of cognition that appear subsequently in the narrative. It also juxtaposes the 
notional masculinity and cultural cognition while revealing the constructed qualities 
and inadequacies of both. Thus the abstraction that Marlow had classified at the 
beginning of the narrative as the sole redeeming quality of imperial territorialisation 
emerges through Heart of Darkness as the nemesis that is impossible to exorcise. 
Such abstraction can also be classified only through a vocabulary of violence and an 
ideology that is painfully preserved through a system of lies. A symptom born out of 
the strategy of abstraction that European imperialism required in order to reify its 
operative system, Kurtz becomes a renegade as well as a revenant at a political as 
well as an abstract level, ironically through an “over-identification” with the 
epistemic (and political) system and by thus turning into an “excess that the system 
has to eliminate.”174   
Marlow’s knowledge of the futility of his own narrative appears as an aporia 
as well as a privilege born out of an existentialist awareness of lack. The lack is 
informed through real material conditions as well as through an emotional imbalance 
through which Marlow feels “himself separate from the world he is physically part 
of”.175 The otherness of the real physical space appears dialogic with the crisis of 
cognition that the European imperialist experiences.  The crisis is constructed as well 
as exacerbated by the defamiliarized co-ordinates that inform Marlow’s mis-
cognition: 
We were cut off from the comprehension of our surroundings, we glided past 
like phantoms, wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be 
before an enthusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. We could not understand 
because we were too far and could not remember because we were travelling 
in the night of the first ages, of those ages that are gone, leaving hardly a 
sign—and no memories. [. . .] The mind of man is capable of anything—
because everything is in it, all the past as well as all the future. (HD 37-38) 
Marlow’s dislocation from his familiar cognitive culture underpins the 
defamiliarization that is a prelude to his final existential awakening.
176
 The passage 
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is remarkable in the manner in which it articulates the technique of defamiliarization, 
as an epistemological device that problematizes cultural narratives in relation to 
subjective experientiality. Conrad describes Marlow’s sensory experience as a 
journey into oblivion and loss as he glides down the Congo like a phantom, sensing 
his learnt memories disappear and struggling to perceive his sense of self.  Marlow 
thus suffers a loss of intentionality as the self-organizing ability of his consciousness 
is compromised in an uncanny landscape where his familiar cognitive coordinates 
change. 
 As the narrator of Heart of Darkness, Marlow is evidently aware of the 
inconclusive quality of his narration that borders on the absurd, and, appropriately 
enough, juxtaposes his nervousness and his narration in an attempt to account for his 
imperfect and frustrated articulation: 
“Absurd!” he cried. “This is the worst trying to tell. . . . Here you all are each 
moored with two addresses like a hulk with two anchors, a butcher round one 
corner, a policeman round another, excellent appetites, and temperatures 
normal—hear you—normal from year’s end to year’s end. And you say, 
Absurd! Absurd be—exploded! Absurd! My dear boys, what can you expect 
from a man who out of sheer nervousness had just flung overboard a pair of 
new shoes? (HD 48) 
 The passage is peremptory as well as loaded with anxiety in its fear of losing the 
attention of the audience, a fear that accentuates the loss 
177
 that Marlow is forced to 
embody through his narrative. As Robert Ambrosini suggests, Marlow’s narrative 
indeterminacy and loss of control “undermines the white man’s language – and 
consequently, many of the ideological presuppositions which ground his audience’s 
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response.”178 The absurd quality in Marlow’s narration of delayed decoding and 
cognitive collapse is almost apologetically attributed to the nervousness of the 
narrator himself while confronting experiential shifts in subjectivity. The “excellent 
appetites” and “temperature normal” that characterize his listeners are in sharp 
contrast to the narrator’s “lean appeared face [that] appeared worn, hollow, with 
withdrawn folds and drooped eyelids with an aspect of concentrated attention” (HD 
48) that emerge as obvious pointers to the hysteric knowledge of the horror that he 
cannot completely communicate.  
In effect, Marlow’s failure of narration in Heart of Darkness – a text that may 
be read as a “melancholic response to crisis”179 – enacts the epistemological enquiry 
into representation of the lost subject. The horror that Marlow cannot communicate 
in his narrative is as much mimetic as emotional and constitutes “a psychological 
confusion between self and other(s) which, in turn, deprives subjects of their full 
rational presence to selfhood”.180 Conrad’s novel is a graphic account of such failure 
of selfhood and its representation, one that converges with a political crisis in a real 
historical setting. More importantly, the uneasiness that Marlow’s tale contains and 
communicates “is precisely the effect of the tale’s reality which must linger on after 
the tale is over.”181 
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2.7 Heart of Darkness, Masculinity Panic and the Crisis of Agency  
 
In his work on the presentation of masculinity in Conrad’s fiction, Andrew Roberts 
studies how confession and overhearing feature as the two most prominent 
characteristics in Conrad’s narrative techniques. Added to this is the element of lying 
that emerges as a compulsive condition in Conrad’s tales of repression and guilt, 
highlighting the “complex interaction of the impulse to reveal and the impulse to 
conceal”.182  Heart of Darkness is a narrative of loss that is unreliably told by a 
speaker whose human will and agency are systematically consumed by the 
machinery of imperialism. The novel depicts the changes undergone by two 
masculine agents of the empire at the heart of darkness that is disturbingly 
discovered as a construct not of the commonly classified African atavism but rather 
of European imperialism itself. It is a narrative that leaves the borderlines between 
human will and human bondage, assertion and ambivalence, painfully unresolved.  
Thus the unreliability of Marlow as a narrator is simultaneously a pointer to 
the agony he cannot fully articulate as well as to the uniqueness he still preserves as 
a human subject, one whose subjective experientiality cannot be communicated in 
purely functional language. Likewise, the supposed degeneration of Kurtz from 
being a symbolic emissary of Enlightenment to an individual anarchic ruler who is a 
threat to European imperialism, may also be interpreted as an ironic and extreme 
assertion of agency in the face of totalitarian bio-political control. Indeed, Marlow 
recognizes Kurtz’s cry of horror as “an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by 
innumerable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions” (HD 70). 
The masculinity panic perceived by both Marlow and Kurtz – who come to be 
connected as hysterical men failing in their service to the empire – emerges as a 
complex combination of insight and guilt. The horror of imperialism and the death of 
agency in Heart of Darkness both constitute a hollowness that emerges from 
inauthentic existence. Such existence can only be resisted by an existentialist 
knowledge that can never be articulated except through a narrative of loss. 
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Perceived in a more cultural context, especially in relation to Marlow’s 
experiences inside the dark underbelly of European imperialism, the nervousness of 
his narrative is also a pointer to the disintegration that ensues “when an individual 
confronts traumatic events that shatter the coherence of his or her assumptive world, 
undermining taken-for-granted beliefs in life’s predictability, fairness, and essential 
benevolence.”183 The panic that comes to consume Marlow in his voyage up the 
Congo thus provides a perspectival shift in perception and cognition, altering his 
neural as well as narrative systems, as manifested by Conrad through the technique 
of delayed decoding. The shifts come with the erasure of previously learned and 
inherited cognitive patterns (hence objects appear increasingly dreamy and misty) as 
well as an initiation into new forms of meaning:  
You lost your way on that river as you would in a desert and butted all day 
long against shoals trying to find the channel till you thought yourself 
bewitched and cut off for ever from everything you had known once—
somewhere—far away—in another existence perhaps. There were moments 
when one’s past came back to one, as it will sometimes when you have not a 
moment to spare to yourself; but it came in the shape of an unrestful and 
noisy dream remembered with wonder amongst the overwhelming realities of 
this strange world of plants and water and silence. (HD 36)   
 
Heart of Darkness depicts panic at two levels. First, there is the immediate bodily 
and neural degeneration in line with the masculinity panic as embodied by Kurtz, 
who, despite being the perfect construct of the entirety of Europe, comes to be 
consumed by his failing nerves in the landscape of otherness that sees him perform 
and “preside at certain midnight dances ending with unspeakable rites” (HD 50). The 
second level of crisis emerges in the articulation of degeneration through techniques 
of defamiliarization, affecting the normal patterns of narrative adopted in 
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contemporary adventure narratives about the empire. This is characterized not only 
by delayed decoding but also by a fractured system of signs that frustrates all 
attempts at cognitive completion.  
The crisis of the cognitive self that Marlow experiences, emerges as a mode 
of deterritorialization that undermines narrative authority. This may be interpreted as 
the loss of what Mikhail Bakhtin classifies as “lateral transgradience”, the dialogic 
imagination in the process of meaning-making. Analysing the dialectics of 
Dostoevsky’s poetics, Bakhtin contends: 
The most important acts, constitutive of self-consciousness, are determined 
by their relation to another consciousness (a ‘thou’). Cutting oneself off, 
isolating oneself, closing oneself off, those are the basic reasons for the loss 
of self [. . .] To be means to communicate [ . . .] Man has no internal 
sovereign territory; he is all and always on the boundary; looking within 
himself he looks in the eyes of the other or through the other.
184
 
Bakhtin’s analysis serves to enunciate the necessity of intentionality that the 
narrative self must obtain ontologically by situating itself through other selves. 
Being is communicating in Bakhtin’s reading and the loss of understanding points to 
a bigger loss in the epistemology of the self. Conrad’s novella highlights such loss in 
its attempted explication of “the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an 
inscrutable intention” (HD 36). The inscrutability of intention – in an uncanny 
landscape where a combat warship fires away into a forest ceaselessly and 
meaninglessly with “a touch of insanity” (HD 17) – ironically informs the loss of 
intentionality in Marlow’s narrative. Thus instead of an intersubjective experience 
which may be dialogically imagined and communicated, Marlow is left only with an 
“epistemological solipsism”185 that extends into the existential enigma in the novel.  
The dialectic of masculinity panic and the crisis of agency that pervades 
Heart of Darkness, its depictions of delayed decoding and its politics of 
containment, emerges perhaps most powerfully at the end of the novel, in the much 
interpreted section where Marlow lies to Kurtz’s Intended about his dying words. 
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Analysing how the politics of retention is operative not just in the manner in which 
Kurtz’s Intended is lied to by Marlow but also in the way the reader is never actually 
given her real name beneath the statutory statement of pseudo-romance, Garrett 
Stewart states how the lie serves to situate the self-circulating circuit of deception, 
degeneration and deadness that creates a “spiritual negation zeroing in on a void.”186  
Read more politically, Marlow’s lie to Kurtz’s Intended, like the final exclamation of 
the horror of hollowness in Kurtz’s dying words, depicts the “full space in which the 
hollow of language assumes volume and size”187 and exposes the system of slippages 
that must be produced and perpetuated for the imperial elsewhere not to affect the 
‘centre’ of civilization. However, the episode is also interesting in the way it is 
similar to the machinery of telegraphic transmission as well as the way it resonates 
with the mode of nervous communication as theorized by Conrad’s contemporary 
neurology.  
Heart of Darkness ends with a moment of deception as Kurtz’s intended is 
lied to by Marlowe who strategically withholds the horror of Kurtz’s final epiphany 
of loss and instead sends a spurious consolation to the European woman (and to the 
docile domestic space she occupies) by asserting that Kurtz ended his life with her 
name on his lips. This episode can be read as a complex politics of (mis)transmission 
as Marlow enacts as a Sherringtonian synapse, a site of nervous negotiation between 
one neuron and the next. Acting as an agency of the empire, Marlow withholds the 
uncomfortable information from the European female and thus transforms the 
potential hysteric into an elegant mourner through a symbolic and strategic 
conversion therapy. As Robert Ambrosini suggests, the scene is marked by 
repression and nervousness whereby “the ambiguity of language creates an 
unbearable tension.”188 At a time when the neural network that preserved the strong 
European body and the telegraphic network that preserved the strong European 
empire were seen as structurally and functionally parallel, Marlowe’s mis-
information takes up a political as well as a medical significance. It resists the horror 
of the empire as well as the hysteria of the naïve female body by consuming the truth 
between two points of sentience and acting as a telegraphic blank as well as a neural 
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synapse where communication signals go astray. It is interesting to note that Kurtz’s 
dying words “The horror! The horror” had appeared to Marlow in the form of a 
“whispered cry” (HD 72), bearing a striking similarity to the mode of synaptic 
transmission that is described by the neuroscientist Eric Kandel as a mode that 
operates “like lips whispering very close to an ear”189. Whispering as a mode of 
communication recurs throughout Heart of Darkness – appropriately enough – in 
Marlow’s description of Kurtz’s (nervous) degeneration from being the model 
European to an atavistic avatar at the heart of anarchy: 
But the wilderness had found him out early, and had taken on him a terrible 
vengeance for the fantastic invasion. I think it had whispered to him things 
about himself which he did not know [. . .] and the whisper had proved 
irresistibly fascinating. (HD 57-58) 
 
The voice of Kurtz and his dying words that never disappear, keep 
consuming Marlow with their hauntological presence – he hears the whispered cry 
“The horror! The horror!” as he stands to wait for Kurtz’s Intended by a mahogany 
door.
190
 The passage where Marlow lies to Kurtz’s Intended deserves to be quoted 
fully in order to understand the drama of deception that operates like a nervous 
transfer as well as a strategic telegraphic transmission: 
 
“‘His last word – to live with,’ she insisted. ‘Don’t you understand loved him 
– I loved him – I loved him – I loved him.’ 
“I pulled myself together and spoke slowly. 
“‘The last word he pronounced was – your name.’ 
“I heard a light sigh and then my heart stood still, stopped dead short by an 
exulting and terrible cry, by the cry of inconceivable triumph and of 
unspeakable pain.. ‘I knew it—I was sure!’ . . . She knew. She was sure.” 
(HD 75-76) 
 
The moment of deception is also the moment of containment and consolation as the 
agent who returns from the heart of the colonial space strategically withholds 
information from the one who must perpetuate her location in logic and its strategic 
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structures of faith. The appeal to know the dying word of Kurtz informs the attempt 
to re-construct him through the logos that underpinned the ideology of logic and 
proportions characterizing nineteenth-century European Christianity as well as 
imperialism. In the beginning there was the word and at the end the word must be 
preserved into perpetuity for the logos to continue.  
 
Read more carefully, however, the passage depicts a double deception, as 
Marlow’s lie emerges as a compulsive act constructed out of coercion, as an 
annihilation of agency with the statement of non-truth forced out of him by the ritual 
of romance, in order that the ritual might continue. The vocabulary of the ritual is 
enacted not only in the dramatic repetition of “I loved him” but also sealed beyond 
interrogation by the statement of certainty (“I knew it—I was sure!”). In this reading, 
Kurtz’s intended emerges as the perfect performer in the play of mourning, with her 
mourner’s dress and elegant articulation of loss. Through his inability to utter the 
truth about Kurtz and in his compulsion to play the game by its rules, Marlow 
paradoxically comes to embody and perpetuate his own melancholia with an ever 
diminishing self-esteem.
191
 Marlow’s role as the imperial agent is thus most fully 
functional at the precise moment of the death of his human agency. Protecting the 
naive female in her mourner’s role, Marlow embodies the masculine hysteria that 
may never be explained or articulated in its combination of guilt and shame. This 
paradoxically informs the existentialist insight that he attains through his knowledge 
of loss as his nervous narrative ends at the “heart of an immense darkness” (HD 76). 
 
 In his analysis of the epistemology of modernity and masculinity in Heart of 
Darkness, Andrew Roberts points at “the linguistic, symbolic and emotional excess 
of the passage which includes the lie, the near-hysteria with which Marlow overloads 
his description of the meeting.”192 Heart of Darkness thus ends with a repressed 
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masculine hysteria and a continued culture of consolation and romance that cannot, 
nevertheless, contain its crisis despite its project to preserve normative imperial 
identity. The degeneration of Kurtz and the hysteria of Marlow both emerge as 
signifiers of a colonial trauma about which the European insider must continue to be 
misinformed. The politics of misinformation operates through a compulsive 
consumption of the truth enacted by the agency of colonial enterprise or through 
strategic coercion whereupon the accepted ritual of romance ensures its own 
perpetuation. The entirety of Europe constructs its fittest agent who becomes a 
degenerate in the African space through a pathological pleasure principle that 
manifests its decadence through a system of lies. In effect, Conrad’s novella is about 
the agony of the human agency at the heart of imperialism, which is described in all 
its degeneration and discontent. The horror that Kurtz utters and Marlow must not 
explain contains fin de siècle masculinity’s gaze into its own decadence, enacted 
through an epistemology of loss that informs the melancholia of existentialist 
awakening.  
  
The knowledge that Marlow gains from his journey into the heart of 
darkness, one that he cannot communicate or disclose (like the trade secret of the 
unnamed Belgian company he had worked for in the Congo), comes to enclose him 
with its hysteric formations. Thus, back in the sepulchral city of Brussels that sees 
little men run with their little business at the heart of the supposed centre of the 
world, Marlow confesses his impotent rage at the sight of such triviality:  
 
They were intruders whose knowledge of life was to me an irritating pretence 
because I felt so sure they could not possibly know the things I knew. Their 
bearing, which was simply the bearing of commonplace individuals going 
about their business in the assurance of perfect safety, was offensive to me 
like the outrageous flauntings of folly in the face of a danger it was unable to 
comprehend. (HD 70)    
 
As he “tottered about the streets” (70), the scene of urban life appears to Marlow as 
essentially one of ignorance and inanity and in his sense of his own superiority, 
Marlow exhibits Nordau’s analysis of the degenerate who “believes himself to be 
possessed by a peculiar insight lacking in other mortals” (Degeneration 19). 
Appearing as he does as a survivor of a war that had consumed the best of Europe, 
Marlow emerges as essentially incompatible with the seamlessness of the city and its 
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urban rituals. The privilege that Marlow ascribes to himself is thus also a loss, one 
that comes with the existentialist knowledge of the almost absolute inadequacy of the 
centres of civilization that run across the European metropolis and its mental life. 
 
Patrick Brantlinger classifies Heart of Darkness as a schizophrenic text 
“undercut both by its racism and its impressionism,”193 and the allusion to the latter 
is culturally significant given that the late nineteenth-century Impressionism in 
painting was categorized as a manifestation of degenerate impulse by Nordau.
194
 
Brantlinger’s reading is supported by the works of clinical psychologists who 
describe schizophrenia as an ipseity disturbance (a crisis in which the self struggles 
to see itself as one holistic entity) that is a curious combination of hyper-reflexivity 
(an exaggerated self-consciousness) and a diminution of the affective self’s 
awareness of itself.
195
 This is also supported by the theories of modern neuroscience 
which argues: 
 
When thoughts are radically dissociated from emotions and motivations, as in 
schizophrenia, personality can, in fact, change drastically. When emotions 
run wild, as in anxiety disorders or depression, a person is no longer the 
person he or she once was.
196
  
 
As he emerges after his experience of horror in Africa, and totters about the 
European metropolis nervously irritated, restlessly feverish and struggling to hold on 
to the respectable notion of the social self, Marlow exhibits an increased awareness 
of his self as well as a melancholic diminution in self-regard.
197
 Unsurprisingly, 
Marlow describes himself at this phase as “not very well” (HD 70), “grinning bitterly 
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Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 639.  
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 Joseph LeDoux, The Synaptic Self, 323-24. See also Shaun Gallagher, “Self-Narrative in 
Schizophrenia”, The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ed A.S. David and T.Kircher (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 336-57. 
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at perfectly respectable persons”(HD 70)  with a temperature that “was seldom 
normal in these days” (HD 70) thus establishing a close correspondence to the state 
of the Turgenevian Superfluous Man who embodies an “egoistic (albeit intelligent) 
sensibility, rather decadent or neurotic in its oscillations of mood; a cynical or ironic 
quality; and, above all, that sense of being superfluous, without role or function; 
isolated from society.”198 Moreover, Marlow’s uncontrollable gesture of grinning at 
strangers also corresponds to his loss of self-organization, a complex neural 
mechanism that is studied by modern cognitive neuroscience thus:  
 
Self-organization reduces the degrees of freedom for action until a human 
face becomes a context-appropriate “special device”, a smiling device, a 
frowning device, or whatever will suit the singular set of circumstances in 
which the action is situated. This capacity is creative and exquisitely context-
sensitive, in the sense that it produces a singular action tailored to a particular 
context.
199
 
 
Marlow’s detachment from context disturbs his nervous behaviour and 
compromises the innate creative ability to align one’s neural gestures into 
appropriate social situations. The loss that he embodies compromises Marlow’s 
conative self
200
 whereby “extreme grief” bypasses violence and “takes the form of 
                                                          
198
 Cedric Watts, A Preface to Conrad, 66. In his analysis of the Turgenevian Superfluous Man and 
the figures in which such attributes are replicated, Watts includes Eliot’s Prufrock, Sartre’s 
Roquentin, Camus’s Clamence and Beckett’s tramps. Watts’ choice of figures is interesting inasmuch 
as they are connected by a cynical irreverence towards the normative functional social and cultural 
systems, an irreverence that borders on the comic by the time one gets to Beckett. The Superfluous 
Man is a significant category to look at especially in an analysis of degeneration and masculinity 
crisis at the turn of the twentieth century. In their knowledge of the hollowness of the social and 
cultural rituals around them, the superfluous men in the literature of the twentieth century flagged up 
their uselessness in such systems of signification, often using metaphors of bodily and performative 
crises that is juxtaposed with their superior insight into the inanity of the social systems of 
signification.  
 
199
 Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 259.  
 
200
 The conative self refers to Spinoza’s notion of the conatus, the tendency to self-preservation that 
characterises all human beings and is innately related to their ability to feel and be emotional. A 
compromised conative self is thus accompanied by a loss of emotions as the subject feels herself less 
and less connected to her world. Spinoza’s notion of the conatus has been taken up by several modern 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio who study emotions as informing man’s cognitive and 
conative ability. The loss of the conative self is thus related to emotional apathy and indifference as 
the subject perceives herself as detached from her world. Damasio states how medical study of 
alienation and depression relates to an emptiness whereby the subject is “cut off from his or her 
conatus, from the tendency for self-preservation.” Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and 
the Feeling Brain (London: Heinemann, 2003) 139. In the same work, Damasio shows how Spinoza’s 
notion of the conatus influenced Freud’s idea of self-preservation (260). A similar view of self-
preservation is also suggested by the neuroscientist V.S.Ramachandran who states that “The brain is 
biologically programmed to value itself” and when this mechanism is compromised the subject 
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apathy” (HD 44). The uselessness that Marlow perceives as characterizing himself is 
situated in a society that is myopically and strategically oblivious to the horrors that 
must be consummated elsewhere for its functioning structures to be produced and 
perpetuated. The dialectic of privileged insight and loss that Marlow experiences is 
not unlike the impotent knowledge of hollowness that characterizes the masculinity 
crisis of the speakers in Eliot’s early poetry who flag up their nervous narratives and 
their incompletions.
201
 Ending as he does “in the pose of a meditating Buddha” (76) 
Marlow in Heart of Darkness becomes less a signifier of spiritual fecundity than a 
parody of the impotent seer who can pose like a prophet but is unable to articulate 
his knowledge of loss for “that would have been too dark—too dark altogether” (HD 
76). 
 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is a tale of terror that inverts the pleasure 
principle of imperial romance and instead offers a nervous narration of panic and 
crisis. A story told by an imperial agent, Heart of Darkness is about the death of 
agency in a landscape of greed and indeterminacy that is “a wanton smash-up” (HD 
20), where somebody had dug artificial holes that “might have been connected with 
the philanthropic desire of giving the criminals something to do” (HD 20). In its self-
reflexive epistemology of un-learning and un-certainty, Conrad’s novel situates a 
feeling and changing mind against a civilization that must pathologically perpetuate 
its ideologies through a “painful entanglement of falsehood and self-
contradiction.”202 In its articulation of failure and its failure of articulation, Heart of 
Darkness undercuts the imperialist arrogance of its times and offers a complex 
                                                                                                                                                                    
suffers“feelings of uselessness and futility (depression) culminating in suicide.” Ramachandran, 
“Introduction”, Consciousness and the Physical World, ed. B.D.Josephson and V.S.Ramachandran 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980) 13.  
 
201
 One can analyse Eliot’s Prufrock as a fallen flâneur who wanders about the metropolis acutely and 
nervously conscious of the inadequacies of his social and sexual self, thus embodying a masculinity 
crisis in a drama of decadence.  Like Conrad’s Marlow in Heart of Darkness, Prufrock admits to his 
inability to say just what he means, and follows the admission with the image of a magic lantern that 
throws –crucially enough in the context of this chapter’s analysis of language and nervous breakdown 
– the nerves in patterns on a screen. The theme of nervous breakdown and its corresponding collapse 
of communication are also manifested in Eliot’s The Waste Land that, with its backdrop of the First 
World War combines metropolitan violence with masculinity crisis.  
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 David Joravsky, “Between Science and Act: Freud versus Schnitzler, Kafka, and Musil”, The Mind 
of Modernism, 294. Joravsky interestingly contrasts Conrad’s Heart of Darkness with Kipling’s “The 
White Man’s Burden”, published in the same year, as suggests how Conrad’s depiction of uncertainty 
and alienation – as opposed to Kipling’s arrogance of assertion – has “won generations of readers 
beyond the author’s life”(294). 
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political and epistemological ambivalence that is increasingly relevant amidst the 
bio-political certainties in the global capitalist world today.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
Masculinity, Bio-politics and Nervous Conditions in the literature of 
the First World War  
 
 
 
3.1 The First World War and the changing ontology of combat 
 
 
The First World War revealed the destructive potential of machinic modernity and 
communicated the knowledge of his own commodified anonymity to early twentieth-
century European man. The scale of casualties wrought by the First World War was 
unprecedented in human history, and the automatism of violence underlined the new 
grammar of combat whereby perfect strangers could kill each other while miles 
apart.
1
 Alongside the trauma and ceaseless shock on witnessing bodily mutilation, 
the methods of warfare also generated long periods of anxious inertia. The bodily 
immobility at the trenches gave rise to nervous conditions by which the individual 
seldom could give vent to his emotion of fear, grief or anger. Such condition created 
a traumatic repression that exacerbated the loss of human will and agency in the 
battlefield, as soldiers saw bodies of comrades turn to waste in stench and muck. 
Among other elements, experiences in the trench constituted insomnia, shock, 
                                                          
1
In a letter written to his son, Robert Michaels, an Austrian cavalry captain, asserted: “Modern 
combat is played out almost entirely invisibly; the new way of fighting demands of the soldier that he 
[. . .] withdraw from the sight of his opponent. He cannot fight upright on the earth but must crawl 
into and under it; at sea he fights most securely when he is concealed under the surface of the water, 
and in the air when he flies so high that he no longer offers a target.” Quoted in Eric J. Leed, No 
Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 
19. 
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survivor’s guilt and the “fear of showing fear”2. The neurosis in the trench was thus a 
combination of anxious stillness and frenzied movements, and informed “an 
experience of radical discontinuity on every level of consciousness.”3 The 
consciousness of the war-survivor was most characteristically marked by trauma, 
guilt and shame, at the knowledge of its association with the violence on human 
lives.  
 
The perfect anonymity of the enemy, the consequent absurdity of killing 
perfect strangers, and disillusion with the jingoistic ideology of ‘manly heroism’ that 
had sent them to the war, often gave rise to feelings of existentialist ambivalence and 
self-doubt in soldiers’ minds. Such conditions were anathema to the execution of 
combat and awakened the mind to the hollowness of the horror rather than the 
heroism of military glory. This was perhaps most poignantly portrayed in the war-
lyrics of soldier-poets such as Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves and Wilfred Owen. 
The poetry born out of their experiences in the trenches eschewed the “militarism of 
a Kipling” and instead offered “the unvarnished and unpopular truth of military 
action that has heretofore been hidden from civilian experience.”4 Such poetry was 
often characterised by an impossibility of interpretation and – within its lyrical 
frame
5
 – contained the chaotic articulation of the mind under emotional trauma. In its 
                                                          
2 Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-22: The Work of the War Office 
Committee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock'”, Journal of Contemporary History 24.2 (April 1989): 227-
56; 233.  
 
3
 Eric Leed, No Man’s Land, 3.  
 
4
 James Campbell, “Interpreting the War”, The Cambridge Companion to the Literature of the First 
World War, ed. Vincent Sherry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 265. The reference to 
Kiplingesque militarism is important in Campbell’s analysis, as that suggests not only a transition in 
the poetic mode but also in that of masculinity, from that of jingoistic heroism to a more ambivalent 
and vulnerable sensibility. The correspondence between embodied feelings and masculinity in the 
wake of war trauma is the central point in this chapter.  
 
5
 As Edna Longley suggests, the lyric of Owen and Sassoon ironically revisited the Romantic 
manifesto, only to impel its politically radical fervour and rescue it from “the emptiness of post-
Romantic poeticalites”. Longley, “The Great War, History and the English Lyric”, The Cambridge 
Companion to the Literature of the First World War, 65.  It is interesting to look at the lyric of loss as 
depicted by the War poets, particularly in relation to the current works in neuroscience done on the 
qualia of human consciousness. As David Lodge suggests in his analysis of literature’s ability to 
contain and communicate consciousness, the lyric, among all literary genres, is the most suited in its 
linguistic complexity, to articulate the qualia of human consciousness. The lyric enables this, as 
Lodge argues, by using language “in such a way that the description of qualia does not seem partial, 
imprecise, and only comprehensible when put in the context of the poet’s personal life.” Lodge, 
Consciousness and the Novel, 11.  
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attempt to articulate an epistemology of shock, the war poetry voiced an embodied 
and cognitive panic that extended the “metaphoric possibilities of a factually 
presented situation”.6 This transcended the ontic reality of the object and instead 
offered a phenomenological insight into the horror of human loss. With its 
mechanically engineered pogroms of destruction, the war heralded the era of shock 
in the European imagination whereby “the daily slaughter in the trenches of the 
Western front seemed to many to have exceeded the capacity of words to describe.”7  
 
The machinery that went into the making of the First World War found its 
corollary in the nervous unmaking of the soldiers in the trenches as well as of the 
citizens of the twentieth-century metropolis. Peter Leese’s historical study of shell-
shock traces the phenomena from the railway accidents of the nineteenth century 
which have been analysed as the first instances of industrialized trauma in the 
Western cultural imaginary. Studying the spatial similarities of the railway 
locomotive and the trench, Leese argues: “Both the trench and the locomotive 
carriage were confined spaces in which the occupant was at the mercy of external 
events; the surrounding environment could be only passively observed as sight and 
sound were severely obstructed; the impact of collision could not be anticipated or 
avoided, only experienced.”8 The suddenness of the railway accident and that of the 
shell burst in trenches was a manifestation of the way in which technology 
increasingly invaded the private space of the twentieth-century European citizen. 
The British neurologist M.D.Eder stated in 1916: “From the combatant’s point of 
view this has been described as industrial warfare; from the medical point of view it 
might be described as nerve warfare.”9 What connected the machinery of the war and 
that of the metropolis, were the principles of compulsory anonymity and immobility, 
along with the increasing consumption of human agency by automatized movements. 
The rhythms of the metropolis and the waves of the war were both premised on 
                                                          
6
 Arthur E. Lane, An Adequate Response: The War Poetry of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972) 103. 
7
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin, 2004) 22. As Sontag goes on to 
mention in the same page, on July 1 1914, the first day of the Battle of Somme; thirty thousand 
British soldiers were killed within the first half an hour. 
8
 Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 15. 
9M.D.Eder, “Psychopathology of the War Neurosis”, Lancet (August 12, 1916) 2. Quoted in Eric 
Leed, No Man’s Land, 164. 
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shared principles of production, transmission and replication of life-extending and 
life-annihilating machines.   
 
The trauma caused by the war and the technologized shocks that invaded 
civilian life in the city both reduced the human being to nervous inertia. While at the 
warfronts this was immediately evident in the trauma of the trenches, in civilian life 
this experience found its paler resonance in the metropolitan rituals of human 
immobility in trains and tubes.
10
 The machinery of the metropolis – like the 
industrial landscape of the warfronts – constituted technologically induced shocks 
that “subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of training.”11As Sandra 
Gilbert argues in her essay about the war in relation to the literary sensibility of early 
twentieth century:  
 
The first modern war to employ now familiar techniques of conscription and 
classification in order to create gigantic armies on both sides, World War I [. 
. .] virtually completed the Industrial Revolution's construction of anonymous 
dehumanized man, that impotent cipher who is frequently thought to be the 
twentieth century's most characteristic citizen [. . .] Fearfully assaulted by a 
deadly bureaucracy on the one side, and a deadly technocracy on the other, 
he was No Man, an inhabitant of the inhumane new era and a citizen of the 
un-promising new land into which this war of wars had led him.
12
 
 
The anonymity of the soldier in trench warfare may be seen as the more vivid 
extension of that of the unknown citizen of the modern metropolis driven by the 
dictates of clock time. The impersonality in the trench and the anonymity in the 
moving machines of the metropolis both induced nervous conditions invoking 
emotional repression, numbness and loss of agency.
13
 This was manifested in the 
                                                          
10
 See Nicholas Daly, “Railway Novels: Sensation Fiction and the Modernization of the Senses”, ELH 
66(1999): 461-87 and Laura Marcus, “Oedipus Express: Trains, Trauma and Detective Fiction”, New 
Formations 41(2000): 173-88.  
 
11Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn  (London: Pimlico, 1999) 171. 
 
12
Sandra Gilbert, “Soldier’s Heart: Literary Men, Literary Women and the Great War”, Signs 8.3 
(1983): 422-450; 423. 
 
13
 Perhaps the most direct analysis of modernity as a nervous condition was made by the social 
theorist Georg Simmel. In his “The Metropolis and Mental Life” Simmel argued that the conditions of 
metropolitan life at the beginning of 20
th
 century desiderated an instinct not to expose one’s ‘inner-
self’ to what was fast becoming the totalizing eye of the modern metropolis. In his study of 
metropolitan restlessness and its associated boredom, Simmel defined the blasé attitude as 
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automatized movements of human beings in the metropolis as well as in the 
battlefield, as both demanded perfect synchronicity and anonymity, in blending with 
the machines of movement, production and annihilation.  
 
The dehumanization of the shell-shocked victim was dramatized in much of 
the contemporary medical vocabulary of the day that sought to situate the sick men 
through a derogatory discourse of difference. Thus Frederick Mott, the British 
biochemist and neuropathologist, at the height of action during the First World War, 
asserted that the shell shocked soldier 
 
[h]as little or no idea of time and place, and his powers of recognition and 
comprehension are greatly impaired. He may be deaf or mute or a deaf-mute 
[. . .] The condition of his mind is reflected, however, in his face, for he has a 
dazed, stupid, mask-like, mindless expression. He probably assumes as 
anergic, crouched-up posture, but he may wander about in an automaton-like 
way.
14
     
 
In this analysis, the reduction in intelligence and cognitive capacities is compounded 
by the automatism of the self-less movement of the machine. The description offered 
by Mott may be interpreted as connecting the shell-shocked victim to the condition 
of automatism ambulatorie subsequently analysed by Ian Hacking in his study of 
fugue as a cultural signifier of masculine hysteria.
15
 The experience of violence in 
the First World War, like the experience of transport and transmission in the 
twentieth-century metropolis, produced an overarching state of immobility, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“unconditionally reserved to the metropolis [. . .] [resulting] from the rapidly changing and closely 
compressed stimulation of the nerves.” Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, The 
Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: The Free Press, 1950) 414. 
 
14
 F.W.Mott, War Neuroses and Shell Shock (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919) 80-81.  
 
15
 See Ian Hacking, “Automatisme Ambulatory: Fugue, Hysteria and Gender at the turn of the 
century”, The Mind of Modernism, 125-40. It is interesting to observe, as Hacking does, how the 
symptom of fugue was essentially gendered masculine, just as hysteria had been received as a female 
malady. Fugue might be seen as the masculine equivalent of feminine hysteria. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the way the military doctors of fin de siècle France used fugue as a convenient 
classification to describe those dissenting soldiers who refused to be conscripted during peacetime in 
the same manner in which shell-shocked British soldiers during the First World War were often 
classified as malingerers who feigned sickness in order to avoid being court-martialled. Fugue thus 
provided an interesting watershed in the medical discourse of the late nineteenth century at a time 
when neurosis and hysteria were increasingly affecting the male medical body. Fugue was a 
subversive phenomenon in nineteenth-century France and threatened bourgeoisie assumptions of 
identity and cultural constructs emerging, as Hacking puts it, as “the body language of male 
powerlessness [. . .] at the cutting edge of clinical and theoretical thinking about hysteria” (129). 
 92 
 
anonymity and invisibility. Such a state, like the hysteria born out of it, was 
essentially indeterminable and yet spectacular; as troops of men, without any 
ostensible physical injury, returned from warfronts with traumatic conditions. 
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3.2 Shell-Shock and Its Contemporary Debates in British Medical Politics 
 
Medical discourses on hysteria and nervous conditions before the First World War 
often looked at lifestyles and their impact on the nervous system. Neurasthenia, as 
studied by George Beard, was classified as an American disease that was associated 
with urban prestige as well as being regarded as pathological. In essence, Beard’s 
classification corresponded to an industrial city culture where the mode of capitalist 
production was accompanied by an anxiety over the sustainability of the productive 
energy-economy. The history of neurasthenia was thus bound up with the 
architecture of the urban condition:  
 
The restless energy bottled up in the urban centres and constantly excited by 
noises, jars and the rushing crowds tended more and more to make 
nervousness the national disease that medical writers were prone to call it. 
Beard's" neurasthenia" (to use Dr. Beard's term) and insanity were 
characteristically city phenomena as feeblemindedness and impaired physical 
vigour were rural complaints.
16
 
 
Essentially denoting a disease caused due to the accelerated lifestyle in a city, 
neurasthenia (as a medical term) quickly entered the fashionable vocabulary of 
cultural modernity, but began to lose ground with the advent of the First World War, 
displaced by new studies in hysteria and trauma that arose with the experience of 
shell shock.  
 
Historically, this transition in medical practice occupied the same moment 
when Freudian psychoanalysis was in its ascendency in the medical imagination. So 
Freud’s analysis of Beard’s neurasthenia can be seen as a critique of its meta-
nosological character as Freud himself sought to study the aetiology of hysteria.
17
 
This disillusion with neurasthenia is interestingly evinced in an account by Leonard 
Woolf, whose wife Virginia Woolf was quite possibly the most famous neurasthenic 
patient in Britain after the First World War. Embittered by his wife’s painful 
experiences at the hands of various neurologists such as George Savage, Leonard 
                                                          
16
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Rise of the City 1878-1898 (New York: Macmillan Press, 1938) 433. 
17For Freud’s assessment of neurasthenia and of the way Beard promoted the concept, see Philip P. 
Wiener, “G.M.Beard and Freud on ‘American Nervousness’”, Journal of the History of Ideas 17.2 
(April, 1956): 269-74.   
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came to describe neurasthenia as “a name, a label, like neuralgia or rheumatism, 
which covered a multitude of sins, symptoms and miseries.”18 Interestingly enough, 
the very same George Savage who treated Virginia Woolf, refused to consider 
neurasthenia as anything more than a euphemism for insanity, not “a definite and 
easily recognized disease with a certain pathology [but] a condition of the nervous 
system manifesting fatigue or partial exhaustion of the nerve centres and exhibiting 
different symptoms according to the inherited or acquired peculiarities of the 
individual.”19  
 
The advent of modern psychiatry after the First World War, with its emphasis 
on psychic disclosure and its narratives of trauma, brought a decisive end to the 
culture of neurasthenia in Britain. The First World War might thus be regarded as an 
epistemic fault-line in the history of medicine and psychiatry, for thereafter medical 
discourses about nervousness underwent a paradigmatic shift. British neurology, 
which had hitherto been “brutally materialistic,”20 faced its evident inadequacy in 
explaining a medical condition that could not simply be reduced to a physical 
disorder. In Britain, in particular, the treatment of neurosis after the First World War 
came under the control of psychiatrists rather than neurologists. In this changing 
medical culture, neurasthenia was seen as an inadequate term to cover a wide array 
of nervous diseases.
21
  Thus the poet Siegfried Sassoon, treated by W. H. R. Rivers 
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Leonard Woolf, Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911-1918 (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1964) 76. See also Stephen Trombley, Virginia Woolf and Her Doctors (London: Junction 
Books, 1981).  
 
19George Savage, “A Lecture on Neurasthenia and Mental Disorders”, The Medical Magazine 20.1 
(1911): 520-30; 520. Cited in Chandak Sengoopta, “‘A Mob of Incoherent Symptoms?’ Neurasthenia 
in British Medical Discourse 1860-1920”, Cultures of Neurasthenia: From Beard to the First World 
War, ed. Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra and Roy Porter (Amsterdam & New York: Editions Rodopi B.V., 
2001) 107. Savage practised tooth-extraction as a mode of therapy for nervous breakdown, a mode 
that was not dissimilar to the ones adopted in the private sector psychiatric practices during early 
nineteenth century, a fact evinced by the following statement by John Haslam, the physician of the 
Bethlem in Norwich, one of the leading public asylums of the day:  “It is a painful recollection to 
recur to the number of interesting females I have seen, who, after having suffered a temporary 
disarrangement of mind, and undergone the brutal operation of spouting in private receptacles for the 
insane, have been restored to their friends without a front tooth in either jaw.” John Haslam, 
Observations on Madness and Melancholy (London: Callow, 1809) 317. Cited in Lisa Appignanesi, 
Mad, bad and sad: A History of Women and the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the Present (London: 
Virago, 2009) 46.  
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L.Hearnshaw,  A Short History of British Psychology (London: Methuen, 1964) 71.  
 
21
 For an historical study of the culture of neurasthenia in Britain from Victorian period to the end of 
the First World War, see Chandak Sengoopta, “’A Mob of Incoherent Symptoms’? Neurasthenia in 
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in Craiglockhart, described the hospital as an “underworld of dreams haunted by 
submerged memories of warfare”.22 The Freudian vocabulary evident in Sassoon’s 
description points to the medical politics advocated by Rivers in Craiglockhart. This 
sought to move away from the somatic materialism of earlier notions of brain shock 
towards a more psychoanalytic orientation.
23
 The neurasthenic notions of nervous 
exhaustion and energy depletion went out of vogue with the more complex and 
immediately visible phenomenon of war trauma that struggled to find a classified 
medical description until the end of the Vietnam War.
24
 
 
An article entitled “Neurasthenia and Shell-Shock”, published in the editorial 
in the Lancet on 18 March 1916, articulated the ambivalence about shell-shock, 
using a metaphor from the vocabulary of the war itself, describing the phenomenon 
in the medical scene as a No Man’s Land that defied definition:  “This nebulous zone 
shelters many among the sad examples of nervous trouble sent home from the 
front.”25 Introduced in 1915 by the British psychiatrist Charles Meyers, the term 
‘shell-shock’ was quickly discovered to be thoroughly inappropriate for precise 
classification and came to suggest a wide range of symptoms, from compulsive 
hysteria to strategic malingering. As Jessica Meyer argues:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
British Medical Discourse, 1860-1920”, Cultures of Neurasthenia from Beard to the First World War, 
97-116.   
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 W.H.R Rivers emerges as a seminal figure in the historical analysis of the neurosis of the First 
World War, especially in the medical vocabulary of shell-shock. As depicted in the semi-fictional 
Regeneration by Pat Barker, Rivers’ own location on the map of post-War neurosis throws much light 
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time of political and medical contingency when medicine and politics together were constructing a 
category of knowledge that sought to redress the proliferation of war neurosis into public debates. 
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specialized and homogenous military/medical space of war neurosis, constitutes a “structure in which 
space, language, and death are articulated.” Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 243.   
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 In the wake of more recent works such as Judith Lewis Herman’s Trauma and Recovery (1992), the 
state of Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (the medical name for shell-shock that emerged in 1980 after 
the Vietnam War) has been revealed to be as applicable to females in civilian lives as to male soldiers 
in the war front. Thus the masculinist essentialism of the term shell-shock requires significant 
revision. 
 
25
The Lancet, 18 March, 1916. Cited in Jacques Lezra, Wild Materialism: The Ethic of Terror and the 
Modern Republic (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010) 24.  
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Throughout the First World War, and well into the interwar period, the range 
of physical and psychological symptoms that came collectively to be known 
as ‘shell shock’ were the subject of intense debate because they fell 
uncomfortably between the care of medicine and the strictures of military 
discipline.
26
 
The introduction of shell shock into the vocabulary of early twentieth-century 
medical discourse was accompanied by a series of misappropriations and 
misapprehensions that revolved around a sudden and spectacular shift in the 
construction of masculine identity. The occurrence of shell shock has been analysed 
as the threshold moment in British medical history that introduced Freudian 
psychoanalysis into the hitherto materialistic body of British neurology.
27
 
 
Shell shock was increasingly perceived as a non-somatic condition that could 
not be attributed alone to a wound to the material body. Thus, Charles Meyers, who 
coined the term, came to admit subsequently that: “A shell, then, may play no part 
whatever in the causation of ‘shell shock’: excessive emotion, e.g. sudden horror or 
fear – indeed any ‘psychical trauma’ or ‘inadjustable experience’ – is sufficient.”28 
As many case studies soon revealed, the shell-shocked victims had often never been 
exposed to the front lines that faced shrapnel blasts. The attempts by British 
physicians such as Sir Frederick Mott to demonstrate an organic and somatic 
foundation for shell-shock were premised on an idea that the syndrome was caused 
by “the commotional effects of exploding shells [that] caused physical damage to the 
central nervous system – either through micropuncture and haemorrhage in the 
cerebral tissues or by inducing tears in the spinal pathways.”29 However, it was 
increasingly evident that the shell-shock syndrome was not attributable to symptoms 
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of hereditary degeneration or to somatic disturbance. The somatic overdetermination 
of British psychiatry came under critique during the First World War by a different 
school of medicine that sought to incorporate psychoanalytic models in its treatments 
of shell-shocked soldiers.  
 
Freud’s own position as healer in the nervous narratives and negotiations of 
medical modernity was increasingly problematized by his growing awareness of the 
borderlines between physical conditions open to empirical science and more 
intangible moments of subjective experience. This realization led to his interest in 
language, symbolic expression and therefore, literary modes of narration:  
I have not always been a psychotherapist but was trained, like other 
neuropathologists, to use local diagnosis and electro-prognosis, and I myself 
find it strange that the case histories that I write read like novellas and lack, 
so to speak, the serious stamp of science. I have to console myself with the 
thought that the nature of the object rather than my own preference is clearly 
responsible for this; local diagnosis and electrical reactions are simply not 
effective in the study of hysteria, whereas an in-depth portrayal of the 
workings of the inner life, such as one expects to be given by novelists and 
poets, together with the application of a few psychological formulas, does 
allow me to gain a kind of insight into the course of a hysteria.
30
 
The narrative mode assumed and adopted in the psychoanalytic process might be 
read as a significant break from the materialist models of pre-Freudian psychiatry 
that drew on concepts of force and corporeal control. As Tim Armstrong asserts in 
his analysis of the epistemology of shock in early twentieth-century modernity, 
Freud can be credited for redeeming the  
[n]otion of trauma from the materialistic and historically specific 
neurasthenic paradigm, with its attachment to the ‘actual’, the quotidian. Like 
the good doctor he insists, as Beard and Page did not, that there is a wound 
attached to the traumatic situation; a wound which is at first neurological, 
then fantastic, and then finally located somewhere between the two.
31
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Trauma thus came to be granted a non-somatic autonomy in Freudian 
psychoanalysis, located somewhere between empirically determinable symptoms and 
psychically indeterminable states.  The use of free-association narratives as 
advocated by Freud
32
 began to replace the medical methods that included shock 
therapy as well as confinement. Thus as Cathy Caruth argues in her analysis of 
trauma and the narratives of history,  
If Freud turns to literature to describe traumatic experience; it is because 
literature, like psychoanalysis, is interested in the complex relation between 
knowing and not knowing. It is at this specific point where knowing and not 
knowing intersect that the language of literature and the psychoanalytic 
theory of traumatic experience precisely meet.
33
 
Like the literary text that contains the dialectic of truth and fiction in its depiction of 
imagined human characters in real (and often historical) situations, Freudian 
psychoanalysis as a study of the mind relied less on empirical evidence than on 
intersubjective interpretation of subjective experience. The psychoanalytic theory of 
hysteria was particularly helpful at a time when the scientific and medical notions of 
nerves, based on materialistic epistemologies, seemed increasingly inadequate in the 
treatment of the new nervous diseases that came in the wake of the twentieth 
century. Shell-shock – which “initiated the era of psychiatric modernism”34 – 
relocated hysteria as a non-gendered phenomenon, refashioning the masculine 
subject in modernity.
35
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3.3 British Masculinity and Bio-political Identity before the First World War 
 
In his work on the cultural anxieties around nervous exhaustion at the turn of the 
twentieth century, Anson Rabinbach suggests how fatigue and neurasthenia might be 
seen as bodily correlates to the second law of thermodynamics and how the fear of 
energy-loss gripped an increasingly capitalist and imperial economy.
36
 Rabinbach 
particularly emphasizes the panic about enervation and fatigue affecting the male 
body as the direct vehicle of the imperial economy.
37
 In analysing the 
correspondence of the nervous economy and the productive economy of the period 
immediately preceding the First World War, Rabinbach underlines the significance 
of the fear of exhaustion. Thus he argues: 
 
[I]n the late nineteenth century energeticism provided a general framework 
for translating the physiologists and physicians’ obsessions with fatigue into 
a coherent social doctrine. Yet these ideas also had a practical impact in the 
emergence of a distinctly European science of work in the two decades 
before the First World War.
38
 
 
Energeticism as a systematic discourse of production and preservation was 
characterised by its close scrutiny of the male body.  Tiredness or nervous fatigue 
connoted loss of production. The male body, with its systems of nervous control and 
energy economy, was increasingly viewed as a site that needed to be preserved in 
order to attain the highest productive potential. Thus a Harley Street physician, 
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commenting on anxieties about the experience of ennui and its negative effects on 
the economy of energy, argued:  
 
Money now is almost exclusively made at the expense of the wear and tear of 
nerve [. . .] and it is a matter of ever-increasing economical importance to 
keep the money-making machine, the brain and the mind, at the highest 
productive pitch—in short, in a state of perfect health.39 
 
The epistemology of medicine and medical discourses at the turn of the twentieth 
century must be understood by analysing these as practices that involve sociological 
values as much as biological facts as nervous disease after 1900 began to “be 
understood statistically, sociologically, psychologically – even politically.” 40 
 
 Crucially, turn-of-the-century British medical narratives corresponded with 
economic and political anxieties pervading a range of political discourses from 
philanthropic liberalism to fascistic xenophobia.
41
 The anxiety about preserving the 
ideal male body was exacerbated during the First World War, effectively exposing 
the constructed nature of gender identity in public discourse. Thus Janet Oppenheim 
contends in her work on the politics of nerves and nervous disorders in late Victorian 
Britain:  
 
The great problem with nervous breakdown, as medical men fully realized, 
was that it made a mockery of these [the conventional gender] very 
distinctions, reducing its male victims to passivity, removing them from 
business activities and public affairs, rendering them utterly indecisive. In 
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short, nervous exhaustion brought men perilously close to the feminine 
condition.
42
 
 
Oppenheim’s analysis throws light on the anxious masculinity that was constructed 
in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain in order to produce and perpetuate imperial 
and industrial control in the public space. Nerves emerged as a vital material as well 
as metaphor in this cultural climate and, as was the case with First World War shell 
shock, increasingly problematized the stability of normative gender identities.  
 
A direct analogy between shell-shocked male soldiers and the hysteria of the 
widows of the German soldiers of the First World War is given in Robert Whalen’s 
study which includes an interesting report made by the Bavarian police in Munich in 
July 1918. Classifying the shell-shocked victims disparagingly as ‘shiverers’, the 
police report states: “The scene this morning could have been avoided had not a 
group of disabled veterans, including two so-called ‘shiverers’, repeatedly simulated 
the nervous attacks, and thereby excited the women.”43 The hysteric widows and the 
shell-shocked men thus appeared to occupy the same nervous and mimetic economy 
under the military-medical gaze.  Indeed, the female malady that informed hysteria 
had been classified by the British surgeon James Paget as neuromimesis, a condition 
that entailed a compulsive and nervous propensity to mimic and simulate. 
Neuromimesis corresponded to the performative quality that was commonly and 
conventionally associated with the hysteric body and the emphasis on mimetic 
propensity tied the term closely to theatrical performance.
44
 For Paget, the central 
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issue was one of will-power and he clearly stated that it required a power of the will, 
“to avoid these imitations, and to disbelieve or disregard sensations imitative of 
those endured by others.”45 
 
Pre-First-World-War Britain, with its obsession with cultural and bodily 
hygiene, was also the moment when the body of the boy was of crucial significance 
and was often viewed as a corollary to the body of the empire. The male body in the 
bio-political discourse of the day was a crucial site of construction and preservation, 
as evinced by the increasing popularity of Boy Scouts’ Movements in Britain and the 
rituals of Boys’ public schools and “young boys and adolescents, in whom the 
Empire had staked a large investment of racial capital, were the obvious targets of 
self-appointed guardians of ‘healthy’ attitudes.”46 As the Clarendon Commission 
declared in 1864, the British public schools were character-factories that sought to 
situate and produce the desirable discourses of masculinity, corresponding closely to 
the necessity of manly control, unemotional constitution and muscular body in 
selfless service to the society and the empire. The Report, published during the 
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height of British imperialism, was absolutely unequivocal about the social 
significance of public schools. Indeed, as the Commission asserted:  
 
The English people were indebted to these schools for the qualities on which 
they pique themselves most – for their capacity to govern others and control 
themselves, their aptitude for combining freedom with order, their public 
spirit, their vigour and manliness of character, their strong but not slavish 
respect for public opinion, their love of healthy sports and exercise.
47
  
 
  The ideal boy was expected to be pious as well as plucky, muscular as well as 
missionary. The discursive zeal with which turn-of-the-century masculinity was 
constructed often incorporated ideologies from Social Darwinism. The selflessness 
of the boy and his subordination of private priorities in the face of collective and 
corporate duties was inculcated early on through the role of the public school that 
emerged as the character manufacturer of the late nineteenth century. The financial 
economy of empire and the nervous economy of the masculine body were closely 
related in the discourse networks before the First World War. The panic about male 
nervous breakdown or “cracking up” was linked also to the fear of failure of the 
imperial economy. Masculinity before the First World War was premised on a self-
effacing ideal that demanded perfect bodily and spiritual health, as well as a strict 
avoidance of what were considered polluting influences such as masturbation and the 
melancholia born out of excessive introspection.
48
  
   
The taboo against masturbation and the associated rhetoric of bodily loss 
emerge in a fascinating exchange between the shell-shocked First World War soldier 
Bill Prior and W.H.R.Rivers in the fictionalized account of Pat Barker’s 1994 novel 
The Eye in the Door (whose very title evokes the medical culture of containment and 
constant surveillance adopted by most hospitals and practitioners in their treatment 
of the soldiers). The exchange begins with Rivers interrogating Prior on his habit of 
masturbation: 
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‘I used to,’ Prior said. 
‘When was that?’ 
‘When I was twelve. Where we lived there was a young man who used to be 
wheeled around on a trolley. I don’t know what was wrong with him, 
tuberculosis of the spine, something like that, something terrible. And the 
trolley creaked, so you could always hear it coming. And he was pointed out 
to us as an illustration of what happened if you indulged in self-abuse.’ 
‘Who told you that?’ 
‘Scoutmaster. Mr Hailes. He actually said what came out was spinal fluid. 
And of course you’ve only got a limited supply of that, and mine was going 
down pretty fast. I used to lie awake and try not to do it, and I’d get more and 
more frightened. Unfortunately, there was only one thing that took my mind 
off the fear. So I did it again. And all the time this creaking trolley was 
getting nearer and nearer.’49 
 
 The location of the scoutmaster as the overseer of ideal masculinity and the symbol 
of the creaking trolley as a signifier of approaching enervation and entropy both 
occupy the oneiric landscape of the hysteric solider. In his analysis of the male body 
under the medical gaze, Foucault also studies the close correspondence between 
masturbation and bourgeois morality in a culture of control, surveillance and sexual 
repression. He states how “[t]he onanistic child was not the child of the people, the 
future worker who had to be taught the disciplines of the body, but rather the 
schoolboy, the child surrounded by domestic servants, tutors, governesses.”50  
Framed in his formative phase, the onanistic boy was kept under close control and 
supervision by the figures of authority in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain.
51
 
 
 In his study of the masturbation panic and moral regulation during the late 
nineteenth to early twentieth century, Alan Hunt asserts that the anti-masturbation 
response was primarily targeted at adolescent boys of middle and upper class status 
attending British public schools. Analysing how masturbation anxiety slipped 
between idealised masculinities and moral panic, Hunt states that “the distinctive 
shape of the British antimasturbation campaign was formed by a conjunction 
between the tradition of antisexual feminism and social imperialist anxieties about 
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the fate of the empire.”52 Thus the panic of masturbation was voiced by scoutmasters 
and physicians alike. Onanism was equated with the expenditure of vital masculine 
energy that ought to have been preserved for production and procreation. These were 
themes that connected the body of the boy to the body of the British empire. Sir 
James Paget, the neurologist who coined the term neuromimesis to describe hysteria, 
was unequivocal in his condemnation of masculine masturbation. In a paper entitled 
“Sexual Hypochondriasis” written in 1870, Paget describes masturbation as: “[a]n 
uncleanliness, a filthiness forbidden by God, an unmanliness despised by men.”53 
The location of onanism between bodily and religious domains of prohibition created 
unique structures of guilt in the formative masculine imagination in Edwardian 
Britain. This complex economy of repression and guilt was in the service of a system 
of “everyday moral regulation that can fruitfully be understood as a project of the 
governance of the self, that, in particular, promoted the goal of self-control.”54  
 
The strict policing of masturbation pointed to an order of masculinity that 
was premised on rational virtuosity and effacement of emotional excess. The 
indeterminacy of hysteria in Pat Barker’s Regeneration trilogy (1992-95) may be 
read as the source of the masculinity crisis exemplified by the soldiers from war and 
is embodied most poignantly by the stammering neurologist W. H .R. Rivers himself 
in a narrative space where stutter  
 
[s]tands for the speaking body, and points to an incongruous and inseparable 
relationship between spirit and matter, discourse and act, the linguistic and 
the physical. The stutter is a symptom or diagnostic, an act that cannot know 
what it is doing, a vivid instantiation of a knowledge that cannot know 
itself.
55
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The stuttering neurologist in Barker’s Regeneration (1992), who articulates his 
ambivalence concerning the discourses of neurology of his day, stands in stark 
contrast to the medical figures in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1922), who express the 
crudely formulated closures advocated by contemporary medical science. The 
doctors Holmes and Bradshaw emerge as fully subscribed to the masculinist medical 
discourses that advocate proportion, coercion and bodily hygiene (issues that were 
also augmented by scoutmasters and headmasters in the early decades of the 
twentieth century). The construction of masculinity (through Scout movement and 
the Public Schools) in the late nineteenth century was evidently in close 
correspondence with the politics of imperial expansion. It was also tied to the panic 
around entropy as supported by pseudo-scientific belief in the finitude of the vital 
spinal fluid that was supposed to be permanently lost every time a boy 
masturbated.
56
 Prior’s sense of shame and guilt in responding to his masturbatory 
instincts was a direct result of a medicalized view of sexual morality that insisted 
that “young men of the middle classes of a great imperial power were enjoined to 
engage in an acquisition of self-discipline.”57  
 
As Foucault contends in his study of medicine and masculinity, the bio-
political culture that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century was quick to realize 
that 
Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing ills 
and of the knowledge that they require; it will also embrace a knowledge of 
healthy man, that is, a study of non-sick man and a definition of the model 
man.
58
 
 
In her analysis of masculinity crisis in the early twentieth century, Sandra Gilbert 
argues that the structural similarities between the narrow domestic space and the 
closed trenches of the First World War brought the hysterical and repressed 
Victorian female into problematic proximity with the male soldier of the First World 
War.
59
 In a similar vein, Eric Leed also suggests that the doctors of the combatants 
realized that the “symptoms of shell shock were precisely the same as those of the 
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most common hysterical disorders of the peacetime, though they often acquired new 
and more dramatic names in war [. . .] what had been predominantly a disease of 
women before the war became a disease of men in combat.”60 The medical treatment 
of male hysteria, especially when it was associated with essentialized ‘feminine’ 
symptoms, often relied on the forceful denial of its existence under the bio-political 
gaze.  
Both female hysteria and shell shock disclosed the inadequacy of the medical 
materialism when faced with symptoms that did not appear to have any real somatic 
origin. More significantly, both exposed the anxieties in the medical discourses 
themselves as they sought to address the resistance to medical classification. 
Hysteria, as well as shell-shock, revealed the constructed quality of pre-First World 
War medical science that, like the doctor-husband in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s The 
Yellow Wallpaper, “scoffs openly at any talk of things not to be felt and seen and put 
down in figures.”61 The treatment meted out to the narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper 
was in close alliance with the modes of therapy on female hysterics which 
constituted, as Mark Micale put argues: 
[t]he condescending authoritarianism of male doctors towards their female 
patients; the tacit collusion of doctors, husbands and fathers in controlling 
unmanageable womenfolk; the combination of male sexual fear, desire and 
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from her confinement in the Isle of Wight, Eleanor stated: “What neither papa nor the doctors nor 
anyone will understand is that chiefly mental worry that affects me. Papa talks about my having “rest” 
and “getting strong” before I try anything and won’t see that “rest” is the last thing I need—and that I 
should be more likely to “get strong” if I have some definite plan and work than to go on waiting and 
waiting . . . what I most dread is the consulting of doctors. They cannot and will not see that mental 
worry is as much an illness as any physical ailment could be.” Cited in Jenny Marx Lonquet, The 
Daughters of Karl Marx: Family Correspondence 1896-1898, ed. Olga Meier, trans. Faith Evans 
(New York & London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982) 145-46. 
 
 108 
 
hostility in the handling of female patients; and the widespread reality of 
abusive practices, especially radical gynaecological surgery, in the treatment 
of female nervous disorders.
62
 
 
Such proscriptive tendencies and medical discourses were reflected in the rest-cure 
methods prescribed by Silas Weir Mitchell whereby the female patient would be 
subjected to absolute confinement and not allowed access to any medium of 
expression, including writing. Mitchell’s method of medical surveillance and the 
treatment of hysteria through confinement were popular well into the twentieth 
century. Doctors treating soldiers from the war also hoped to induce a strategic 
boredom among patients with nervous breakdown through uniform monitoring and 
control.
63
 Medical treatments before the war were based on a materialist 
reductionism that perceived the male hysteric as “morally depraved, wilful and 
egoistic. These judgements led the physician to stress discipline, chastisement and 
even punishment as part of the therapeutic process.”64  
 
Both female hysteria and male shell-shock suggested the phallogocentric 
anxiety of losing control over the body. This threat was accompanied by a desire to 
construct a strategic ‘Other’ that could accommodate the anxiety of degeneration 
through a discourse of disgust and difference. This idea of deviance, as Sander 
Gilman has argued, needed to be structured through strategic stereotypes that offered 
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 See Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-
1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003)140-42.  
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a standardized language of loss.
65
 Narratives of Social Darwinism and eugenics 
occupied the medical and cultural climates leading into and emerging out of the First 
World War: from trench trauma to public school repression, from the confusion of 
conscience in colonial conditions to its correspondent nervous melancholia. The 
political anxiety around the military masculinity crisis was spectacularly showcased 
by the establishment of The War Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock that ran its 
office from 7 September 1920 to 22 June 1922 under the chairmanship of Lord 
Southborough, a group of constitutionally class-conscious men who accused the 
lower orders of the military for malingering and who were themselves “products of 
an age dominated by the ideas of social Darwinism, the eugenics movement and 
racism; they reflected as well some of that pre-war obsession with national and racial 
degeneration.”66 Similar notions were advocated by Lewis Yealland who, in his 1918 
work, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare encouraged a strategic system of shaming the 
shell-shocked soldiers who were described as the “hideous enemy of negativism”67 
that ought to be threatened with court martial. J. C. Hunn, a medical military officer 
associated with the Royal Welch Fusiliers thought of Siegfried Sassoon’s transfer to 
Craiglockhart Military Hospital as a move into a society of degenerates and alcoholic 
malingerers who had fallen into the convenient classification of shell shock primarily 
to cajole their way out of the war.
68
 
 
Social Darwinists before the First World War advocated a model of 
masculinity that upheld the theory that “the association of morbid introspection, 
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exaggerated self-consciousness, and ‘unnatural egoism’ with mental disorders was [. 
. .] fundamental, even causal, rather than symptomatic or accidental.”69  
Introspection and egoism were associated with undesirable ‘female’ attributes. The 
ideal British masculinity devised by the Social Darwinists instead relied on selfless 
spiritual as well as bodily courage and the subordination of individual agency before 
that which was more conducive to collective and corporate programmes. This model, 
which had largely invested in the expansion of imperialism, was also fostered during 
the war, along with associated notions of bodily and racial hygiene and disgust at 
messiness and corporeal contamination.
70
 Thus Jose Harris argues in the context of 
imperial British masculinity:  
 
Imperial visions injected a powerful strain of hierarchy, militarism, “frontier 
mentality”, administrative rationality and masculine civic virtue into British 
political culture. [On the other hand] domestic political forces were running 
in quite the opposite direction, towards egalitarianism, “progressivism”, 
consumerism, popular democracy, feminism and women’s rights.71 
 
The masculine body was thus constituted by the medical, cultural and political 
discourse of the day, discourses often obsessed with questions of class and stock.  As 
British medical records of the First World War evince, the issues of race, class and 
upbringing were initially of paramount significance to the physicians treating war 
soldiers. These were physicians who mostly appropriated the vocabulary and 
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grammar of Social Darwinism, criminology and the discourses on degeneration, the 
tenets of which had contributed to the construction of an ideal masculinity and the 
ideal male body before the First World War. But, by the time the war ended, the 
normative model of masculinity had undergone a seismic shift with the 
presuppositions of patriarchy increasingly interrogated and exposed, along with the 
limitations of the materialist medical view on nervous illness.
72
  
 
The epistemic shift in the map of medical science wrought by the experience 
of shell shock can hardly be overestimated. As Martha Nussbaum has argued, 
anxieties in the German masculinist imagination around the First World War 
incorporated disgust at the messy corporeality of the human body and aspired 
towards a steely stability of nerves that sought to transcend the body’s fleshy frame. 
In order to achieve this, it was necessary to construct an ‘Otherness’ that would 
signify the body of shame and the shame of the body that the masculinist economy 
sought to overcome. This was ideologically instantiated by a mutable messiness 
which was projected onto the female body and Jewish men in the wake of the First 
World War. The constructed ‘Otherness’ contained both the categorised abject entity 
and the feeling of disgust directed against it. This was in opposition to the steely 
image of the model German man who was compared to the perfectly functioning 
machine.
73
 The British public schools and their tenets about hygiene operated on 
similar principles and were crucially and ideologically alive to the project of building 
this discursive body as well as the compulsory body-less-ness of the model man in a 
culture of eugenics and Social Darwinism. Thus the Strand Magazine enquired in 
1905 about the deterioration of the public schoolboy
74
 and George Savage, who 
(mis)treated Virginia Woolf, asserted unequivocally in his Lumleian Lectures to the 
Royal College of Physicians, in 1907, that degenerative insanity was attributable to 
social misfits than to material brain disease.
75
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The masculinity crisis that emerged during the First World War can be read 
as the product of a broader cultural condition whereby the binaries of good and evil, 
moral and immoral, male and female, could no longer hold on to the firmness of an 
earlier high-Victorian ethnography. Medicine was also challenged in similar terms as 
the spectacle of hitherto heroic men breaking down into neurotic fits grew 
increasingly familiar. By the end of the War, there were more than 80,000 instances 
of shell-shock that passed through the military medical records.
76
 As Ted Bogacz 
argues in his article on the shell shock trauma and the political and cultural anxieties 
around it, reports of shell shock and male hysteria in the war were increasingly 
presented in the printing press that disseminated the trauma throughout the British 
civilian space:  
 
A series of articles appeared in The Times, for example, referring to 
hysterical blindness (8 April), 'The Wounded Mind' (24 April), and deafness 
and paralysis resulting from 'Wounds of consciousness' (25 May) among 
soldiers in the trenches. By mid-1916, the shell-shocked soldier had become 
a virtual cliché in the English press.
77
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3.4 Post-war Metropolis and Mental Life in Mrs Dalloway   
 
     and think of poor Albert 
He’s been in the army for four years, he wants a good time 
  
T.S.Eliot, The Waste Land 
78
 
 
 
The returning soldier was a recurring symbolic figure in the post-First World War 
British novel, often embodying an enervated masculinity characterised by 
melancholic alienation in the normative civilian space. In his nervous movement 
from a realm of heroism to that of nihilism, the shell-shocked soldier embodied a no-
man’s land informed by an irrational displacement and detachment.79 This is 
instantiated in many post-war novels such as Rebecca West’s The Return of the 
Soldier (1918), a fictional narrative about shell shock and its associated amnesia. In 
West’s story, the soldier Chris Baldry forgets about the trauma of the trench as well 
as his unhappy marriage to a superficial woman as he moves back in his mind to that 
part of his life spent in profound and pure love for a working class girl, a love that 
was never consummated due to class barriers and the war.
80
 The relation between 
war and class returns heavily in Pat Barker’s Regeneration (1992-95) trilogy and 
also in Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), where a direct reference to the war also 
occurs in the exchange of working class women anxious to preserve their sexual 
appeal for the boys back from war who want a good time.  
 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1922) published in the same year as Eliot’s 
The Waste Land, is a complex narrative of human loss that grew out of the author’s 
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personal experiences under her contemporary medical gaze. The bio-political context 
of Woolf’s novel is immediately evoked by her detailed descriptions of the mourning 
metropolis, where “Everyone has friends who were killed in the War.”81 The city in 
Mrs Dalloway – like the battlefields of the First World War – is a complex 
combination of speedy machinic rituals and privately embodied inertia. Woolf 
dramatizes the discourses of medical control that she herself had been subjected to, 
through the fictional characters of Holmes and Bradshaw.
82
 Commenting on the 
historical significance of Woolf’s novel, William Greenslade states: “Mrs Dalloway 
is the first to fully comprehend and objectify the myths of degeneration: it is the last, 
in that no subsequent sophisticated fictional account could or would take 
degeneration seriously.”83 Degeneration and decadence in Woolf’s work – 
essentially a city-novel about one day in various connected lives – are carefully and 
disturbingly juxtaposed alongside notional signifiers of speed and scientific 
progress.
84
 The male body in Mrs Dalloway emerges as the site where the bio-
political gaze enacts its corrective measures and its heavy-handed erasure of 
deviance. Woolf’s novel is all the more disturbing in the manner in which it depicts 
how such merciless medical execution was both socially sanctioned and legally 
permitted. Masculinity in the post-war metropolis of Woolf’s novel is embodied by a 
range of figures, from Septimus Smith, the enervated shell-shocked soldier from the 
war, to Peter Walsh, the confused imperial officer back from the colonies. Both 
emerge as painful subjects of an imperial and masculinist machinery that is 
perpetuated in bio-political systems by imperious medical practitioners: “men who 
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never weighed less than eleven stones six, who sent their wives to Court, men who 
made ten thousand a year and talked of proportion [. . .] who mixed vision and the 
sideboard; saw nothing clear, yet ruled, yet inflicted” (MD 120).     
 
The various men who inhabit Woolf’s fictional landscape correspond to 
various registers of cultural behaviour. The medically conditioned and corporeally 
controlled male body in Mrs Dalloway, as it emerges through the narrative of the 
novel, is mercilessly mapped by the bio-political machinery that seeks to re-construct 
its functional frame.
85
Mrs Dalloway is a novel that brings the male body, medical 
politics, and psychic trauma together with the backdrop of major socio-political 
changes wrought by the First World War. What makes Woolf’s novel even more 
complex is its depiction of the bio-political panic after the war and how its coercion 
is resisted by the feeling mind that unlearns its previous presuppositions through 
experiential change. A novel about the wounded male subject who embodies crisis 
and existentialist panic, Mrs Dalloway is a narrative about the changing masculine 
self and its subjective experience of emotional loss. In its human essence, Woolf’s 
narrative interrogates the ontology of crisis and degeneration, and disturbingly 
ascribes the same to the dominant bio-political apparatus that sought to control the 
body and behaviour of the human subject. A profoundly political text, Woolf’s novel 
is also a depiction of the manner in which male bodies turned to waste products due 
to their inability to re-integrate themselves within the praxis of post-war modernity.
86
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3.5 Mrs Dalloway and the Order of Trauma 
 
Septimus in Mrs Dalloway is first introduced in the novel through markers of bodily 
and emotional enervation: “Septimus Warren Smith, aged about thirty, pale-faced, 
beak-nosed, wearing brown shoes and a shabby overcoat, with hazel eyes which had 
that look of apprehension in them which makes complete strangers apprehensive 
too” (MD 12). Septimus symbolizes the hysteric body of the male soldier in the 
civilian space which sees him not as a hero but as a shirker and simulator. 
Containing the shock of the war and hounded by the nerve doctors who dominate 
him bodily, Septimus presents the male body in pain as well as the loneliness of the 
mis-understood survivor. The trauma that he embodies is thus bodily as well as 
social, blurring the borderlines between the medical and the political realms. As 
recent studies in trauma have shown:  
 
Traumatic disjunction occurs away from the combat zone as well. The failure 
of friends, neighbours, and other civilians, older and younger, to recognize 
the complexity of the losses produced by participation in combat and the 
resulting psychological trauma adds another layer to the devastation which 
the soldier must endure, and this lack of compassion deepens his isolation. 
This contrasts sharply with the attitudes shown toward the young men prior 
to the start of the war.
87
  
 
The movement from a position of privilege to a position of loss was rendered more 
complex by the medical attitudes towards shell-shock after the First World War. 
Such class-conscious materialist medical science saw the syndrome as a pseudo-
diseased condition of an essentially un-heroic de-energized clan of former soldiers. 
As the hollowed out shell rendered redundant after the war, Septimus embodies 
emptiness and continually fails to frame himself into the reconfigured post-war 
metropolis and its mental life.
88
 The isolation he faces after the trauma of the war 
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takes him into a hyper-reflexive selfhood that can no longer attach itself to the 
notional necessities of culture and its mechanisms in the metropolis. Septimus’s 
emotional detachment from such structures of civility and ideologies of ‘manly’ 
behaviour is a consequence of his experiences in shock during the war, which the 
doctors treating him do not understand. Instead, the inward-looking melancholia of 
the shell-shocked soldier is perceived by contemporary medical practitioners as a 
dangerous form of self-absorption that is pathological, inasmuch as it is counter-
productive to the heteronormative capitalist society that seeks to maximise 
masculinist profit principle. Thus, exemplifying a medical culture where the 
difference between dogma and discourse is precariously positioned, Dr Holmes 
advises Septimus’ wife Lucrezia “to make her husband (who had nothing whatever 
seriously the matter with him but was a little out of sorts) take an interest in things 
outside himself” (MD 18). 
  
In the eyes of the masculinist bio-political gaze, Septimus embodies the 
undesirable propensity of solipsistic self-introspection and morbid self-
consciousness that Michael Clark studies in his work on medical psychology in late 
nineteenth-century Britain.
89
 Thus Septimus is advised by the formidable neurologist 
Sir William Bradshaw to think as little about himself as possible (MD 80). More 
importantly, in the context of the melancholia he embodies, Septimus appears to 
appropriate the Freudian psychoanalytic formulation of traumatic repetitions where 
“the movement of the subject is always a movement towards death: towards the 
trauma that has not yet occurred, but is still inscribed in the novel’s anticipations and 
repetitions [. . .] [whereby] Trauma becomes a foundational principle rather than an 
exceptional event.”90 Inhabiting the nebulous zone between subject and object, 
Septimus the shell shocked soldier embodies the compromised subject of modernity 
which is emptied of its intentionality under dominant bio-political gaze. In such 
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culture of coercion and control, agency can only be enacted by a solipsistic 
irrationality that appears absurd in the eyes of bio-political agents. 
91
 
 
 In a post-war culture of traumatophilia and hyperkinesis, the signs that are 
taken for wonders most often corroborate the aura of technocracy that fulfils Freud’s 
prophecy of man becoming the prosthetic God with machines.
92
  Thus the scene in 
Mrs Dalloway where the skywriting aeroplane advertises toffee in the air is 
significant as it dramatizes the contingency of the signifier and its metaphoric 
meaning in the post-war civilian space.  The contingency of imaginary associations 
is brought into play in Woolf’s novel in the nervous mind of the shell-shocked 
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each other. Thus while Woolf’s narrative  has the cocksure physicians of nerves upholding proportion 
and eugenics against the shell-shocked soldier Septimus, McEwan’s novel has Henry Perwone, a 
genteel and complacent middle class neuroscientist pitted against Baxter, a baddy from the streets 
with Huntington’s disease, a nervous condition with no known cure. McEwan’s novel draws largely 
on the vocabulary of neuroscience in its treatment of human relationships, if only to evince the 
inadequacies of scientific medical knowledge in an understanding of the human mind and 
imagination.     
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soldier from the war.
93
 Back from the trenches of war, a site where an aeroplane in 
the sky almost always signified destruction and danger to the body, Septimus is 
unable to locate and subjectivize himself in the civilian space where a plane in the 
sky displays and constructs commodity fetishism in the form of an advertisement for 
toffee. Septimus’s agony in understanding the signs in the mutable metropolis 
corresponds also to the dialectic of attention and inattention in the order of things in 
twentieth-century cultural modernity. As analysed by social critics such as Walter 
Benjamin as well as by medical practitioners such as George Beard, early twentieth-
century modernity was often characterised by inattention and distraction, with the 
subject moving across the metropolis through “dangerous intersection [where] 
nervous impulses flow through him in rapid succession, like the energy from a 
battery.”94 Likewise social theorists such as Georg Simmel as well as psychophysical 
researchers such as William Wundt perceived the conditions of modernity in terms 
of the subject’s increasing exposure to autokinesis and acoustics and the ability to 
retain attention over windows of time.
95
  
 
The dialectic between attention and alienation through distraction often 
constituted the shock principle that characterised twentieth-century cultural 
modernity, its metropolis and mental life. As Tim Armstrong asserts:  
 
For Benjamin the shock effect is part of a genuinely dialectical view of 
technology, in which it offers new possibilities as well as new forms of 
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alienation – the shock is a symptom of alienation; it is what the worker on the 
production line experiences, since each of his actions is disconnected from a 
total purpose, representing an empty jolting rather than an intentional 
making.
96
  
 
The metonymic mode of movements, that metropolitan modernity constructed, 
offered its citizens only incomplete locations across the narratives of association and 
alienation. The skywriting scene in Mrs Dalloway bears out this theme as various 
minds situated at various parts of the metropolis suddenly become equidistant from 
the advertising aeroplane, with each mind offering its own bit of meaning in an 
economy of signs and speculations. The metonymic meaning formation across the 
sky through a process of association and amalgamation is described in detail by the 
narrative: 
 
Dropping dead down, the aeroplane soared straight up, curved in a loop, 
raced, sank, rose, and whatever it did, wherever it went, out fluttered behind 
it a thick ruffled bar of white smoke which curled and wreathed upon the sky 
in letters. But what letters? A C was it? an E, then an I? Only for a moment 
did they lie still; then they moved and melted and were rubbed out up in the 
sky, and the aeroplane shot further away and again, in a fresh space of sky, 
began writing a K, an E, a Y perhaps? (MD 17)  
 
Septimus exists in the map of the metropolis with a reconfigured sentient 
structure that receives the double shock induced by machinic hyperkinesis as well as 
by the traumatic memory of the war. In effect, the advertising aeroplane in the 
civilian sky space also contains within its kinesis the violence to the human eye that 
sees its signs without understanding its fuller meaning, thus dramatizing the schism 
between the physical eye and the cognitive brain, a theme that Woolf takes up more 
immediately in her essay on cinema.
97
 The sky-writing scene in Mrs Dalloway mixes 
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 Tim Armstrong, “Two Types of Shock in Modernity”, 66.  
 
97 Virginia Woolf, “The Cinema”, Collected Essays, ed. Leonard Woolf (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1966) 268-72. Woolf’s deliberately dramatic depiction of the fission between the brain and the eye 
before cinematic visuality is suggestive of the violence to the order of sentience corresponding to the 
new visual subject that emerged with the turn of the twentieth century. Woolf’s depiction of the 
cognitive schism –“Eye and brain are torn asunder ruthlessly as they try vainly to work in couples” 
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mechanical reproduction. Woolf’s essay carries the remarkable reference to one of the most 
influential films in the history of cinema: Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari. Wiene’s 
film is a cinematic spectacle of horror that was immediately associated with the growth of Fascism 
after the First World War. The human subject – overdetermined by the collective stimuli of the 
modern metropolis – often moved into a “hyper-reflexive” mode of denial that multiplied itself in its 
attempt to retain the “purity” of perception. Benjamin’s notion of the “posthumous shock” bears 
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fascination with fear, intimidation with wonder, in its spectacle of signs that swim 
out of machines in the sky. The sound waves travel to Septimus’ reconfigured 
nervous system with different semantic structures, as do the visual signs and their 
signification. Thus the name of the toffee that is advertised in air is uttered to 
Septimus and it emerges with a different acoustic register to his nerves haunted by 
the shock of war: 
 
‘K . . .  R . . .’ said the nursemaid, and Septimus heard her say ‘Kay Arr’ 
close to his ear, deeply, softly, like a mellow organ, but with a roughness in 
her voice like a grasshopper’s, which rasped his spine deliciously and sent 
running up into his brain waves of sound, which , concussing, broke. (MD 
18)  
 
 This episode depicting the matrix of machines in the post-war metropolis also 
exhibits the reception of the soundscapes of the city to a traumatized soldier 
dislocated from the war zone and discomfited in the reconfigured city-space. In an 
age of mechanical reproduction, the newly emerging politics of sound in the form of 
gramophone and radio technologies induced their corresponding nervousness to the 
human senses previously unaccustomed to such sound waves.
98
 The new aural 
sensitivity that emerged in the wake of such technologies of reproduction also 
inspired “justifiable fears about state control, hegemonic dominance and a passive 
public”99 in an era where new machines of sound produced and re-produced 
disembodied voices through telegraph and gramophones. The disembodied voices 
                                                                                                                                                                    
remarkable resemblance with Adorno’s notion of Schauder, that state of shuddering--the inverted 
wonder--experienced by modern man in his meetings with the machine. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel Adorno and Ralph Tiedemann (London: Continuum, 
2002) 15. 
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through machines of modernity such as the gramophone often carried connotations 
of deadness that emerged in a dialectic of newness and reproduction.  
 
It is interesting, while analysing the K R scene in Mrs Dalloway, to make the 
analogy with Roland Barthes’ notion of the difference between hearing as a 
physiological act and listening as a psychological act requiring attention. Thus, it is 
possible, as Barthes asserts:  
 
[t]o describe the physical conditions of hearing (its mechanisms) by recourse 
to acoustics and the physiology of the ear; but listening cannot be defined 
only by its object, or, one might say, its goal.
100
  
 
Barthes’s analysis draws attention to the intentionality of the listening process, a 
quality that is associated with the agency of the listening subject. With his human 
agency compromised by the unresolved shock from the war and the tyranny of 
medical agents who promote proportion over human emotion, Septimus in Woolf’s 
novel fails to integrate the hearing and the listening processes. The sky-writing 
episode from Mrs Dalloway problematizes the politics of watching and seeing by 
dramatizing the schism between the two processes in a mind uninitiated to the 
mechanism of the movement, thus extending the schism between the eye and the 
brain that Woolf dramatizes in her essay on the cinema. Crucially, the nursemaid’s 
spelling out of the word to Septimus with the signs K and R and the shell-shocked 
soldier’s reception of the same depicts an instance of hyper-hearing as a nervous 
condition whereby codes from two different orders of sound (the military and the 
civilian) jar incongruously within the nervous system of the shell shocked soldier.
101
 
This hyper-hearing propels Septimus to transform the alphabets K and R into the 
sound Kay Arr, one that carries the hope-less association of and desire for care. The 
sounds of the aeroplane carry to the shell-shocked soldier an increased and 
heightened awareness of the self and its potential danger while also attempting to 
resituate his nervous self in the reconfigured territory of the post-war urban 
soundscape. With his trauma and nervous breakdown, Septimus embodies this 
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schism between the self and its signifier in the post-war landscape. This schism 
informs his hysteria in the haunted metropolis after the war that, despite its 
compulsive rituals of urbanity and machines of movement (the aeroplanes and 
omnibuses keep cutting across the narrative of Mrs Dalloway and the ambulance 
carrying Septimus’s dead body speeds to the hospital swiftly and cleanly), is 
essentially a waste land where medical control neither heals nor hears but takes up a 
neo-fascistic hegemony.  
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3.6 Medical Science and the Crisis of the Feeling Self in Mrs Dalloway 
 
 
The metropolis in Mrs Dalloway is a landscape where economies of shock are 
increasingly naturalized through repetitions and rituals. As Esther Leslie asserts in a 
work on Walter Benjamin’s location of resistance in a culture of conformism, the 
unique product of the ceaseless structures of shocks across the modern metropolis 
was that of numbness, which emerged as a bodily as well as cultural discourse of 
familiarization through a ritual of compulsory repetitions, culminating at a point 
where the pure human self was almost indistinguishable from the aesthetics of the 
automaton.
102
 Numbness of course emerges in the discourses of modern 
neuroscience as a neural condition characterised by a loss of emotions and cognitive 
capabilities whereby “the disturbance of cerebral auto-affection produces a sort of 
nihilism [. . .] an absolute indifference, a coolness that visibly annihilates all 
difference and all dimensionality.”103 Ironically, it is the shell-shocked soldier from 
the war who emerges as the most porous character in the urban landscape. The 
narrator informs the reader that “This susceptibility to impressions had been his 
undoing” (MD 58). In his susceptibility to experiential and emotional change, 
Septimus embodies an “extremity of consciousness which the others, protected by 
their social roles and their ability to draw themselves together as Clarissa does before 
her, will never reach.”104  
 
In his dislocation from the urban architectures of meaning around him, 
Septimus embodies the ambivalence of hypersensitivity as well as the inability to 
feel, an inability that compromises his functional social self. What characterizes 
Septimus and ironically underlines his subjectivity, is his awareness of his increasing 
inability to feel, an awareness that is also a painful pointer to the general numbness 
around him in a post-war metropolis that “has swallowed up many millions of young 
men called Smith” (MD 69). Tutored in the discourses of ‘manly behaviour’ before 
the war, Septimus had effaced his emotional self in favour of the ‘manly self’. The 
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return of the repressed occurs after the War in peacetime when Septimus becomes 
engaged to Lucrezia through the panic “that he could not feel” (MD 71). The 
repetition of this inability in Septimus’s haunted imagination corresponds closely to 
Freud’s notion of repetition in war trauma whereby “dreams occurring in traumatic 
neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing the patient back to the 
situation of the accident.”105 But more importantly, this repetition emerges as a 
pointer to the transformation of a privilege into a loss. Once the heroic male who 
congratulated himself for effacing emotions, Septimus now emerges as a traumatic 
and ‘unmanly’ subject ironically and precisely because of his inability to feel or 
emotionally connect to the people and objects around him. Thus:  
 
He looked at people outside; happy they seemed, collecting in the middle of 
the street, shouting, laughing, squabbling over nothing. But he could not 
taste, he could not feel. [. . .] He could reason; he could read [. . .] he could 
add up his bill; his brain was perfect; it must be the fault of the world then – 
that he could not feel. (MD 72)  
 
Septimus’ inability to feel is caused not so much by any physical injury but 
largely as an outcome of an intense period of emotional repression tutored and 
advocated by military masculinity coupled with the confrontation with unresolved 
shock at the trauma in the trenches during war. Septimus’s inability to feel 
corresponds to what William James classifies as the form of melancholic perversion 
where the sufferers perceive themselves as “sheathed in India-rubber; nothing 
penetrates to the quick or draws blood, as it were.”106 As the ideal of jingoistic 
heroism disappears from the mind and the war emerges as a landscape of shock and 
loss, the masculine subject suffers an annihilation of agency through a combination 
of ineffectuality and incomprehension. While he retains the function of his reasoning 
brain and its logic of mathematics – the faculties that had informed the project of 
masculinity during the War – Septimus perceives the liquidation of his emotional 
self that cannot feel anymore or respond to the stimuli of the world around him. 
Viewing the world as an anarchic space of fleeting emotions that cannot constitute a 
self, Septimus thinks of procreation itself as a sin in a landscape of bio-political 
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determinism. The narrative informs the reader of the emotional and cognitive 
instability of Septimus through another process of hyper-hearing that further 
dramatizes Septimus’s inability to feel. As Rezia informs him of Mrs Filmer’s 
daughter’s expectation of a child and laments her own childless loneliness in relation 
to it, Septimus stares blankly at the tragedy of his own un-selfing that cannot connect 
to feelings anymore: 
 
She could not grow old and have no children! She was very lonely, she was 
very unhappy! She cried for the first time since they were married. Far away 
he heard her sobbing; he heard it accurately, he noticed it distinctly; he 
compared it to a piston thumping. But he felt nothing. (MD 73) 
 
As the traumatized subject in the post-war metropolis, Septimus the shell-
shocked soldier is increasingly robbed of his emotional, cognitive and integrative 
abilities and painfully embodies the growing schism between existing and living, 
looking and seeing, hearing and listening. In his nervous condition, Septimus 
embodies the subversive state in the bodily realm that Merleau-Ponty correlates to 
the politics of strikes against normative functioning society. Such a state of sickness 
subjects the person “the vital rhythms of his body”107 that enact a defamiliarized 
structure of sentience in relation to the normative social markers. More importantly, 
Septimus’s condition may be interpreted as an illustration of the break in the 
seamless unity in neural and cognitive behaviour that is compromised in a state of 
sickness and shock. Writing of his experiences after his own amputation, the 
neurologist Oliver Sacks studies how indifference, inattention and alienation may be 
read as symptoms that suggest a ‘system-breakdown’ in the subject. Sack’s analysis 
demonstrates how classical neurology – pioneered in England in the works of Henry 
Head who was actually one of Virginia Woolf’s personal physicians during her 
nervous illness – failed to understand the agony of the human being precisely due to 
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its objectivising nature that did not comprehend the subjective agency of “the living 
‘I’”.108  
Septimus’s state may be interpreted as one objectified by a bio-political gaze 
which fails to fathom his subjective experience of shock and loss. Painfully 
embedded in a culture that sees emotions as anathema to the masculinist behavioural 
code, Septimus embodies an alienation that cannot be translated into language. As 
the disrupted self whose disruption ironically reflects back on the awareness of the 
feeling subject, Septimus experiences an emptiness that is neurologically 
underpinned as well as phenomenologically embodied. It is interesting to compare 
the sense of loss experienced by Woolf’s fictional character to Oliver Sacks’ concept 
of ‘existential neurology’ that looks at Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) for a 
fuller understanding of the neurological process. Thus Sacks states: 
 
Scotoma, in Kantian terms, was an ultimate neuro-ontological extinction (or 
‘Akantia’). Physically, physiologically, there was an absence of nerve 
impulse, image, and field; but metaphysically, or ontologically, an absence of 
reason, and of its constructs, space and time.
109
     
  
In correlating neurology and existential ontology, Sacks demonstrates how 
existentialist crisis – one experienced by Septimus in his knowledge that “it might be 
possible that the world itself is without meaning” (MD 72) – is characterised by a 
loss of the feeling self that is conducive to the normal social and neural functioning 
of the body. Kant’s concept of the Scotoma, like Spinoza’s concept of the conatus 
and the conative self, is crucial in the analyses of modern neuroscience that looks at 
philosophy for a fuller understanding of the human mind, self and its sense of loss. 
Although his brain was perfect, and he could add up the bills, Septimus could not 
feel and was thus increasingly alienated from the world that moved around him. 
Woolf’s novel thus flags up the epistemic schism between the brain and the mind, 
between the neural patterns and the sense of self that Septimus’s contemporary bio-
                                                          
108
 Oliver Sacks, A Leg to Stand On (London: Macmillan, 1991) 164. In this work, Sacks 
demonstrates how the uniqueness of the self may elude the medical gaze of neurology and 
neuropsychology which has been overly reliant on a culture of empirical classification where it is 
difficult for patients experiencing alienation to “convey their feelings: the patient might not speak, the 
doctor might not hear” (156). By delineating the difference between the ‘schemata’ and ‘inner 
images’ of neuropsychology and the ‘experiencing’, ‘willing’ and ‘feeling’ that characterise the 
subjectivity of the self, Sacks affirms how the neural systems that are visible to the medical machines 
“are embedded in, and transcended by, selves” (164).     
 
109
 Sacks, A Leg to Stand On, 166.  
 128 
 
political culture did not understand, with its brutal materiality and love of proportion. 
In suffering the loss of his feeling self, Septimus embodies a compromised core 
consciousness that normally “relates information about the current state of the self to 
the prevailing circumstances in the outside world—the source of all the objects that 
the self requires to meet its inner needs.”110  
 
In equating the sound of his wife weeping to that of a piston thumping, 
Septimus exhibits a cognitive system wounded by the war, whereby once 
familiarized paradigms of perceptions are rendered defamiliarized through a process 
of deferral and disorientation.
111
 The connection and comparison that Septimus’s 
traumatized mind makes between his wife weeping and a piston thumping 
demonstrates the ubiquity of the automaton in his imagination whereby an emotional 
experience is immediately associated with a machinic operation through a process 
where feeling is increasingly reduced to entities. In retaining what he considers to be 
his reasoning self, while having liquidated his feeling self, Septimus embodies the 
dual effects of war trauma and masculinist repression gone wrong. His inability to 
emote or feel corresponds to that condition of numbness that modern neuroscientists 
classify as a form of consciousness disorder.
112
  
 
Like Eliot’s tired typist in The Waste Land whose brain only allows a half 
formed thought to pass across it as she puts a record on a gramophone after the 
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departure of her carbuncular lover,
113
 Septimus’s mind as well as his body is 
characterised by a numbness born out of over-repression, a “cannibalistic 
solitude”114 that had been exacerbated by the emotional shocks experienced in the 
war. In their inabilities to emote, both Septimus as well as the typist in The Waste 
Land, are hystericized by non-feeling. Their compromised emotional selves exist in 
an age when the typewriter and the machine gun were both constructed by similar 
aesthetics of automatism: indeed when the typewriter was “a discursive machine 
gun.”115 The culture corresponds to a vocabulary of violence on the senses that 
operates in the military as well as in the civilian space, marked by similar automatic 
machines that blur the borderlines between “wilful human action and helplessness of 
automatism.”116 In an age of mechanical reproduction and automatic annihilation, 
both the male soldier back from the war and the female typist consumed by her 
machine are reified by a masculinist machinic unconscious indifferent to the private 
perceptions of the emotional self. The neuropathology of the non-feeling self in post-
war modernity is thus a condition that is both political as well as medical. More 
significantly, the emotional self that Septimus is bereft of through a process of 
masculinist appropriation, self-denial, and shock, also compromises his well-being 
and situatedness in the society and the stimuli around him.
117
 Septimus’s inability to 
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feel thus compromises his cognitive condition by compromising his notion of his 
own autobiographical self in his consciousness. Thus modern neuroscience affirms:  
 
In a curious way, consciousness begins as the feeling of what happens when 
we see or hear or touch. [. . .] it is a feeling that accompanies the making of 
any kind of image—visual, auditory, tactile, visceral — within our living 
organisms. Placed in the appropriate context, the feeling marks those images 
as ours and allows us to say, in the proper sense of the terms, that we see or 
hear or touch. [. . .] From its most humble beginnings, consciousness is 
knowledge, knowledge consciousness, no less interconnected than truth and 
beauty were for Keats.
118
  
 
Damasio’s allusion to Keats in the passage cited above is doubly relevant in the 
context of Mrs Dalloway, for Septimus emerges in Rezia’s imagination equated with 
Keats.
119
 In a broader sense, Septimus’s predicament arises out of his corporeal and 
phobic encounters with the bio-politics of proportions and eugenics, embodied by 
the agents of masculinist medical science.
120
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3.7 Masculinity and the Return of the Repressed in Mrs Dalloway 
 
 
The narrative of Mrs Dalloway keeps emphasizing the effacement of emotion to 
which Septimus increasingly subjects himself. The ‘manly behaviour’ that Septimus 
congratulates himself for exhibiting during and immediately following the war, 
contains the forceful repression of emotion that automatically extends into an 
effacement of free-will and agency. This is evidently in correspondence with the 
unemotional masculinity principle advocated by the Boy Scouts and public school 
culture of his day. Thus: 
 
[w]hen Evans (Rezia, who had seen him only once, called him ‘a quiet man’, 
a sturdy red-haired man, undemonstrative in the company of women), when 
Evans was killed, just before the Armistice, in Italy, Septimus, far from 
showing any emotion or recognising that here was the end of a friendship, 
congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably. The War 
had taught him. It was sublime. [. . .] The last shells missed him. He watched 
them explode with indifference. (MD 70) 
 
The masculinity embodied by Evans – with his silent sturdy nature and 
undemonstrative countenance before women – and that exhibited by Septimus during 
times of loss, both uphold the primacy of ‘manly’ reason that congratulates itself on 
its cold indifference and negation of emotional expression. The primacy of reason 
over emotion is also placed in accordance with the rituals of dominant masculinity 
with its steely nerves and strong will. Mrs Dalloway is a significant study of the 
human mind in a stern bio-political culture inasmuch as it depicts how the 
supposedly ‘strong will’ exhibited by manly men (as manifested by lack of 
emotional attachments), ironically informs the negation of will and agency in the 
human system. The novel is a moving account of how the repressed emotional self 
gradually disappears along with the conative self required to enact the necessary 
rituals of living and social cohesion.  
 
The cognitive and cohesive quotient of emotions and the awareness of the 
subject’s feeling self are increasingly highlighted by discoveries of modern 
neuroscience in terms of how those integrate the human being to the self-
preservation and self-enhancing techniques in relation to the external environment. 
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In particular, Antonio Damasio’s work on feelings suggests how the emotional self 
contributes directly to the construction of the practical self necessary to carry out 
social integration and cognition. Suggesting that emotions and the ability to feel are 
essentially (and neurologically) linked to the reasoning centres in the brain, Damasio 
states:  
In short, feeling your emotional states, which is to say being conscious of 
emotions, offers you flexibility of response based on the particular history of 
your interactions with the environment. Although you need innate devices to 
start the ball of knowledge rolling, feelings offer you something extra.
121
   
 
 Emotions thus contain the “something extra” which – perhaps more than anything 
else – constitutes that which makes us fully feeling human beings, as well as 
allowing us to bodily and socially integrate with our environment. As the 
indeterminable element in the human system, emotions emerge in phenomenology
122
 
as well as in modern neuroscience as the pointer to the unmappable agency that 
contributes towards human uniqueness. Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway is a remarkably 
complex novel inasmuch as it brings together masculinity and the crisis of agency 
through an epistemology of the feeling self that cannot be mapped by medical 
science. By foregrounding the male body in crisis against a background of bio-
political panic, Woolf’s novel depicts how the cultural and materialist construction 
of masculinity affects and eventually consumes a human being by robbing him of 
that which makes him uniquely human. It is thus a novel that blurs the borders 
between the inside and the outside, material presence and unmappable essence, by 
depicting those together in the site where material interpellations and private 
emotions are constantly re-negotiated in real life: the human body.     
 
The emotional repression that Septimus had enforced onto himself 
throughout his military career is the naturalized enactment of the ideological tutoring 
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 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (London: Picador, 
1995) 133.  
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 As Raymond Gibbs suggests in his study of the three levels of embodiment (the neural, the 
cognitive and the phenomenological), it is only at the phenomenological level that we are most 
actively aware of our physical state as well as its relation to the external environment. While 
emphasizing how the three levels are constantly connected to each other for the proper functioning of 
the human system, Gibbs states that it is only at the phenomenological level of embodiment in which 
“we feel experience, of the way things appear to us, and of qualia, that is the distinctive quality of 
experience such as the pain of a toothache, the taste of chocolate, the sound of violin, or the redness of 
a ripe Bing cherry.” Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 40. 
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on masculinity and ‘manly’ propriety he had received since his boyhood. However, 
the constant and compulsory effacement of his emotions, coupled with the horrors he 
had experienced during the war, begins to adversely affect his normal functioning 
self by an increasing disappearance of agency and intentionality. Thus while his 
neural embodiment remains medically functional (thus making him non-sick in the 
eyes of medical science), his cognitive and phenomenological embodiment are 
compromised due to the crisis in his feeling self. The narrative informs how 
Septimus, with his inability to feel, descends into a pit (MD 74). This highlights how 
the repressed male subject transforms from the signifier of plucky masculinity before 
the war to the crumbling system embodying post-war trauma. His hysteric location 
after the war situates Septimus in the same plane as that of the women with nervous 
malady “through their common enemy, the nerve specialist.”123 More importantly, in 
living the death of his unique human agency with the gradual loss of feelings, 
Septimus emerges as the example of emptied humanity. Thus the war that is initially 
perceived as a sublime experience in masculinity by Septimus, a slide show of glory 
and ‘manly’ love, is increasingly revealed as an inexplicable experience of loss that 
haunts the traumatic subject.   
 
In the medical gaze embodied by Doctor Holmes, nothing is really wrong 
with Septimus and the doctors’ orders include playing cricket, a collective male sport 
that corresponded closely to the masculinist vocabulary of Edwardian Britain. The 
masculinist medical narrative in Mrs Dalloway that appears to override and consume 
the private narratives of loss and hysteria is symbolically embodied by the 
phallogocentric Big Ben whose beats of standardized clock time across the 
metropolis precludes the possibilities of private articulation and drowns the moment 
of epiphany. The narrative makes this abundantly clear at moments of hesitancy that 
emerge only to be felled and flattened, as evinced by the encounter between Clarissa 
and Peter Walsh when: 
 
The sound of Big Ben striking the half-hour struck out between them with 
extraordinary vigour, as if a young man, strong, indifferent, inconsiderate, 
were swinging dumb-bells this way and that. (MD 39)    
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 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady, 192.  
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As the little narratives of human beings remain unarticulated and are lost in the 
indifferent metanarrative of the metropolis and its standardized time, the 
phallogocentric structure of sound from the tower clock denies the moment for 
private utterance. In the same manner, Septimus’s pain is denied and decimated by 
the masculinist medical discourse on nerves and “His body was macerated until only 
the nerve fibres were left. It was spread like a veil upon a rock” (MD 55).  The 
reduction of Septimus’s body to its network of nerves corresponds to the condition 
of his shock under the medical gaze that – like the body of the evening that Eliot’s 
Prufrock sees as a patient etherised upon a table – pierces through his body like an 
X-Ray machine. The X-Ray’s emergence in the late nineteenth century and 
pervasive use by the time the First World War ended, signified coercion as well as 
clarity, phobia as well as discovery. It constituted a “complex and contradictory 
relation of identification and exposure [that] exists among bodies, images, and 
cultural apparatus.”124 Exposed and reified by such a medical gaze that denies him 
his pain while seeking to bully him back into the masculinist mode of behaviour, 
Septimus emerges through similar hysteriography as that of the hysteric women of 
the late nineteenth century.  
 
The traumatic nightmares that Septimus contains within him include the 
vision of his dead soldier friend Evans who emerges in his imagination unchanged in 
his grey uniform and appearing without wounds. It is interesting to compare this 
passage in Mrs Dalloway with a related scene in Katherine Mansfield’s short story 
“The Fly” where the unnamed ‘boss’, having lost his son to the War, embodies a 
masculinity that is the obverse of Septimus’s shell-shocked condition, with his stout, 
rosy and strong body seemingly in control of the architecture of his office, as well as 
that of his mind. Thus the specially designed new phallic architecture of his office 
corresponds to the boss’s desire to overcome the loss of his son while his refusal to 
face the same loss except in its moment of purity also corresponds to the same 
masculinist principle of preservation through privilege. In his attempt to hystericize 
himself through a private performance after enacting the sadomasochistic drama of 
torture on a living body (the fly in his inkpot), the boss in Mansfield’s story faces the 
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failure of his project of preservation through his inability to evacuate himself through 
weeping.
125
 Septimus’s trauma at the prospect of seeing the dead body of his friend 
corresponds – in contrast to the boss in Mansfield – to the hysteria of one who has 
been to the real scene of loss and embodies the same in the manner of his shock. 
Thus while the grey uniform in which the dead soldier features in the photo-frame in 
Mansfield’s story is an impediment to the performative hysteria of the boss (as it 
does not give him the pleasure of his desired release
126
 through a masculinist mode 
of mourning), the grey suit in which the dead Evans appears in Septimus’s vision 
carries real joy that reaches the dimension of mystic revelation: 
 
I must tell the whole world, Septimus cried, raising his hand (as the dead man 
in the grey suit came nearer), raising his hand like some colossal figure who 
has lamented the fate of man for ages in the desert alone with his hands 
pressed to his forehead [. . .] and with legions of men prostrate behind him 
he, the giant mourner, receives for one moment on his face the whole — (MD 
57)   
 
Mysticism and the machine appeared incongruously close in early twentieth-
century modernity, with technology such as the camera and the telephone carrying 
their uncanny correlates in vocabularies of experience that form “an ellipse with foci 
that are far apart and are determined, on the one hand, by mystical experience [. . .] 
                                                          
125
 Katherine Mansfield, “The Fly”, The Stories of Katherine Mansfield, ed. Antony Alpers 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1984) 529-32. A condensed narrative of the condition of man 
under increasing internalization of war neurosis, Mansfield’s “The Fly” is a depiction of the 
epistemology of the masculine hysteric at the heart of the modern metropolis and the ritual of failed 
hysteria inside the closet space of the modern office. The effort of resistance to trauma in the story is 
enacted by a figure which wants to preserve the phallogocentric through a strategic system of 
nostalgia and orchestrated rituals of hysteric mourning. “The Fly” probes into the privilege of the 
hysteric who seeks to maintain the phallogocentric economy with its triumph over time by seeking to 
re-live and re-play the original moment of loss. Like the erotic economy of male homosexuality that is 
anxiously closeted and articulated in the nineteenth century drama of masculinity as evinced in texts 
such as The Picture of Dorian Gray, the hysteria of the boss in Mansfield’s “The Fly” emerges as a 
closeted drama and a ritual of retention. The failure of the boss to remember the original trauma of his 
loss despite the perfected rituals inside his closet is a pointer to the paradigm shift in memory that the 
boss had compulsively sought to repress. The hysteria at the end of “The Fly” is thus constituted by 
its paradoxical absence and the failure of the masculinist project of remembrance. 
 
126
 It may be argued that the masculinist mode of mourning that the boss in Mansfield’s story seeks to 
enact by locking himself up in his office space and staring at his dead son’s photo works with similar 
rituals as that of masturbation, through its compulsory economy of secrecy, shame and satisfaction. 
The erotic economy is hinted at by Mansfield’s narrative itself by the sadomasochistic pleasure the 
boss derives during the fly episode before his last attempt at weeping. The symbolic emasculation that 
the boss faces at the end of the story corresponds to his inability to weep anymore at the loss of his 
son, an inability that corresponds ritually to the inability to masturbate anymore. The lack of grief in 
the masculinist economy of the boss corresponds thus to the failure of phallic performance.     
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and, on the other, by the [machine induced] experience of the big-city dweller.”127 
Septimus’s isolation as the mourner is the obverse of the compulsory secrecy 
accompanying the boss’s mimetic hysteric performance in “The Fly”. The 
protagonist in Mansfield’s story and the shell-shocked soldier in Woolf’s narrative, 
although both impacted by the First World War, appear discursively dissimilar in 
their situatedness in relation to normative masculinity.
128
 Thus while the boss in 
Mansfield’s “The Fly” embodies the plucky muscular masculinity that is still going 
strong by a strategic concealment of personal loss, thus appropriating the love for 
proportions advocated by the bio-political agents of eugenics, Septimus embodies 
the nervous masculinity rendered hysteric by the real horrors of the war.  
 
The consumption that Septimus comes to embody equates him in Rezia’s 
imagination with that of Keats, the enervated male poet not understood in his day. 
The location of poetry in Mrs Dalloway exists in an interestingly incongruous 
relation with that of medical science.
129
 The history of the war and the masculinist 
ideal that was invested in it is depicted vividly in the intellectual and physical vigour 
of Septimus: 
 
He went to France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of 
Shakespeare’s plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress walking in a 
square. There in the trenches the change which Mr Brewer desired when he 
advised football was produced instantly; he developed manliness, he was 
promoted; he drew the attention, indeed the affection of his officer, Evans by 
name. (MD 70) 
 
                                                          
127 Benjamin, “Some Reflections on Kafka”, Illuminations 142. For an analogy between the new 
machines of modernity and the panic in contemporary human imagination see Pamela Thurschwell, 
Literature, Technology and Magical Thinking, 1880-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) and Tim Armstrong, Modernism, Technology and the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) 77-105.  
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 It is interesting to compare Septimus’s inability to appropriate the mimetic vocabulary of 
masculinity and the corresponding shame with Flory’s failure to perform the appropriate masculinist 
behaviour in the colonial contact-zone in Orwell’s Burmese Days, the analysis of which will be done 
in the following chapter. 
 
129
 It is interesting to compare the location of poetry and medical science in Mrs Dalloway with that in 
McEwan’s Saturday again, for the scene of transformation that moves the degenerative criminal with 
Huntington’s disease in McEwan’s novel happens not inside a clinic but in a kitchen where a poet 
reads aloud Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” to him.   
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The metonymic markers of Englishness through Shakespeare’s plays and genteel 
ladies who inspire poetry are in sharp contrast to the hurried cosmopolitanism and 
the mutable metropolis that take their places after the war. It is interesting to note the 
movement of Septimus himself from appropriating the normative model of 
masculinity to embodying helpless hysteria under the masculinist medical gaze. The 
construction of muscular manliness is produced through football in the trenches and 
the affection of Evans carries the suggestion of homoerotic desire that was both a 
signifier of clandestine love as well as military masculinity.
130
 Likewise the death of 
the male lover moves Septimus to the culturally tutored indifference for which he 
initially congratulates himself, for upholding what he considered the manly stoicism 
against loss. This is the same ‘manly’ virtue that the boss in Mansfield’s “The Fly” 
attempts to perpetuate with strategic and masturbatory modes of mourning. 
 
The mode of masculinity that Septimus embodies through his non-feeling 
and betrayal of love is strikingly similar to that of Peter Walsh, the imperial officer 
back to the metropolis from the colonies. Both men marry women they do not love 
and guiltily look back at the life that did not happen because of their failure to feel, 
Septimus looking back at Isabel Pole whom he had outraged by marrying Rezia 
through a panic of non-feeling and Peter by marrying an Anglo-Indian woman 
instead of Clarissa Dalloway. Both men seek to appropriate the military model of 
masculinity, Septimus by actually joining the army in the war and Peter by looking 
admiringly and marching alongside the boys in uniform carrying guns up Whitehall. 
However, even as he sees and marches alongside the boys in admiration, Peter 
notices the imminent decadence in the masculinity they embody: 
 
It is, thought Peter Walsh, beginning to keep step with them, a very fine 
training. But they did not look robust. They were weedy for the most part, 
                                                          
130
 Sarah Cole studies the homoerotic strain in Mrs Dalloway and affirms that Septimus’s shell-shock 
is caused not so much by the trauma of War as the death of his male lover in whom he had invested 
all his emotional self. While the argument in this chapter does not fully subscribe to Cole’s analysis 
that appears to undermine the social and medical conditions informing First World War Shell-shock 
in its analysis of the homoerotic bonds that are structured and severed during and after the War, it is 
certainly significant that Evans reappears in Septimus’s traumatic nightmares as the signifier of loss 
and guilt. As Cole asserts, “Septimus offers a striking image of the alienated soldier as bereaved 
friend [. . .] this isolated figure at times appears in connection with the self-enclosed group – a 
precarious form of community, with a language and sign system of its own, yet insufficient 
institutional structure to prevent its collapse into fragmentation and solitariness.” Modernism, Male 
Friendship, and the First World War, 181-82.   
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boys of sixteen, who might, tomorrow, stand behind bowls of rice, cakes of 
soap on counters. Now they wore on then unmixed with sensual pleasure or 
daily preoccupations the solemnity of the wreath [. . .] They had taken their 
vow. The traffic respected it; vans were stopped.  (MD 42)  
 
The middle-aged Peter Walsh’s march alongside the young boys in uniform, emerge 
as a nervous mimicry of the masculinity the young soldiers embody as well as a 
montage of movements across the post-war metropolis. Returning from the colonial 
space into the Western metropolitan center, Peter, like Marlow in Heart of Darkness, 
quickly sees through the markers of gentility and discerns the signs of decadence and 
discontent that civilization cannot conceal.  
 
Both Peter Walsh and Septimus emerge eventually as marginalized men in 
the reconfigured metropolis. Peter returns from the peripheries of the empire and is 
unable to appropriate the vocabulary of the urban rituals except through over-
idealized wonder at the signifiers of civilization. Most importantly, both figures are 
characterised by a repression of emotions and feeling and come to realize how that 
undoes the self. Thus while the shell-shocked Septimus comes to be consumed by 
his repression, Peter Walsh realizes that “It had been his undoing – this susceptibility 
– in Anglo-Indian society; not weeping at the right time, or laughing either” (MD 
122).
131
 He comes to realize that: “Cleverness was silly. One must say simply what 
one felt” (MD 154) a realization that that is immediately followed by the confession 
that he does not know what he feels. The hyperlink narrative of Mrs Dalloway 
proceeds by making connections across characters and their minds along a complex 
praxis of space and time in a moving and mutable metropolis.
132
 The suicide of 
Septimus is the fallout of the bodily panic of approaching terror as he perceives 
himself in the power of Holmes and Bradshaw who advocated that “he must be 
taught to rest” (MD 119) thus appropriating the vocabulary of violence of the 
Mitchell-method of cure even while seemingly suggesting peace-therapy.  
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 The repression that Peter experiences and is subjectivized by in the Anglo-Indian social space 
around him is strikingly similar to the one faced by Flory in Orwell’s Burmese Days, a text that will 
be taken up in the following chapter.  
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 The alternative and alternating perspectives of narration that Mrs Dalloway incorporates offers a 
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by modern neuroscientists. Thus V.S.Ramachandran, the neuroscientist, famous for his works on 
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Septimus’s final attempt to save his writing by burning those from the reaches of 
Holmes and Bradshaw – is symbolic of his desperation to retain his private symbols 
of signification from the panoptic gaze of masculinist medicine.   
 
The masculinist vocabulary of medicine embodied by Holmes and Bradshaw 
is immediately evident in the cry of “Coward” by Holmes as Septimus leaps from 
the large Bloomsbury window, thus voicing not despair but disapproval, not sorrow 
for the human tragedy but disgust at the unmanliness of the act. The mangled body 
of the shell-shocked soldier lies as a testimony to the tyranny of masculinity and its 
medical discourses that preach proportion, until it is siphoned away with the sirens 
of civilization that thrill Peter Walsh as he hears the high bell of the ambulance 
speeding through the traffic.
133
 Septimus, who jumps from the window and kills 
himself in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, emerges eventually as a frameless figure in the 
reconfigured social landscape. In his insight into the horror and epistemology of his 
loss,
134
 and his helpless embodiment of the failure of feelings after the war, Septimus 
emerges as a subject who remains unarticulated in his refusal to be reified through 
the prisms of masculinity and medical science.  
 
Woolf’s novel is a story of the death of agency and free-will in the post-war 
metropolis. In its depiction of the bio-political regime that oversees human bodily 
and social behaviour, Mrs Dalloway demonstrates how the politics of masculinity 
and medical science reduces human complexities and capacities to mappable 
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 It is interesting to compare Septimus with Conrad’s Kurtz in Heart of Darkness, as figures who 
become problematic to the masculinist system precisely due to their over-identification with the 
system. The resultant crisis arises out of the knowledge of the horror that they embody in their 
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methods of classification and cure. In its vivid instantiations of trauma and loss, 
Woolf’s novel situates the feeling male body in resistance to the bio-political gaze in 
a deconstruction of political presuppositions and medical tenets. In their inconstant 
and incomplete inscriptions into the systems of patriarchy best exemplified by the 
dominant discourses of masculinity and medicine, the fictional Septimus and the real 
soldiers of the First World War embody in their nervousness a condition that is 
medical as well as immediately political, one that Slavoj Žižek classified as “the 
effect and testimony of a failed interpellation”135 into the symbolic. The 
ambivalence, existentialist crisis, and eventual suicide of Septimus enact a resistance 
and show how ideological interpellations may be disrupted by phenomenological 
experience and subjective change. In its philosophical essence and literary 
complexity, Woolf’s narrative emerges as a story that shows what it means to be 
truly, painfully and chaotically human, in a world that celebrates proportion and 
itemized knowledge.  Historically and culturally located after the First World War, 
Mrs Dalloway is epistemologically dialogic with the postmodern world of western-
liberal politics, state-terrorism and genetic engineering today.  
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3.8 Coda: Two Scenes from Harold Pinter’s The Birthday Party and Pat 
Barker’s Regeneration 
 
   
The ontology of trauma is characterised by a contingency that can assume medical as 
well as political dimensions. This contingency often blurs the borderlines between 
the biological body and the political subject as both are confronted by a catastrophe 
that ruptures the spatio-temporality of the self, destroying the divisions between 
before and after.
136
 Thus Catherine Malabou affirms: 
 
Coolness, neutrality, absence, and the state of being emotionally “flat” are the 
basic indexes of the meaninglessness of wounds that have the power to cause 
a metamorphoses which destroys individual history, that cannot be 
reintegrated into the normal course of a life or a destiny, and that, therefore, 
must be recognized as such even though it is impossible to categorize them as 
neurosis, psychosis, or, more vaguely, “madness.”137 
 
One of the most powerful expressions of expressionlessness in literature, one that 
occurs with a dramatic reduction of emotions and consciousness and entails a 
condition of immobile muteness, occurs in the final scene of Harold Pinter’s The 
Birthday Party (1958) where the pianist/artist Stanley is taken over bodily by the 
agents of the status quo who capture him away into the black van that waits outside.  
As a “phenomena of a paranoid state”138, Pinter’s play may be interpreted as a 
systematic invasion of human agency by the agents of bio-political discourse. The 
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figure of Stanley, as he appears in the final scene, embodies on stage the muted 
immobility of the shocked subject whose mind as well as body is completely 
consumed by the trauma induced by systematic and pre-planned violence. The 
passage deserves to be quoted in order to evoke the drama of reduction and 
annihilation. As Stanley appears in the morning after the violent birthday party 
dressed in a dark well-cut suit and white collar (the uniform of conformation to 
status quo as it were) clean-shaven and holding his broken glasses, he is subjected to 
a series of etiological and cultural classifications by McCann and Goldberg, against 
which Stanley is unable to articulate his resistance anymore:    
Goldberg. It goes without saying. Between you and me, Stan, it’s about time 
you had a new pair of glasses. 
McCann. You can’t see straight. 
Goldberg. It’s true. You’ve been cockeyed for years.  
 [. . . ] 
McCann. You’re in a rut. 
Goldberg. You look anaemic.  
McCann. Rheumatic. 
Goldberg. Myopic. 
McCann. Epileptic.  
Goldberg. You’re on the verge.  
 [. . . ] 
Goldberg. We’ll watch over you. 
McCann. Advise you. 
Goldberg. Give you proper care and treatment.
139
   
 
Stanley’s symbolic castration at the hands of Goldberg and McCann – who in 
phenomenological terms, “intrude upon his condition of Being-In-The-World”140 – 
constitutes the claustrophobic menace that informs Pinter’s play. By situating the 
action in an absurdist frame, The Birthday Party, with its hysterical and ideological 
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tensions,
141
 offers a remarkable narrative about the inevitable invasion of the 
ideological and repressive state apparatus that subjects the human self to a process of 
liquidation, reduction and reification.  But more interestingly, in the context of this 
chapter, Pinter’s play pitches the masculinity question by mapping it through 
political as well as medical realms. Thus Stanley is classified as an idler as well as an 
epileptic by the agents of status quo that come to classify and consume him through 
a series of shocks. It is important to remember that epilepsy and hysteria were 
closely associated in the medical imagination from Charcot’s day142 and McCann 
and Goldberg emerge as bio-political agents at this point in the play as they seek to 
brand the body of the dissenting subject. The violence in the play is directed against 
the non-conforming male body that becomes vegetative at the end through its failure 
to articulate the voice of the resistant self. Both neurologically as well as culturally, 
the sense of the self is inextricably attached to the production of language and the 
                                                          
141
 In his work on the compromised subjectivity in Pinter’s The Birthday Party, Marc Silverstein 
studies how Stanley’s de-formation and re-formation may be interpreted with the Althusserian 
concepts of ideological and repressive state apparatus that are used to integrate and control the 
subject. Subjectivity and subjection emerge as ideologically tied as Stanley’s body and self are 
possessed by the agents of the status quo. Stanley’s castration at the hands of the agents constitutes a 
loss of emotions, will as well as language. Silverstein also studies how the Jewish and Irish identities 
that appear in Pinter’s play bring its political subtext into close correspondence with its hysteric 
landscape. Marc Silverstein, Harold Pinter and the Language of Cultural Power (London: Associated 
University Press, 1993) 26-49.  
  
142
 Jean Charcot, conventionally attributed as the first modern medical analyst of hysteria before the 
advent of Freud in the medical map, was reported to have discovered the hysteric’s behavioural 
proximity to the epileptic through a serendipitous incident whereby during one instance in the Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris when epileptic men were placed in the same ward as female hysterics due 
to repairment work in the ward, the doctors were faced with the sudden difficulty in differentiating the 
‘real’ epileptic seizures from the ‘feigned’ hysteric ones.  See George Makari, Revolution in Mind: 
The Creation in Psychoanalysis (New York: Harper Collins, 2008) 15. Despite its anecdotal nature, 
the incident can be seen as a case study in itself in the study of the history of hysteria and the medical 
debates it ensued at the end of the nineteenth century. If the ‘real’ physical ailment of the epileptics 
was indistinguishable from the symptoms exhibited by the ‘mentally ill’, hysteria seemed to emerge 
as a problematic territory between the somatic and the psychic and Charcot himself applied the hybrid 
nosological term hysterio-epilespsy to a number of his patients before abandoning it in his subsequent 
years. During his heyday as director of the Salpêtrière Asylum in Paris, Charcot gave public 
demonstrations of hysteric seizures and recorded the trajectory of his la grande hysterie with the use 
of photography. For an extensive description of Charcot’s use of photography and advanced 
photographic techniques in the demonstration of hysterical seizures, see Georges Didi-Huberman, 
Invention de l’hystérie: Charcot etl’Iconographiephotographique de la Salpêtrière (Paris: Macula, 
1982). The systematization of Charcot’s study found its objective manifestation in the automatic 
precision of the camera as professional Parisian photographers such as Albert Londe worked in close 
collaboration with him and one of Charcot’s personal assistants, Paul Regnard, set up a photographic 
exhibition of the hysterics which was subsequently published by Gilles de la Tourette and Paul Richer 
in 1888. Charcot’s studies and photographic representation of hysteria will later be of significant 
influence on Surrealist artists such as Conroy Maddox who would describe the photography of the 
Salpêtrière as constituted by “convulsive beauty.” Quoted in Silvano Levy, The Scandalous Eye: The 
Surrealism of Conroy Maddox (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003) 211. 
 
 144 
 
language breakdown in Stanley – as he appears like a hollowed-out self-less man in 
the end – dramatizes an aphasia normally characterised with the violence of shock. 
 As Martin Esslin contends, Stanley appears in the end “in a state of catatonic 
trance, unable to speak, without any human reaction; but dressed most respectfully in 
‘a dark, well-cut suit’.”143 With his clean suit and brushed hair, Stanley becomes the 
passive body ready to be reduced and reified, with his unique sense of self and its 
agency clinically killed as evinced in the symbolic collapse of his vanquished and 
vanishing voice. The scene constitutes the drama of failed resistance whereby the 
conscious cognitive self slips away and fails to find its figurative frame either in the 
body or in the voice: 
Stanley concentrates, his mouth opens, he attempts to speak, fails and emits 
sounds from his throat.  
Stanley. Uh-gug . . .  uh-gug . . . eeehhh-gag . . . (On the breath.) Caahh . . .  
caahh. . . 
They watch him. He draws a long breath which shudders down his body. He 
concentrates. 
Goldberg. Well, Stanny boy, what do you say, eh? 
They watch. He concentrates. His head lowers, his chin draws into his chest, 
he crouches. 
Stanley. Ug-gughh . . . uh-gughhh. . .  
McCann. What’s your opinion, sir? 
Stanley. Caaahhh . . . caaahhh. . .  
McCann. Mr Weber! What’s your opinion? 
[. . . ] 
Stanley’s body shudders, relaxes, his head drops, he becomes still again, 
stooped. Petey enters from door, downstage, left.
144
  
 
Stanley’s linguistic collapse is depicted as analogous to the shattering of the 
subject whereby the wound perpetrates a permanent damage on to the sense of self. 
Language as a signifier of neural stability has long been a site of research among 
neurologists, perhaps beginning most systematically in the works of Henry Head, 
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Britain’s premier neurologist and researcher on aphasia during the First World War, 
a medical figure to whom: “The pathological form of speech manifested by the 
aphasic represented an attempt by the organism to adapt to a reduced level of 
functional efficiency resulting from some insult to the brain.”145 The physical 
condition of aphasia, in the works of neuroscientists since Head, has most often been 
perceived as a neural loss to the unique system of cognition and performance that 
constitutes the human self.
146
 Language emerges as a central neural function in 
modern neuroscience whereby the areas in the cerebral cortex corresponding to 
comprehension and those corresponding to expression – Broca’s and Wernicke’s – 
are connected by neural pathways.
147
 The seamless integration of mental activities in 
the brain is actually the result of the functioning neurons constituting “large, 
interconnected networks of specialized regions, such as those governing 
language”.148 Thus the failure of Stanley to assert his opinion is syntagmatic to the 
collapse of the language centres in his brain that constitutes his unique self, its 
agency and intentionality. The move from resistance to reduction is staged and 
embodied through a process that merges the medical and the political dimensions, 
whereby language meets nerves, masculinity merges with medical science.  
The absurdist frame of Pinter’s play further underlines the bio-political 
trauma that Malabou classifies as a ruptured condition whereby: “The individual’s 
history is cut indefinitely, breached by the meaningless accident, an accident that is 
impossible to re-appropriate through either speech or recollection.”149 The passage of 
language collapse and the castration of the self from Pinter’s play are premised on a 
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violence of coercion and subjection not dissimilar to the scene of shock therapy 
meted out to the shell shocked soldier by Lewis Yealland as witnessed by W. H .R. 
Rivers. In contrast to the scene of muted immobility in The Birthday Party, the 
episode in Pat Barker’s Regeneration (1992) is aimed at making the male subject 
speak by tying him by straps to a chair and subjecting him to varying degrees of 
electric shock in a locked room. However, the politics of persecution and domination 
is quite similar to that of the agents of the state apparatus in Pinter’s The Birthday 
Party inasmuch both rely on compulsory control and violence on the body. Callan, 
the shell shocked soldier who features in the scene in Regeneration, appears in the 
eyes of Rivers at the beginning of the electric shock treatment as “indifferent, or 
defiant, though once he was settled in the chair his eyes shifted from side to side in a 
way that suggested fear.”150 The emphasis of Yealland in the electric shock scene in 
Regeneration is, appropriately enough, not on eking out the human voice but the 
physical sound of speech out of Callan, who is clearly perceived under the 
masculinized medical eye as a malingering dissenter who must be re-oriented and re-
integrated like Pinter’s Stanley in the economy of productive meanings.   
Thus Yealland exclaims to his medical subject who is increasingly 
electrified, “You must speak, but I shall not listen to anything you have to say” 
(Regeneration 231) paradoxically highlighting similar schisms between hearing and 
listening that was evident in the Kay Arr scene in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway albeit in a 
different register.  The scene in Regeneration is also significant inasmuch as it starts 
by a strategic blending of the medical and political models of masculinity that often 
found discursive convergences in Edwardian England. Thus, as the electrode is 
applied to the back of Callan’s throat to such a degree that the leads rip out of the 
battery, Yealland appropriates the voice of the advocate of model masculine 
behaviour: 
‘Remember you must behave as becomes the hero I expect you to be.’ 
Yealland said. ‘A man who has been through so many battles should have a 
better control of himself.’ He fastened the straps round Callan’s wrists and 
feet. ‘Remember you must talk before you leave me.’ (Regeneration 230) 
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The behaviour of the masculine hero thus constitutes stoic machismo in battlefield 
and adherence to the politics of masculinist medical politics and the voice of the 
doctor here converges seamlessly with that of the scoutmaster, the signifier and 
supervisor of model masculinity that was a construct of coercion, domination and 
repression. It carries the same pseudo-enthusiasm about perfect proportions and 
health that features in related figures in Pinter’s The Birthday Party and Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway. In blurring the borderlines between the ideological apparatus and its 
repressive counterparts, the voice of masculine authority in the form of the 
physician, the scoutmaster and the commander constituted what Foucault came to 
classify as the panoptic schema: a system of surveillance, containment and 
classification which seeks to ritualize and naturalize itself through inconspicuous 
repetition whereby schools, barracks and hospitals all come to resemble prisons.
151
  
 The scene in Regeneration offers a classic instantiation of how the medical 
violence perpetrated on the male body appropriates the vocabulary of cultural and 
ideological rectification. But the scene is rendered more complex by the difference 
of ideological location and medical practice that sees the neurologist Rivers (who 
seeks to draw on Freudian psychoanalysis in treating war hysteria) shiver at the sight 
of the treatment by electric shock that Yealland metes out to a shell-shock victim: 
The ‘ah’ was produced by an almost superhuman effort [by Callan], the 
muscles of the neck in spasm, the head raised in a series of jerks. Even the 
torso and the arms were involved in the immense effort of pushing this sound 
across his lips. Rivers had to stop himself trying to make the sound for him. 
He was himself very tense; all the worst memories of his stammer came 
crowding into his mind. (Regeneration 231) 
 The unconscious and almost automatic empathy that the Freudian physician 
establishes with the victim subjected to the brutal materiality of bio-politics is 
dramatized in the episode by the allusion to Rivers’ stammer, a signifier of 
nervousness that he himself embodies. The structure of sympathy that is evoked in 
the scene of shock cuts across the rigid binaries between the doctor and the patient 
upheld by Yealland who advocates that “The last things these patients need is a 
sympathetic audience” (Regeneration 228). Rivers’ worst memories of stammer 
occur at a crucial moment during the scene where the medical violence on the shell-
shocked body increasingly coerces it to speak.  In effect, Rivers himself emerges as 
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the co-victim and co-patient in the scene despite his status as a neurologist. The 
brutal and merciless taxonomies Yealland embodies through his strategy of no-
sympathy and electric shock induce the repressed hysteria in Rivers himself as he is 
reminded of the social stigma of his stammer.  
Like Septimus who stammers before Sir William Bradshaw’s assertion of the 
brilliant career he has before him despite his condition (MD 74), Rivers’ stammer, 
like Callen’s ‘ah’, is located in the landscape of the body where language can only 
emerge in its non-completion and non-complicity in relation to the real. The stutter, 
as Iain Chambers asserts, constitutes a “leaky habitat” where “the violent transitivity 
of language [. . .] erupts most starkly across the hyphen of hybridity.”152  The stutter 
thus appears as the schism between the realm of standardized structures of culture 
and knowledge, and that of private utterance. It is a schism that is resistance as well 
as shame, a nervous condition as well as subconscious strategy that “dislocates 
voice, and throws into ontological uncertainty the body that it breaks away from.”153 
The scene in Regeneration ends with Callan starting to speak again, forced through 
the increasing pain of electric shock, with the last remnant of defiance in his smile 
crushed by further shock applied to the side of the mouth. The passage is explicit in 
its depiction of destruction concealed as cure, an episode that heightens the licensed 
tyranny of the medical science and its violence on the human body and the human 
self: 
‘Are you not pleased to be cured?’ Yealland asked. 
Callan smiled. 
‘I do not like your smile,’ Yealland said. ‘I find it most objectionable. Sit 
down.’ 
Callan sat. 
‘This will not take a moment,’ Yealland said. ‘Smile.’ 
Callan smiled and the key electrode was applied to the side of his mouth. 
When he was finally permitted to stand up again, he no longer smiled.  
‘Are you not pleased to be cured?’ Yealland repeated. 
‘Yes, sir.’ 
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‘Nothing else? 
A fractional hesitation. Then Callan realized what was required and came 
smartly to the salute. ‘Thank you, sir.’ (Regeneration 233) 
 
In electrically remodelling Callan into the normative mode of masculinity 
that is approved by the bio-political gaze, Yealland appropriates a process of 
dehumanization whereby the human self and agency are clinically killed in the bio-
political construction of the perfectly functioning subject. Like Stanley in The 
Birthday Party who cannot speak again, Callan in Regeneration who can speak 
again, is located at the interfaces of merciless violence and sanctioned ideological 
hegemony, perpetrated by the agents of the status quo through a process that 
necessitates the liquidation of the unique human intentionality and the birth of the 
passive performing body. The birth of the functioning bio-political subject is thus 
also the death of subjective agency and emerges as a direct result of violence on the 
self and its free will.  The scenes from Pinter’s The Birthday Party and Barker’s 
Regeneration show male bodies bio-politically regenerated in order to be integrated 
as functioning social objects from being anti-social agencies. The regeneration is 
effected through material coercion and bodily shock, and the resultant product is a 
will-less non-subversive self with mere motor mechanisms. These scenes portray 
how humanness is constituted by subjective ambivalence and doubt, and how the 
same is ironed away by the purely objective machineries of bio-political science that 
aims at sameness and standardization rather than uniqueness and difference. The 
absurdist frame of Pinter’s play with its structures of silence heightens the crisis of 
the human subject and “the realities of the human mind with its despair, fear and 
loneliness in an alien and hostile universe.”154 Such irrational alienation 
characterises not only the fantastic theatre space but also informs human locations in 
real political situations, where subjective change takes place through shock, shame 
and existentialist awareness.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
The White Man’s Nerves: George Orwell and the Bio-politics of 
British Colonial Masculinity 
 
  
4.1 The Epistemology of Edwardian Masculinity 
 
As previous chapters have demonstrated, the project of British masculinity since the 
nineteenth century almost always contained within it the necessity to correspond 
(culturally as well as bodily) to the imperialist politics of the day. The body of the 
boy who would grow to become a man of the empire needed to be conditioned into a 
perfect state of nerves in order to play its part in perpetuating the processes of 
colonial control. As Revathi Krishnaswamy argues in her analysis of the 
epistemology of British colonial masculinity from the late-nineteenth to early 
twentieth century, the dominant discourses of British masculinity changed from 
Thomas Arnold’s notion of goodness and learning in the 1830s to the muscular 
Christianity associated with Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes, down to the self-
help and athleticism advocated by Samuel Smiles and Baden Powell.
1
 This was of 
course also the time, as the first chapter has demonstrated, when the discourses of 
degeneration along with their many pseudo-scientific premises produced a collective 
paranoia about racial decline through encounters with other races and cultures. That, 
along with the necessity to produce and perpetuate a brand of masculinity that would 
uphold the steely structure of imperial control, saw the emergence of public schools 
and social movements geared towards manufacturing the model man. Indeed the 
rearing of ideal British masculinity that would successfully inherit the ideologies of 
colonial control was one of the primary concerns of the Boy Scout movements in 
Britain at the turn of the century.  
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As Michael Rosenthal argues in an analysis of the epistemology of the Boy 
Scout movement, Baden Powell, generally considered as the pioneer of scouting in 
Britain, systematized a model of masculinity that encouraged an effacement of 
individual emotion and instead prepared young boys for collective corporate service 
to the empire. Classifying such a mode of upbringing as a “character factory”, 
Rosenthal analysed how skills in cricket (a sport where individual skills contribute 
towards the collective quality of the group) were seen as pointers to the masculine 
ideology in the colonies.
2
 Powell, of course, was a close friend of Kipling whose 
adventure narratives, more often than not, played up the stereotypes of British 
notions of masculinity with a combination of imperial ideology and conquest of 
‘Otherness’.3 In his book, entitled appropriately enough, Scouting for Boys, Powell 
delineated the dictum of normative masculinity that was to be constructed and 
corroborated in the service of the empire. Defining the boy scouts as the executioners 
of the empire during peacetime, Powell expounded their political significance: 
 
These are the frontiersmen of all parts of our Empire. The ‘trappers’ of North 
America, hunters of Central Africa, the British pioneers, explorers and 
missionaries over Asia and all the wild parts of the world, the bushmen and 
drovers of Australia, the constabulary of North-West Canada and of South 
Africa – all are peace scouts, real men in every sense of the word [. . . ] They 
are accustomed to take their lives in their hands, and to fling them down 
without hesitation if they can help their country by doing so.
4
 
 
Powell’s advocacy of plucky masculinity exemplified a condition whereby 
“the ideal of manliness was frequently tied to a reworked Christian code of knightly 
conduct, itself placed within a newly articulated national tradition.”5 The 
amalgamation of masculinist and nationalist discourses encouraged a productive 
                                                          
2
 Michael Rosenthal, The Character Factory: Baden Powell’s Boy Scouts and the Imperatives of 
Empire (New York: Pantheon, 1984).  For an incisive analysis of the correspondence between cricket 
and imperial masculinity as exemplified by the Bodyline Series between England and Australia, see 
Nalin Jayasena, Contested Masculinities, 61-104.   
 
3
 This is demonstrated in the introduction with my reference to the critique of Kipling by Edward Said 
and George Orwell.  
 
4
 Baden Powell, Scouting for Boys: A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship, ed Elleke 
Boehmer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 300.   
 
5
 Allen Warren, “Popular Manliness: Baden-Powell, scouting, and the development of manly 
character”, Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America 1800-1940, ed. 
J.A.Mangan and James Walvin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 200.  
 152 
 
bodily economy devoid of distractive sentimentality and committed almost entirely 
to the maximisation of the empire. Such discourses operated on an erotic economy 
that prohibited masturbation, homosexuality and effeminacy, encouraging a model of 
masculinity that would be replicated paradoxically in the anti-colonial movements 
against the empire in the Indian political and spiritual scene. As Revathi 
Krishnaswamy asserts in her complex analysis of the epistemology of effeminacy 
and its resistance in the Indian colonial scene and its emergent nationalism: 
 
In fact, the self image of Indian, especially Bengali, men in the nineteenth 
century was deeply conditioned by a negative view of effeminacy. Whether 
they urged their fellow Indians to cultivate a robust physique or advocated 
violent military resistance to imperial rule, whether they undertook to 
revitalize Hinduism along the lines of muscular Christianity or attempted to 
reform the lives of women, many Bengali writers, reformers, political and 
religious leaders of the time – men like Michael Madhusudhan Dutt (1824-
73), Dayanand Saraswati (1824-83), Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-94), 
and Vivekananda (1863-1902) – were simply reacting to being labeled 
effeminate.
6
 
 
Thus curiously enough, the dominant discourses that informed British imperialism as 
well as the ones that sought to resist colonial control and reincorporate Indian 
indigenous nationalism were characterised by a brand of masculinity that operated 
along the principles of military idealism and disgusted reaction against perceived 
effeminacy. The brand of British masculinity that emerged and was popularized at 
the turn of the twentieth century was in close correspondence with the discourses of 
imperialism and colonial control. The tenets of such masculinity were premised on 
principles of production and perpetuation that upheld the episteme of the empire and 
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thus “sexual desire between men frequently ruptured Britain’s imperial allegory by 
shattering national unity and impeding the entire defeat of subject groups.”7 
 
The public school discourses and scout movements during Edwardian Britain 
thus promoted and eventually facilitated a heterosexual and homosocial masculinity 
that operated along the axes of production, classification and control of imperialist 
ideologies. Such systems of education and upbringing often relied heavily on 
strategic shaming and stigmatization, strategies that were rampant in the medical 
discourses that sought to treat the victims of First World War shell-shock. The term 
“sissy” thus entered common vocabulary not signifying endearing effeminacy but as 
a signifier of social shame. As Julia Grant argues in her astute analysis of the 
paradigm shift in the politics of turn-of-the-century British masculinity:  
 
While effeminate or unmanly boys were not artifacts of the twentieth century, 
the meaning attached to them shifted in conjunction with the politics of 
masculinity and transformations in child rearing, gender socializations and 
the new sciences of human development. Nineteenth century sissies were 
castigated by their peers, but twentieth century sissies bore clinical as well as 
social stigma. As the peer group loomed ever larger as a means of the 
socialization of children, confirming to the code of boyhood became 
increasingly central to the establishing to the normalcy of boys’ personalities 
and behaviours.
8
 
 
The anxiety to appropriate the model of masculinity that would successfully 
negotiate with nervousness amidst adventures was a progeny of boys’ public school 
as well as common cultural vocabularies. The sprightly sporting boy manifesting 
masculinist attributes was consequently reared and recruited as a potential candidate 
for imperial adventures as well as for capitalist expansion.  
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4.2 Orwell and his Location in Contemporary Masculinist Ideology: Reading 
“Such, Such Were the Joys” 
 
 
Very few figures came to occupy as much significance in an analysis of British 
imperial masculinity and its repressed colonial nervousness as that of George Orwell. 
Orwell’s problematic position in the public discourses on masculinity in an intensely 
class-conscious Britain in the early decades of the twentieth century, coupled with 
his personal encounters at the contact zones as a colonial police officer in Burma, 
render him as well as the body of his works, into a remarkable contact zone in itself. 
It is one where British masculinity mixes with colonial contingencies, where private 
melancholia meets political nervousness. Ashish Nandy’s analysis of Orwell’s 
position in the colonial machinery in India is of special significance here. Orwell, as 
Nandy points out in his assessment of the writer and his location in the ideology of 
imperialism, had had personal difficulties as an adolescent growing up in the 
masculinist atmosphere of late nineteenth-century Britain. Bed-wetting was a “sin” 
as well as a crime that attracted retribution in the British public school and Orwell 
was often subjected to that shame in a regime not unlike that which was meted out to 
the shell shocked soldiers by British materialist psychiatrists.
9
 Orwell thus emerges 
as an interesting figure that connects the European panic of masculine degeneration 
(and the compulsive need to build and preserve a model of masculinity) to the 
masculinist ethnographies in the colonial contact zone.  
 
The politics of man-making and empire building were both premised on 
similar notions of expansionist production out of imperial investment. Especially 
pertinent in relation to this thesis is Orwell’s accounts of strategic shaming and 
corporeal punishments as methods to correct and deter dissenting schoolboys in 
Edwardian Britain. Orwell’s accounts – most poignantly presented in the 
autobiographical essay “Such, Such Were the Joys” (1952) – thus carry special 
significance in a study of the politics of cultivating the masculinist ideal of 
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Edwardian Britain, a time when “bully worship and the cult of violence”10 emerged 
as the most popular themes in Boys’ Weeklies. Orwell’s accounts bear significant 
resonance in relation to the treatment of shell shocked soldiers of the First World 
War most often shamed and treated on the basis of their lineage and stock.  
 
A retrospective look at the horrors of his public school days, “Such, Such 
Were the Joys” is a remarkable essay that combines personal disgust and ideological 
revulsion towards the dominant discourses of boyhood, class and the grammar of 
education that informed imperial masculinity during late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain. Taking up issues of contention and obsession such as class discrimination, 
hygiene, masculine taboos, homosexuality and masturbation, Orwell’s essay is a 
poignant statement as well as a retrospective reminder of the fetish and phobia of the 
British society of his times. Such a culture was keen on preserving its racial and 
societal purity while also exhibiting xenophobic tendencies in its discourses of 
domination and discrimination. More significantly, in the context of this thesis, 
“Such, Such Were the Joys” points to the politics of privileged masculinity and its 
formations in early twentieth-century Britain. Orwell’s essay belongs to and points 
towards a cultural climate increasingly marked by a reified masculinity and its 
prescribed ideals. Such ideals were often propounded and publicised by 
schoolmasters who saw institutional education as informing the ideal masculinity for 
imperial Britain. Thus G.G.T.Heywood, one of the prominent schoolmaster-idealists 
of late nineteenth century Britain, pronounced:  
 
From a master’s point of view, the ideal boy is the one who makes the most 
of his natural gifts of mind and body, a boy who can work hard and play 
hard, yet behind all this he possesses the virtues and characteristics which we 
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all associate with a Christian gentleman. He is unselfish, modest, frank and 
honourable, and although he does his best to conceal it, he has a foundation 
of true religion.
11
 
 
The brand of masculinity prescribed by the status quo curiously and 
appropriately amalgamated the military as well as the missionary zeal that informed 
the construction and corroboration of the empire. As Helen Kanitkar contends, the 
three dominant strands of masculinity that emerged out the machinery of imperial 
masculinity were the sporting boy, the all-white boy, and the Christian boy. 
Discussing the role of the boarding school and boys’ magazines in fostering the 
culture of masculinity in the Edwardian imagination, Kanitkar asserts:  
 
To be moulded into this imperial masculinity, boys either entered the highly 
structured, all-male, boarding-school environment or were presented with 
idealized views of such institutions through ‘ripping yarns’. [. . . ] At entry to 
boarding school new loyalties and points of pride – friendship, school, sports 
team – were generated, preparing boys for later, greater loyalties to regiment, 
nation and empire. Readership of ‘ripping yarns’ extended to boys from a 
variety of backgrounds a positive and beguiling image of a public-school 
code, presenting the virtues of a class whose position of undeniable power 
and privilege was, so these books imply, derived from adherence to its 
ideals.
12
 
 
Kanitkar’s argument thus persuasively asserts the culture of desirable masculinity 
that was constructed and circulated by a discourse network of boarding schools’ 
curricula and popular boys’ weeklies, both of which feature heavily in Orwell’s 
accounts of Edwardian Britain. More significantly, Kanitkar’s account showcases the 
compulsory comradeship and homosocial politics that constituted such masculinity 
formation.  
 
The ability to work and play hard as well as to retain the pure principles of 
religion all constituted the conditions conducive to the political and spiritual 
ideologies that justified the empire and its masculinist expansionist economies, 
                                                          
11G.G.T.Heywood, “Ideals of Schoolboy Life”, Unwritten Laws and Ideals of Active Careers, 
ed.E.H.Pitcairn (London: Smith, Elder, 1899) 242.  Cited in J.A.Mangan, “Social Darwinism and 
upper-class education in late Victorian and Edwardian England”, Manliness and Morality, 136.  
 
12
 Helen Kanitkar, “’Real true boys’: Moulding Cadets of Imperialism”, Dislocating Masculinity: 
Comparative Ethnographies, ed. Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne (London: Routledge, 1994) 
185-86.    
 
 157 
 
exemplified most (in)famously by Kipling’s maxim of the White Man’s Burden. The 
eugenics operative in the British public schools of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
period often constituted a social Darwinism that appropriated the Spencerian maxim 
of the survival of the fittest.
13
 The criterion of fitness was more often than not 
premised on a privilege that was inherited through lineage, rather than acquired 
through merit. The masculinity manufactured out of Edwardian boarding schools 
before the First World War was driven by a discourse of hierarchy and social 
signifiers of supremacy, that corresponded closely to the ostensible opulence of the 
imperialist economy before the advent of the war. Thus Orwell reports: 
 
There never was, I suppose, in the history of the world a time when the sheer 
vulgar fatness of wealth, without any kind of aristocratic elegance to redeem 
it, was so obtrusive, as in the years before 1914. [. . .] From the whole decade 
before 1914, there seems to breathe forth a smell of the more vulgar, un-
grown-up kinds of luxury, a smell of brilliantine and crème de menthe and 
soft centered chocolates—an atmosphere, as it were, of eating everlasting 
strawberry ices on green lawns to the tune of the Eton Boating Song.
14
 
 
The signifiers of supremacy, metonymically delineated by Orwell, constitute an 
unwholesome and hollow materiality that operated along a discourse of difference. 
The economy before 1914 corresponded closely to the ontology of ostentation that 
carried the sanctioned signifiers of class, an ontology that was permanently shaken 
and deconstructed after the First World War and “After 1918 it was never quite the 
same again. Snobbishness and expensive habits came back, certainly, but they were 
self-conscious and on the defensive” (SJ 357).  
 
As Christopher Hitchens’s analysis of the author contends, Orwell’s gaze into 
the horrors of empire was informed by his earlier experiences in childhood that 
showcased models of discrimination, exploitation and injustice. Such models 
hypocritically upheld facades of well-intentioned ideology and humanitarian 
objectives. These were particularly operative and extended in more immediately 
politicized contexts in the contact-zones of British imperialism, where structures of 
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privilege and exploitation were concealed beneath a vocabulary of liberal 
philanthropy.
15
 Various critics have argued for and against the historical veracity of 
Orwell’s account in “Such, Such were the Joys.”16 But as in “A Hanging”, Orwell’s 
essay on the horrors of his school life is less interesting for its purely factual veracity 
than for its instantiating quality that operates as a pointer to the broader issues of the 
day. Even biographers who contend the content of truth in Orwell’s essay agree on 
its thematic proximity to the totalitarianism of Nineteen Eighty Four (1949), as the 
two works were published almost contemporaneously. The dystopian world of 
Winston Smith and young Eric Blair correspond closely to similar structures of 
surveillance and containment. This is amply corroborated by Gordon Bowker who 
describes “Such, Such Were the Joys” thus: 
 
It is the recollection of a place and period viewed through a highly sensitive 
and complex mind, filtered through time and coloured by ideology, the 
account of a closed and oppressive world from the alter-ego of Winston 
Smith, the last apostle of free thought. [. . .] ‘Such, Such Were the Joys’ is an 
extraordinary piece of retrospective reinvention, an adult version of a long-
felt hurt coming from the pen of a master satirist who could be as savage as 
he could be inventive.
17
 
 
The continual comparison critics make between “Such, Such were the Joys” and 
Nineteen Eighty Four exemplifies the complexities born out systems of 
totalitarianism, political as well as institutional. In its depictions of the dystopian 
conditions that ironically informed the ontology of privilege, “Such, Such were the 
Joys” emerges as a significant insight into the mechanism of masculinity-formation 
in Edwardian Britain, a mechanism that sought to send its manufactured product to 
the service of the empire.
18
  
 
The school itself emerges in Orwell’s essay as a signifier of constant 
surveillance and supervision and the resonances with the crime-obsessed world of 
Nineteen Eighty Four are not far to seek. As Jeffrey Meyers in his study of Orwell’s 
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school education asserts, “Behind its ugly but imposing facade, the school offered all 
the attractions of a penal colony.”19 The recurrent anxieties of being bullied and 
shamed by the status quo in “Such, Such were the Joys”, along with the politics of 
privilege such model upheld, give a remarkably astute analysis of the politics of 
masculinity-formations of the day that operated with a mixture of indoctrination and 
intimidation. Perhaps the most unequivocal of Orwell’s essays, “Such, Such were the 
Joys” opens with the shame of being a bed-wetter in a boys’ public school and the 
fear and routine retribution associated with the same:   
 
Soon after I arrived at St Cyprian’s (not immediately, but after a week or two, 
just when I seemed to be settling into the routine of school life), I began 
wetting my bed. [. . . ] it is normal reaction in those children who have been 
removed from their homes to a strange place. In those days however, it was 
looked on as a disgusting crime which the child did on purpose and for which 
the proper cure was beating. For my part I did not need to be told it was a 
crime. [ . . .] There was no volition about it, no consciousness. You did not 
properly speaking do the deed: You merely woke up in the morning and 
found that the sheets were wringing wet. (SJ 330)       
 
The crime without a consciousness that came to be associated with bed wetting in 
Orwell’s imagination was a pointer to the passive personal helplessness against 
social stigma. The shame in boys’ bed wetting can be interpreted as a proleptic 
signifier of the shame in not being manly enough in terms of exerting perfect phallic 
and nervous control.
20
 Orwell’s shame in being the enuretic offender in a boys’ 
public school was a mixture of fear and forbiddenness that came with the threat of 
symbolic emasculation as evinced in the figure of the “grim statuesque matron” who 
inspected his sheets meticulously every morning.  
 
The women figures in “Such, Such were the Joys” emerge with 
hypermasculine attributes in the boy Eric’s imagination and the essay is remarkable 
in the way it reports the original trauma in a confused boy’s mind with the voice of a 
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more mature male looking back at it all. The shame in being enuretic is accentuated 
in the emasculated exposure before the female figures that exemplify the trauma of 
the nervous formative male in a constrictive landscape where the loving mother 
figure is conspicuously absent. Thus, Mrs Wilkes, the headmaster’s wife, was a 
“stocky, square-built woman”, who evoked immediate guilt in the boy Orwell “even 
at moments when one was not guilty of anything in particular” (SJ 331). The strange 
lady who appears with Mrs Wilkes, and who is immediately and mistakenly 
associated in the boy Eric’s imagination as Mrs Form (from the allusion to the Sixth 
Form boys deputed to beat younger boys) is described as an “intimidating, masculine 
looking person wearing a riding habit” (SJ 331). With the fear of being physically 
beaten by her creeping in his mind, Mrs Form immediately appears in the boy 
Orwell’s shuddered imagination as a “terrifying vision [. . .] arriving for the occasion 
in full riding kit and armed with a hunting whip” (SJ 332). 
 
The masculinity in the figure of Mrs Form and the threat of castration she 
embodies with the hunting whip in the boy’s mind combines sexual fear with 
physical domination. In effect, Mrs Form embodies the ideal masculine hunter 
unleashing merciless and ruthless retribution on masculine inadequacies, a figure 
that recurs in Burmese Days as Verrall who emerges surrounded by an “aura of 
horsemanship and soldiering.”21 The figure of Verrall dramatizes the symbolic 
emasculation of the protagonist John Flory who could be read as a sufficiently 
Orwellian figure in the colonial contact-zone with his private hesitations and 
‘unmanly’ ambivalence. Mrs Form’s hunting whip in “Such, Such Were the Joys” 
effectively becomes the metaphor of the phallus that the young Orwell is guilty of 
abusing with bed-wetting and masturbation, both undesirable exercises in exhaustion 
without production, and thus inviting corrective measures. The scene of shame also 
constitutes the fear of symbolic castration by stronger females as Orwell’s 
description affirms:   
 
To this day I can feel myself almost swooning with shame as I stood, a very 
small, round faced boy in short corduroy knickers, before the two women. I 
could not speak. I felt I should die if ‘Mrs Form’ were to beat me. But my 
dominant feeling was not fear or resentment: it was simply shame because 
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one more person, and that a woman, had been told of my disgusting offence. 
(SJ 332)   
 
The presence of the women gazing at his inadequate masculinity (reminiscent 
of the boss’s reverie-image of Woodifield’s girls gazing at his dead boy’s grave and 
opening it up in Mansfield’s “The Fly”) constitutes both a moment of disclosure as 
well as disintegration for the young Eric, leading up to the epistemic violence 
perpetrated on the non-integrated masculine self. In her analysis of the politics of 
shame and stigma, Martha Nussbaum asserts that shame is an unsettling emotion that 
corresponds closely to the moment of disclosure of the social self, arrested in its 
inadequacies in relation to normative principles of behaviour:  
 
Shame therefore cuts beneath any specific social orientation to norms, and 
serves as a highly volatile way in which human being negotiate some 
tensions inherent in their humanness—in, that is, their awareness of the 
themselves as beings both finite and marked by exorbitant demands and 
expectations.
22
 
 
The normative masculinity that is desired and decreed in the boy’s public school 
through a combination of cricket, classics, and mnemonic history tests, was set to 
prepare boys to be real men. In order to rise above being “‘a little office boy at forty 
pounds a year’”, the boys in St. Cyprian’s were supposed to demonstrate skills in 
discipline and performance of the mind as well as of the body, and refrain from 
bodily aberrations such as enuresis and masturbation, both considered crimes 
constituting aberrant masculinity and located on a similar pedestal of deviance as 
homosexuality.  
 
“Such, Such were the Joys” emerges as an essay that exhibits social 
Darwinism at work at boys’ school in early twentieth century Britain where money, 
class and lineage held the tickets to progress and privilege. As Gordon Bowker 
asserts in his analyses on Orwell’s experiences at St. Cyprian’s:  
 
Later, as a socialist, he saw the place [St. Cyprian’s] for what it was – a 
commercial venture, dedicated to profit, favouring the rich pupils and 
abusing the poor [. . .] Not only did it embody all the things he came to reject 
– imperialism, snobbery, the valuing the strong over the weak, the 
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denigrating of his curiosity about the natural world – but helped to distort his 
normal feelings about sex.
23
 
 
More significantly, Orwell’s earlier experiences in shame and segregation provided 
him with a clearer and more directly recognizable look through the ideologies of 
imperialism. Orwell’s first person accounts and focalized fiction about masculinity 
formations at home as well as colonial configurations in Burma throw light on the 
epistemology of private hesitation in the face of a collective totalitarian ideology. 
This hesitation manifests itself in the nervousness and nervous narratives of 
individuals who seek, eventually ineffectually, to interrogate the machinery of 
masculinity operative in colonial contact-zones.  
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4.3 Nervousness, Agency and Masculinist Performance in “Shooting an 
Elephant” 
 
Orwell’s essays and fiction set in colonial Indo-China, most notably depicted in his 
novel Burmese Days (1934), serve to inscribe an insider’s perspective into 
imperialism. His writing paradoxically also reconstitutes the insider-outsider 
relationship within the ideology of the imperial system. More significantly, like the 
fictional narrators of Joseph Conrad, Orwell’s narratives tend to be focalized through 
nervous and ambivalent figures at the heart of imperialism. Like Conrad’s narratives, 
Orwell’s essays and novel on the colonial situation in Burma offer an insider’s 
account of the epistemic violence that informed colonial melancholia and the 
existentialist knowledge of loss. As Christopher Hitchens argues, Orwell’s gaze into 
colonialism and his articulation of its human horrors “are an indissoluble part of his 
lifelong engagement with the subjects of power and cruelty and force, and the crude 
yet subtle relationship between the dominator and the dominated.”24 However, as 
Orwell’s own writing often evinces, especially in his essays on colonial Indo-China 
such as “Shooting an Elephant” (1936), “A Hanging” (1931), and his novel Burmese 
Days (1934), the distinctions between the dominator and the dominated were far 
from straightforward or linear in a cultural climate mapped by denial, deception and 
disintegration.
25
  
 In disguising an epistemology as a fixed unchallengeable ontology, the 
politics of classification in the colonial space operated in a manner that cemented the 
expansiveness of ‘white privilege’ that was politically necessary for imperialist 
control and its ideological apparatus.
26
 Orwell’s writing is often characterised by the 
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fault-lines in such structures of presupposed political privilege that hold up the 
cracks in the constructed quality that informs imperial identity. Set in Lower Burma 
and offered as a first-hand report of his personal experiences as a colonial officer, the 
essay “Shooting an Elephant” starts by stating the collective aversion Orwell was 
subjected to and was subjectivized through as an agent of the British empire. The 
essay carefully delineates the dilemma in the mind of a young officer entrusted with 
executing the mission of imperialism in a colonized space and is a significant study 
of the reificatory repression that informs an imperialist culture of compulsory 
classifications and control. What emerges in the essay almost immediately is the 
ambivalence that informs the schism between the collective consciousness and the 
individual will. The will appears as systematically subjugated by the political 
unconscious which informs the economy of expectations of the colonizer as well as 
the colonized.  
 
In her work on white identities, Linda Martin Alcoff refers to the film Dances 
with Wolves (1991) as a politically flawed narrative with supremacist pretensions 
that nevertheless manages to depict the dilemma of an “awakened white 
consciousness”27 in a political contact-zone riven by war. Likewise, Orwell’s essays 
and fiction about the colonial contact-zone are fascinating frames that depict the 
spurious strategies of supremacy operative in colonial Burma. They also depict the 
political and personal moments of hesitation in which such narratives of order and 
control are momentarily fractured with eventually unfulfilled glimpses into 
existentialist awakenings. Thus the fragile figure of Orwell in “Shooting an 
Elephant” – who happens notionally to be a colonial master – receives a 
reconfigured knowledge of his own servility to a system of expectations that 
constitutes a political will operative at an excess to the personal will. More 
significantly, the essay also dramatizes the dilemma of the self that is expected to 
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appropriate colonial masculinity at its hegemonic best, a hegemony that operates not 
only at the interfaces between races (the colonizer and the colonized) but also in the 
borderlines between the private self and its cultural and political signifiers. 
 
Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant” dramatizes a state where the conscientious 
colonizer torn between his personal hatred of individual colonized natives and 
ideological aversion towards imperialism “could get nothing into perspective” (CE 
15-16), thus exemplifying the loss of intentionality and the crisis of agency in a 
political landscape of compulsory difference. The agony of being the object of 
collective aversion that was too weak to assume political proportion manifested itself 
in various surreptitious forms of retaliation at the imperial contact-zone:  
As a police officer I was an obvious target and was baited whenever it 
seemed safe to do so. When a nimble Burman tripped me up on the football 
field and the referee (another Burman) looked the other way, the crowd 
yelled with hideous laughter. This happened more than once. In the end the 
sneering yellow faces of young men that met me everywhere, the insults 
hooted after me when I was at a safe distance, got badly on my nerves. (CE 
15)  
The location of subversion is significant in Orwell’s account: the football field where 
the grammar of the sport offered a space for retaliation without political penalty and 
where the subversion would be spectacular as well as safe, where it would be 
unmanly to uphold and seek protection from the notional politics of privilege. The 
laughter of the Burmese spectators on seeing the sahib tripped emerges as a release 
from repression in an otherwise political regime reified by the rituals and discourses 
of difference.  
“Shooting an Elephant” is about the no man’s land between active 
intervention and passive acceptance, collective hysteria and private nervousness, and 
the nervous negotiations – political as well as personal – that constitute the 
epistemology of compulsory difference. The political indecision embodied by the 
young Orwell torn between his hatred of imperialism and an equal degree of disgust 
against the Burmese natives is vividly illustrated:  
All I knew was that I was stuck between my hatred of the empire I served and 
my rage against the evil-spirited little beasts who tried to make my job 
impossible. With one part of my mind I thought of the British Raj as an 
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unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down, in saecula saeculorum, 
upon the will of prostrate peoples; with another part I thought that the 
greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest’s 
guts. (CE 16)  
With his ideological hatred of imperialism and his private aversion against the 
colonized natives who are described as an array of anonymous entities with revolting 
attributes, Orwell in “Shooting an Elephant” articulates the ambivalence that 
characterizes the critique of an ideology that is paradoxically embedded in the very 
ideological narrative it seeks to spurn. Here, as elsewhere in Orwell’s oeuvre, one 
sees the drama of dislocation powerfully at work, torn between the historical 
materialist narratives in which the subject is embedded and the private narrative that 
is directed against the same historical materialism that the subject is painfully part of.  
In his vacillations between the macrocosmic and the microcosmic narratives 
of violence and aversion, Orwell in “Shooting an Elephant” dramatizes the 
distinction Foucault makes between the universal ‘left’ intellectual “acknowledged 
the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice” and the “specific 
intellectual” embedded in “a question of real, material, everyday struggles”.28  In his 
hopeless embedded-ness in the very ideology he seeks to decry, Orwell in “Shooting 
an Elephant” also showcases what Slavoj Žižek classifies as the structural 
mechanism that produces “the effect of subject as ideological misrecognition” while 
also forcing the subject to acknowledge that “this misrecognition is unavoidable – 
that is, we must accept a certain delusion as a condition of our historical activity, of 
assuming a role as agent of the historical process.”29 As a powerless agent of a 
powerful historical process, Orwell in “Shooting an Elephant” enacts the death of 
agency at the heart of the colonial contact-zone. The human experience as depicted 
in the essay emerges as constricted by the political presuppositions of power, with 
free will and intentionality giving way to the pre-set codes of performance. With its 
political complexity and mutually contradictory strands of personal and ideological 
priorities, “Shooting an Elephant” dramatizes a nervous condition that contains 
elements of black comedy. Informed of a mad elephant ravaging the local bazaar, 
Orwell the colonial superintendent of police was forced to set out to look for it in a 
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pony with a .44 Winchester rifle, presenting the iconic image of the colonizer 
expected to control any potential anarchy.  
What constitutes the image of the colonizer on horseback with a rifle is not 
only the signifier of power in the colonial condition but also the compulsory 
performance of grand imperial machismo. Appropriately enough, as the sahib 
marched on in a bid to shoot the elephant, the Burmese population flocked out of 
their houses to follow him in an image that approximates as well as parodies the Pied 
Piper signifier even as it produces the possibility of collective hysteria in a 
spectacular sport. The Pied Piper image evoked by Orwell with his embodiment of 
the sahib with a rifle (followed by thousands of natives flocking out of their quarters 
in excited expectation of a spectacle of annihilation) is interesting in relation to the 
discourse on degeneration in European imagination where the Pied Piper attribute 
was associated with the pathologically degenerate with the potential for seduction as 
well as annihilation.
30
 The Pied Piper attribute of degeneration has been associated in 
literary fiction with Conrad’s Kurtz, the archetype of the excesses of masculinist 
greed and decadence in the ideology of imperialism.
31
 Indeed, like Kurtz, Orwell in 
“Shooting an Elephant” presents the European male “whose nerves went wrong” 
(HD 50) in an imperial economy driven by compulsory and compulsive principles of 
privilege. Unlike Kurtz, who paradoxically attempts to assert his agency by 
becoming a renegade to the very system that had historically constructed his type, 
Orwell in “Shooting an Elephant” emerges as a passive performer and perpetuator of 
the discourse of domination and difference that proceeds along with its strategic 
system of stereotypes.  
Orwell’s initial reluctance to shoot the harmless elephant and his eventual 
surrender to the collective will show not so much as a real act as a mimetic one, one 
that must powerlessly replicate the rituals of imperial masculinity always already 
inscribed for the individual who emerges as perfectly reducible and replaceable in 
the discursive space of difference. The mimetic and performative quality of his 
imperial identity is exposed before Orwell at the moment in which he is forced to 
surrender the will of his private self in order to enact the performance of the pukka 
                                                          
30
 Nordau, Degeneration, 23.  
31
 See C.T.Watts, “Nordau and Kurtz: A Footnote to Heart of Darkness”, Notes and Queries 
219(1974): 226-27.   
 168 
 
sahib. Orwell’s insight into his personal helplessness under the collective gaze 
occupies the epistemic moment when the ontology of privilege is cracked open and 
the notional hierarchy is turned on its head.  The dialectic between the collective 
gaze that turns the self inside out and the private gaze into the hollowed-out 
caricature of power in “Shooting an Elephant” deserves to be quoted in full so as to 
grasp its full impact: 
I could feel their two thousand wills pressing me forward, irresistibly. And it 
was at this moment, as I stood there with the rifle in my hands, that I first 
grasped the hollowness, the futility of the white man’s domination in the 
East. [ . . .] I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it 
is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing 
dummy, the conventionalized figure of a sahib. For it is the condition of his 
rule that he shall spend his life in trying to impress the “natives”, and so in 
every crisis he has to do what the “natives” expect of him. He wears a mask, 
and his face grows to fit it. (CE 19-20) 
Orwell’s discovery of the hollowness of the white man’s privilege occupies 
an epiphanic moment where phenomenological awareness mixes existential insight 
with political unlearning. In its experience of hollowness, Orwell’s articulation is 
akin to that of Kurtz’s in Heart of Darkness, a novel that also depicts the dangerous 
and inevitable shift from an excessive profit principle to a decadent pleasure 
principle that informs the pathology of imperial greed. The compulsory self-
fashioning of the white man in the colonial contact zone becomes compulsive at the 
point when the human face is subsumed by the social mask that signifies difference 
and domination.
32
 More significantly, the politics of masking and compulsively 
appropriating normative masculinity through a hyper-mimetic mode also points to 
the loss of agency in the face of such compulsory performance. The anxiety of the 
human self to appropriate the imperial masculinity that informs white privilege in the 
colonies was as political as the anxiety of the hyper-civil native to appropriate the 
colonizer’s tongue. Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant” is an essay where masculine 
behaviour emerges as a nervous mimicry of the imperial masculinist code. Thus, in 
preparing to shoot the elephant against his pure human will in “Shooting an 
                                                          
32
 It is interesting to compare this passage with the anxiety of appropriating the appropriate mask in 
Eliot’s Prufrock who sees himself being seen and reified by a collective gaze of societal structure 
where he continually fails to frame himself.  Like Orwell, Prufrock too emerges as a masculine 
hysteric in a performative space that, although seemingly less immediately political than that of 
“Shooting an Elephant”, is nonetheless characterised by similar economy of expectations.    
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Elephant”, Orwell enacts the neuromimesis of the colonial master who is forced to 
feign and enact his pre-assigned narrative of masculinist performance:  
A white man mustn’t be frightened in front of “natives”; and so, in general, 
he isn’t frightened. The sole thought in my mind was that if anything went 
wrong those two thousand Burmans would see me pursued, caught, trampled 
on and reduced to a grinning corpse like that Indian up that hill. And of that 
happened it was quite probable that some of them would laugh. (CE 21)
33
 
 
Linda Martin Alcoff’s analysis of the crisis of individual identity in a 
collectively constructed political space of difference is again significant here, 
especially in relation to the interrogation that the self can potentially present in the 
face of such ideological coercion. This fractured fault line of identity-reconfiguration 
enacts an existentialist awakening accompanied by an immediate political 
knowledge whereby “one realizes how one’s own hegemonic hermeneutic horizon of 
shared meanings has been infected by white supremacy, one’s own sense of identity 
becomes invalidated.”34 While the state of the shell-shocked soldier and the male 
hysteric was almost always perceived as a pseudo-hysteric performance based on 
psychosomatic degeneration, the compulsory enactment of imperial masculinity was 
rarely perceived as a performance and was strategically premised on a seamless 
naturalness, like the narrative of imperialism itself: the pukka sahib’s code. 
“Shooting an Elephant” ends with the confession mixed with the fear of being found 
out from this strategic seamlessness, as Orwell “wondered whether any of the others 
grasped that I had done it solely to avoid looking like a fool” (CE 23). 
Orwell’s essay is a remarkable articulation of human hesitation, confusion 
and horror. It contains the paradoxical knowledge that the experience of privileged 
political power can also be one of pure human helplessness, that the assertion of 
privileged masculinity can also emerge as one containing the dissolution of agency. 
                                                          
33
 In her historical analysis of colonial masculinity in the context of colonial India, Mrinalini Sinha 
studies how “The figures of the ‘manly Englishman’ and the ‘effeminate Bengali babu’ were 
produced and circulated in order to shape, the shifts in the political economy of colonialism in late 
nineteenth century: the changing imperatives in the strategies of colonial rule as well as the altered 
conditions for the indigenous elite’s collaboration with colonial rule.” Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial 
Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and ‘the effeminate Bengali’ in Late Nineteenth Century 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) 2. Sinha’s historical analysis illustrates how the 
brands of masculinity produced and perpetuated by the episteme of the empire relied on their reified 
binaries of sexual and political performativity.   
 
34
 Linda Martin Alcoff, Visible Identities, 206.  
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In situating the hesitant human self and will against the overarching structures of 
domination and hierarchy, “Shooting an Elephant” is a disturbing study of shame, 
guilt and the knowledge of powerlessness. Such knowledge emerges as a 
phenomenological and existentialist awareness in the colonial space where the 
borders between victory and loss, assertion and acceptance, are constantly revised as 
well as reified.      
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4.4 Colonial Masculinity and Its Discontents: A Study of Burmese Days 
 
In his analysis of the white man’s nervousness in the colonial condition – writing 
specifically on American colonialism in the Philippines – Warwick Anderson traces 
the trajectory of nervous illness of the colonizer as a pathology that was culture-
specific and essentially masculinist. Studying the dialectic between masculine 
hysteria and colonial machismo, Anderson asserts: 
The medical shaping of nervousness, initially mechanistic in character, later 
psychodynamic, contributed to the cultivation of masculinity and whiteness 
in a colonial culture. The new tropical colonies, the latest in the long line of 
last frontiers, presented both a special resource for white male self-fashioning 
and its testing ground. In this novel setting, the combination of ideas of 
bourgeois masculinity with ideas of whiteness and civilization becomes 
startlingly obvious, even as the nervy instability of the combination is 
revealed with equal clarity. 
35
 
The white masculinity in the imperial agon was thus rendered hysteric by the 
compulsion of the presupposed ontology of privilege and its anxious self-fashioning. 
The anxiety born out of inadequate masculinity is a theme that recurs in Orwell’s 
novel Burmese Days, whose protagonist John Flory carries his birthmark as a 
signifier of shame. Like Orwell who saw his school solely as a profit making 
enterprise, and like Conrad’s Marlow in Heart of Darkness who sees the horrors of 
European imperialism from close quarters as an evil network of lies and exploitation, 
Flory in Burmese Days uses the metaphor of the sick female patient to describe the 
dying British empire and asserts unequivocally his disgust at the spurious discourse 
of the white man’s burden:  
I’m here to make money, like everyone else. All I object to is the slimy white 
man’s burden humbug. The pukka sahib pose. It’s so boring. Even those 
bloody fools at the Club might be better company if we weren’t all of us 
living a lie the whole time. (BD 39) 
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 Warwick Anderson, “The Trespass Speaks: White Masculinity and Colonial Breakdown”, The 
American Historical Review 102. 5 (December 1997): 1343-70; 1346.  
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Evidently positioning itself against the Kiplingesque narrative of imperial 
adventure and its edificatory duties, Orwell’s Burmese Days is a remarkable novel 
about an insider’s account of the horrors of colonial domination, horrors that 
consume the dominator as well as the dominated. The nervous tension that 
constitutes power and its compulsory hierarchies in colonial Burma in Burmese Days 
incorporates issues of race, gender as well as language. If the characters in Burmese 
Days are less focalized or rounded than that of Forster’s A Passage to India (1924), 
Orwell’s novel emerges as a more direct depiction of the compulsive qualities of 
racial law and its perpetuation in the colonial contact zone. Thus the xenophobic 
imperialist Ellis, who combines the stereotypes of the crude colonizer with that of 
incorrigible presumptuousness, is immediately threatened when the Indian waiter at 
the English club retorts in near-perfect English:   
 
“Don’t talk like that damn you—‘I find it very difficult!’ Have you 
swallowed a dictionary? ‘Please, master, can’t keep ice cool’—that’s how 
you ought to talk. We shall have to sack this fellow if he gets to talk English 
too well. I can’t stick servants who talk English. (BD 26) 
 
Crucially, the inadequacy of the Indian servant rests precisely at the point where he 
exhibits an adequate and accurate appropriation of the normative language of the 
colonizer. The incident immediately instantiates one of the central issues in Orwell’s 
oeuvre on the colonial contact zone: the compulsive construction and circulation of 
the discourse of difference and its stereotypes. The nervousness of the cocksure 
colonizer (embodied in Ellis who never changes throughout the course of the novel 
from being a megalomaniac imperialist) is located at the point where his arrogant 
assumption of racial superiority is, if only marginally, threatened, not by an actual 
act of rebellion that can be conveniently punished, but by what is perceived as the sly 
civility of the colonial servant.
36
  
                                                          
36
 In his analysis of the sly civility that characterises the colonial dialectic of non-reconciliation, Homi 
Bhabha describes its double inscription. Thus Bhabha states that “Between the civil address and its 
colonial signification – each axis displaying a problem of recognition and repetition – shuttles the 
signifier of authority in search of a strategy of surveillance, subjection, and inscription. [. . .] Both 
colonizer and colonized are in a process of miscognition where each point of identification is always a 
partial and double repetition of the otherness of the self – democrat and despot, individual and 
servant, native and child.” Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994) 138-39. 
The threat that is enacted through hyper-civility is further accentuated through language for Bhabha, 
as mimicry in the colonial space emerges as a subversive act of spectacular resistance. Thus for 
Bhabha, “When the words of the master become the site of hybridity [. . .] then we may not only read 
between the lines but even seek to change the often coercive reality that they so lucidly contain.” 
Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders”, Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985): 144-65; 162.   
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The complex luggage of language and its political performance are depicted 
again when Ellis “deliberately exaggerated his Cockney accent, because of the 
sardonic tone it gave to his words,” (BD 22) while dramatizing his resentment to 
Macgregor’s proposing membership of the club to the natives.37 Cockney as a social 
signifier within an English space stands in stark contrast to the standardized English 
practised at the colonial contact-zone, one that is desired and appropriated by the 
colonized. Language thus emerges in Burmese Days both as a signifier of class and 
race through varying epistemological frames. The political condition depicted in the 
novel corresponds closely to the class condition in England as the natives in India are 
frequently equated with the lower classes in Britain. Burmese Days thus blends the 
discourse of degeneration (and its notion of ‘bad stock’) with that of colonialism 
through its fictional frame. Thus Mrs Lackersteen, another stereotype of the crude 
colonizer, laments the loss of authority over the colonized masses by drawing 
attention to an analogous situation in Britain: “We seem to have no authority over 
the natives nowadays, with all these dreadful Reforms, and the insolence they learn 
from the newspapers. In some ways they are getting almost as bad as the lower 
classes at home” (BD 29).  
 
                                                          
37
 For an analysis of Cockney accent as a signifier of a certain social symbol, see Lynda Mugglestone, 
‘Talking Proper’: The Rise of Accent as Social Symbol (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 50-
76. As Mrinalini Sinha asserts in her analysis of the culture of clubbing during the British Empire, the 
imperial English club emerged not only as a spatial signifier of the expansive ontology of homosocial 
white masculinity in the colonial contact-zone; but also grudgingly granted right to women to enter 
the notionally all-male-space, for the sole purpose of continued and closely monitored protection from 
the contaminating presence of the colonized male. Mrinalini Sinha, “Britishness, Clubbability, and the 
Colonial Public Sphere: The Genealogy of an Imperial Institution in Colonial India”, Journal of 
British Studies 40.4 (October 2001): 489-521; 515.  The club in Burmese Days emerges both as a 
symbol of desire as well as disgust, along with being the spatial location of hegemonic homosocial 
masculinity. Thus, while for the Burmese elite males such as the Machiavellian (and perversely pious) 
gangster Ko Po Kyin and the hyper-Westernized and hyper-servile doctor Veraswami the White 
Man’s Club at Kyauktada emerges as a sacred shrine of social status that is both desired as well as 
feared; for Flory it represents the crude complacency of imperial English masculinity that is driven by 
humbug and “booze as the cement of the empire” (BD 39).  It is this complex location of difference 
within the masculinist imperialist economy that makes Burmese Days a work of original revelation 
despite its political incorrectness and ultimate appropriation of the vocabulary of imperialism. Sinha’s 
study of the discourse of difference signified by the subscription to imperial clubbability in the 
colonial contact-zone shows how such clubbability “was always defined in relation to the dependent 
and the subjected—women, children, servants, employees, slaves, and the colonized.” Mrinalini 
Sinha, “Britishness, Clubbability, and the Colonial Public Sphere”, 497. It is interesting to note that 
such politics of privilege and exclusive system of admittance are still operative in several clubs in 
Kolkata (formerly the capital of colonial India) that were originally formed during British 
imperialism. Also, such clubs still subscribe to strict dress codes that adhere to the grammar of 
dressing appropriated by imperial British and Anglo-Indian masculinity.    
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The lower classes back in Britain and the colonial natives are both perceived 
from similar positions of privilege by the status quo and Orwell’s novel echoes 
similar sentiments of segregation as that in the 1956 play by John Osborne Look 
Back in Anger whose protagonist Jimmy Porter appears as a hysteric young man of 
working class background profoundly envious of the Edwardian gentility while also 
appreciating the privilege of nostalgia such Englishness possesses with its proud past 
of imperial glory, a past that can only be preserved in strategic and essentialized 
remembrance. The masculine hysteria of Jimmy constitutes sadistic misogyny as 
well as desire for the mother-protector, hatred of upper-class etiquette as well as 
resentment of the yobs at the front rows of cinema halls in a curious combination 
that mixes personal failure with political decadence, similar to the setting in Orwell’s 
Burmese Days.
38
  
 
Curiously enough, despite his ostensible aversion towards upper-class 
gentility, Jimmy in Osborne’s Look Back In Anger appreciates the loss that his 
father-in-law Colonel Redfern carries with his fall from masculine military grace, a 
fall that emerges as a metaphor for Britain’s descent as an imperial power post-
Second World War. In a sentimentally evocative passage, Redfern describes his 
disconcertion to his daughter Alison by narrating his imperial adventure and its 
corresponding heroic code, one which had initiated for him personally in 1914 
(interestingly, the date Orwell himself had chosen for his descriptions of the unreal 
un-grown-up luxury and spurious sentiments to the tune of Eton boating songs in 
“Such, such were the Joys”) and ended with his departure from colonial India back 
to a Britain where he could not re-locate himself emotionally or politically. The 
image of imperial British-ness (parodied as well envied by the twenty-five year old 
Jimmy who inhabits the post-imperial landscape with no brave new causes) is 
                                                          
38
 Jimmy Porter belongs to the post-Orwellian generation of Englishness which sees itself as having 
no brave good causes to die for anymore. The decline of England as a colonial and imperial power is 
immediately evident as a political sub-text in Osborne’s play that emerges as the fallout of the 
Orwellian gaze into imperialism and its discontents. More significantly, in relation to Orwell, 
Osborne’s Look Back in Anger also incorporates the loss of definite political faith that ensued after the 
Spanish Civil War and Jimmy Porter’s father who fights and dies of the War, is a sufficiently 
Orwellian figure conspicuous through his physical absence in the play, while also symbolically 
informing the loss in the political landscape. The dead father who had fought in the Spanish Civil War 
had emerged enervated and broken out of its confusion through a climate that Orwell himself had 
described as “the horrible atmosphere produced by fear, suspicion, hatred, censored newspapers, 
crammed jails, enormous food queues, and prowling gangs of armed men.” George Orwell, Homage 
to Catalonia (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938) 142. 
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revealed in Look Back in Anger by one of its nostalgic upholders only at the moment 
of its loss:  
 
Perhaps Jimmy is right. Perhaps I am a – what was it? An old plant left over 
from the Edwardian Wilderness. And I can’t quite understand why the sun 
isn’t shining anymore. [. . .] It was March 1914 when I left England, and 
apart from leaves every ten years or so, I didn’t see much of my own country 
until we all came back in ’47. [. . .] When I think of it now, it seems like a 
dream, if only it could have gone on forever. Those cool, long evenings up in 
the hills, everything purple and golden. [ . . .] I think the last day the sun 
shone was when that dirty little train steamed out of that crowded, 
suffocating Indian station, and the battalion band playing for all it was worth. 
I knew in my heart it was all over then. Everything.
39
  
 
The image of spiritual fecundity Redfern delineates is a direct progeny of imperial 
glory that the colonel comfortably embodied and is now painfully dislocated from. 
His disintegration as a signifier of masculine order thus emerges from a fall from the 
moment of imperial and political potency. This fall is accentuated with the symbolic 
departure from the colony in the last train in a day where the symbolic sun last shone 
over the dying British Empire. The political privilege that Redfern mourns in Look 
Back In Anger had been informed by the maximization of a masculinist economy 
that had thrived through discourses of domination and deception. Such a culture is 
powerfully presented in Orwell’s Burmese Days which, unlike Redfern’s picture of 
the seamless imperial idyllic, sees “continuity and coherence underscored by 
division and difference”.40  
 
Flory in Orwell’s Burmese Days (who is considered “notoriously Bolshie in 
his opinions”) embodies nervous masculinity in the colonies, and like Marlow in 
Heart of Darkness, also realizes the horror of imperialism without being able to 
articulate or explicate it, except during moments of private hysteria that 
paradoxically inform his existentialist insights. Curiously located between his private 
hatred of imperialism and his discomfort under the collective gaze of the colonized 
(a nervous ankylosis that is spectacularly dramatized in the essay “Shooting an 
Elephant”), Flory sees himself and his creed of colonizers as “condemned forever to 
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 John Osborne, Look Back in Anger (New York: Criterion Books, 1957) 68.  
40
 Homi Bhabha, “Representation and the Colonial Text: A Critical Exploration of Some Forms of 
Mimeticism”, The Theory of Reading, ed. Frank Gloversmith (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1984) 96.  
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dance the danse du pukka sahib for the edification of the lower races” (BD 151) 
whereby his imagination retains the rhetoric of racism despite his personal hatred of 
its inherent ideology. The borderlines between the dominator and the dominated are 
not always clearly demarcated in Burmese Days, despite its subscription to the logic 
of binaries operative in the empire and its colonial space. Thus while Doctor 
Veraswami embodies the stereotype of inferiority complex characterizing an entire 
race as advocated by European psychiatrists such as Octave Mannoni working on 
colonial territories
41
, the protagonist of the novel, John Flory, notionally a white 
imperial male, embodies a different strand of inferiority marked by a psychosomatic 
condition. As the narrative informs the reader, Flory’s dislocation and difficulty had 
begun at the moment of his birth, indeed “in his mother’s womb when chance put the 
blue birthmark on his cheek” (BD 64).42 The birthmark in the novel does not only 
emerge as a signifier of social shame
43
 but also as a mark of self-loathing and sexual 
shame (as evinced in Flory’s covering his birthmark right after his sexual act with 
Ma Hla May for he “always remembered the birthmark when he had done something 
to be ashamed of”).  
 
The politics of naming as a strategy of shaming runs throughout Burmese 
Days as evinced in Flory’s childhood in school where he was called Blueface and 
Monekybum in a couplet written by the school poet who had gone on to be a writer 
for the Nation: “New-tick Flory does look rum, Got a face like a monkey’s bum” 
(BD 64). The shame in looking rum and being equated with a monkey (a simile that 
is loaded with racist connotations) is solely and partially redeemed by Flory’s being 
a “liar and a good footballer, the two things absolutely necessary for success at 
                                                          
41
 Mannoni’s work on anthropological psychiatry and his hypotheses on human behaviour on the basis 
of race and cultural locations are perhaps most explicitly presented in Prospero and Caliban (1950). 
The notion of inferiority complex was of course first propounded by Alfred Adler in The Neurotic 
Constitution (1917). Mannoni’s highly racialized analysis was subsequently taken up and critiqued for 
its essentialism by Fanon in his Black Skin White Masks (1952).  
 
42
 The description of Flory’s chanced inheritance of the disfiguring birthmark is curiously similar to 
the Neo-Darwinist notion of the random genetic code that is conferred at the moment of conception. 
Indeed, Flory’s birthmark operates like genetic determinism that situates him in shame and self-
disgust. The Neo-Darwinist genetic character is studied in greater details in the following chapter on 
McEwan’s Saturday.    
 
43
 Flory is nicknamed Blueface and Monkey-bum in his school and tries to conceal the mark as best 
he can during his amorous advances towards Elizabeth who in turn embodies high-art and high-class 
in Flory’s nervous imagination with her pure European-ness signified by her past in Parisian cafes and 
artistic associations. 
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school” (BD 64). Football and lying thus emerge as two essential criteria for 
appropriating the model masculinity that is muscular as well as manipulative in what 
is described by the narrative as the “formative period” of masculine formation, the 
horrors of which are personally elucidated by Orwell in “Such, such were the Joys.” 
The formative period had featured again for Flory in a different ontology of imperial 
masculinity in the colonial contact-zone during his first few months at Burma with 
four other young Englishmen when: 
 
They swilled whiskey which they privately hated, they stood round the piano 
bawling songs of inane filthiness and silliness, they squandered rupees by the 
hundred on aged Jewish whores with the faces of crocodiles. That too had 
been a formative period. (BD 65) 
 
The two different phases of formative periods delineated here correspond to 
what Raymond Williams classifies as “negative identification” that constitutes an 
abduction of one’s “initial and formative social experience”44 in favour of a new 
horizon of cultural and social hermeneutics. The formative phase in Burma had thus 
taught Flory the necessity of withholding private preference in order to super-
ordinate cultural signifiers of the performances of imperial masculinity, a condition 
that is manifested by the nervous tensions embodied by Flory at various points in the 
narrative. The Jewish whores, with faces of crocodiles, embodied the stereotype of 
fallen degenerated human species in the imperial masculine imagination, embedded 
in highly racialized stereotypes. Flory’s sense of inferiority (due to the disfigurement 
caused by the birth-mark on his face) becomes a nervous condition and a neural 
reflex in the novel and seems to subscribe to the medical theory posited by Alfred 
Adler in his work on the inferiority complex. In the opening chapter of The Neurotic 
Constitution, Adler had studied the “relationship between somatic inferiority and 
psychic overcompensation” and offered “detailed description of organ-inferiority as 
the etiology of the neurosis”.45 In his work, Adler analyses the compensation through 
the central nervous system sought by the subject subsumed by inferiority complex, 
leading on to the condition of psychogenesis.   
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 Raymond Williams, George Orwell (Glasgow: Collins, 1971) 20.   
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 Alfred Adler, The Neurotic Constitution: Outlines of a Comparative Individualistic Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, trans. Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind (London: Routledge, 1999) 1.  
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A narrative that blends the medical and the political through a mode that 
locates culture as well as body under the hegemonic gaze that decides discourses, 
Orwell’s Burmese Days emerges as a novel that contains the contingencies in the 
colonial contact-zone with its nervous masculinities. Indeed, Flory’s discomfiting 
shame about his birthmark as well as his insight into the horrors of the empire are 
characterised by a nervous strain that becomes almost hysteric in its compulsive 
concealment and behaviour: “He was quite aware of its [the birthmark’s] 
hideousness. And all times, when he was not alone, there was a sidelongness about 
his movements, as he manoeuvred to keep the birthmark out of sight” (BD 17). As a 
signifier of shame, the birthmark also stands for an ‘Otherness’ that Flory appears to 
be overdetermined by. It eventually contributes towards his failure as a lover as well 
as an imperial official in the imperial space. Martha Nussbaum’s discursive analysis 
of shame is particularly pertinent here as a nervous manifestation of inferiority born 
out of visible physical aberration or cultural deviance. Thus Nussbaum argues:  
 
People who look different from others—people with visible diseases or so-
called deformities, the mentally or physically handicapped—wear their 
shame on their faces [. . .] When there is no visible brand, societies have been 
quick to inflict one, whether by tattooing or branding or by other visible signs 
of social ostracism or disapproval.
46
 
 
Due to the degree of visible social shame that his birthmark carries and contains, 
Flory’s facial manoeuvres also correspond to the compulsory neural rituals of 
concealment and evasion through which the shame is effaced. The medical as well as 
the social signifiers of shame are contained and corroborated by the facial 
expressions that Darwin believed to represent innate mental patterns.
47
 Flory in 
Burmese Days embodies both forms of shaming and segregation analysed by 
Nussbaum, with the conspicuous marker of shame on his face through his crescent-
shaped birthmark as well as his private hatred of the ideology of imperialism. 
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Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, 174. The facial politics of shame is significant from its very 
origin as Elspeth Probyn informs, “Etymologically shame comes from the Goth word Scham, which 
refers to covering the face.” Elspeth Probyn, “Writing Shame”, The Affect Theory Reader, 72. 
 
47
 In his 1872 work The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin drew heavily on the 
analyses of the French physician Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne, who in 1862 had used photography 
and electrical stimulation to study facial expressions and how those corresponded to the various 
emotional states of the human self. Darwin had reportedly requested Duchenne to allow him to 
reproduce the photographs in his Expressions of the Emotions. See Randolph R. Cornelius, The 
Science of Emotions: Research and Tradition in the Psychology of Emotions (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1996) 28-32.  
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Indeed, his Bolshie-ness and birthmark appear together in the vocabulary of tirade 
used against Flory by the more ascertained imperialist Ellis: 
 
“He’s a bit too Bolshie for my taste. I can’t bear a fellow who pals up with 
the natives. I shouldn’t wonder if he’s got a lick of the tarbrush himself. It 
might explain that black mark on his face. Piebald. And he looks like a 
yellow-belly, with that black hair, and skin the colour of a lemon.” (BD 34) 
 
Thus discursive deviance and bodily degeneration appear and merge in the same 
rhetoric of rage and it is interesting to note how Ellis’s tirade moves swiftly from an 
ideological antagonism to bodily abhorrence, from intellectual aversion to visceral 
disgust that were rampant in the dominant late nineteenth-century cultural 
vocabulary, directed against figures who embodied such deviance, such as Oscar 
Wilde.   
 
The possibility of piebald-ness that Flory carries with his birthmark (which, 
although actually blue, appears black under Ellis’s imperialist gaze) demarcates him 
from the normative mappings of the imperial homosocial space exemplified by the 
Englishman’s club. More significantly, and in keeping with the discourse of 
degeneration and denigration in the narratives of imperialism, Flory is equated with 
effeminacy and homosexuality through his association with the colonized males. 
This is a further corroboration of the possibility of degeneration that he seems to 
embody with his piebald skin and black birthmark before Ellis’s eyes who calls 
Flory “a nigger’s Nancy Boy.” The narrative describes the bodily and the ideological 
transitions by describing Flory’s disgust with the empire through the development of 
his brain: 
 
For as his brain developed—you cannot stop your brain developing, and it is 
one of the tragedies of the half-educated that they develop late, when they are 
already committed to some wrong way of life—he had grasped the truth 
about the English and their Empire. (BD 68) 
 
The development of the brain and the knowledge that comes with the process is both 
political and neural and the intersections between anthropology and neuroscience 
yield rich research into the human mind and how it makes meaning out of matter, 
how consciousness is informed by culture. This argument is augmented by the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz who states that:  
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As our central nervous system – and most particularly its crowning curse and 
glory, the neocortex – grew up in great part in interaction with culture, it is 
incapable of directing our behaviour or organizing our experience without the 
guidance provided by the systems of significant symbols.
48
  
 
 Geertz’s argument upholds the traffic between brain and external matter and 
analyses how the brain and the body are situated and informed by cultural systems 
and signifiers. Such a study shows how the self and its cultural location are 
positioned apropos of each other. Likewise, neuroscientists and psychiatrists have 
increasingly come to look at the cultural and anthropological determinants that 
emerge as “a complex interaction between biological and psychological and social 
sources of vulnerability”.49 
 
 Like Kurtz who discovers the horror of the truth about imperialism in Heart 
of Darkness only when his nerves go wrong, Flory attains the knowledge of the 
horror only with the transitions in his brain. The connection with Heart of Darkness 
as well as with Nineteen Eighty Four (1949) is made more direct (albeit at an 
implicit level in Burmese Days) with the depiction of the horror of the one who is 
overdetermined by the power-paradigm that he must compulsively inscribe himself 
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 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 49. In his analysis 
of the epistemology of medical anthropology as a discursive discipline, Byron J. Good states how 
medicine and its welding with anthropology studies the often under-noticed political and economic 
conditions that govern the character of the health systems in any period. Likewise, the cognitive 
science that has informed medicine during the last four decades has also been critical of the 
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functioning, and illness in various societies.” Good, Medicine, Rationality and Experience, 50. The 
societal nature of neuroscience is of course immediately and powerfully voiced by scientists who 
increasingly argue that the interchange between the social and the biological is an essential 
component of the making of the human subject and must be factored into any analysis of the human 
brain. See Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby ed. Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social 
and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).  In this collection, the 
psychologist Shaun Gallagher asserts that experience entails at its most pragmatic level, the affective 
as well as the social forces that factor into the sentient subject’s cultural milieu that can never be 
detached from modes of cognition and perception (90). This argument situates itself intellectually 
against the DNA-centric theory of Neo-Darwinism and looks at synaptic plasticity and epigenetics as 
modes through which the self is rendered unique and unmappable due to its interactions with the 
structures of stimuli around it. This debate will be taken up in greater details in the following chapter 
on McEwan’s neuro-novel Saturday which pits different orders of masculinity and cultural locations 
against each other, with the backdrop of political unrest and the medical narratives of neuroscience.  
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into, through a combination of unarticulated hysteria and claustrophobia. This is 
amply evinced by the narrator’s descriptions of the culture of colonial control: 
 
It is a stifling, stultifying world in which to live. It is a world in which every 
word and every thought is censored. In England it is hard to imagine such an 
atmosphere. Everyone is free in England; we sell our souls in public and buy 
them back in private, among our friends. But even friendship can hardly exist 
when every white man is a cog in the wheels of despotism. Free speech is 
unthinkable. All other kinds of freedom are permitted. You are free to be a 
drunkard, an idler, a coward, a backbiter, a fornicator; but you are not free to 
think for yourself. Your opinion on every subject of any conceivable 
importance is dictated for you by the pukka sahib’s code. (BD 69) 
 
The absolute censorship on free speech and free thinking connects the condition 
immediately with Nineteen Eighty Four, with the totalitarian dystopia that punishes 
thought-crime. But Burmese Days goes a step further with its complex depiction of 
the dialectic of law and permissible lawlessness where the insider is also always an 
outsider who must consummate the compulsory performance of the pukka sahib’s 
code. This is the nervous strain that comes with the compulsory perpetuation of the 
code manifested in Flory as well as in the Orwellian self in “Shooting an Elephant”. 
More significantly, the location of the code is significant inasmuch as it is situated at 
an epistemic excess in relation to the personal will. This assumes a manner similar to 
the ontology of normative masculinity operative at a strategic remove from the 
human self that seeks to appropriate it.  As the narrative informs, focalizing itself 
through the state and voice of Flory, “You are a creature of the despotism, a pukka 
sahib, tied tighter than a monk or a savage by an unbearable system of tabus” (BD 
69). Thus the state of the colonized native which is described as a nervous condition 
by Sartre in his foreword to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth50 receives its obverse 
on the other side of power in Orwell’s novel even as it retains the essentialized and 
essentializing vocabulary of the imperialist self.  
 
Burmese Days may be justly criticised for appropriating strategies of 
imperialist stereotyping and essentialism in its descriptions of “naked black coolies 
squabbling over the luggage” (BD 71), Burmese women as Dutch dolls and English-
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educated Indians as greasy babus.
51
  Like Heart of Darkness which frequently 
appropriates a Lombrosian vocabulary, Burmese Days depicts the remnants of such 
rhetoric, in the essentializing imagination of the naïve Westerner located in the non-
Western terra incognita. Thus Elizabeth asserts her revulsion on seeing the black 
bodies of the Burmese acrobats who induce disgust in her ingrained ideology of 
European physiognomic superiority: 
 
But they have such hideous-shaped heads! Their skulls kind of slope up 
behind like a tom-cat’s. And then the way their foreheads slant back—it 
makes them look so wicked. I remember reading something in a magazine 
about the shape of people’s heads; it said that a person with a sloping 
forehead is a criminal type. (BD 118-19) (my italics) 
 
The sloping forehead as a physiognomic signifier of criminal propensities as 
classified by the criminology of Lombroso continued to exist in the common 
Western public discourse of disgust
52
 well into the twentieth century. Elizabeth with 
her European past of Parisian life of white wine and arty cafes subscribes to such 
discourses of difference. But it is precisely due to its political incorrectness that 
Burmese Days, like Heart of Darkness, stands out as a complex text that resists 
closure even as its narrative moves towards a conventional finale.  
 
Flory emerges in Burmese Days as an ambivalent outsider to the code in a 
manner which acts as the converse to the fearful ‘Otherness’ that Kurtz comes to 
embody in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. Both their states are eventually connected 
by a discourse (more immediately ostensible in Conrad’s novel) as well as a 
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 One can take up Edward Said’s analysis of the politics of representation here and assess how 
anthropology offers representation as a political choice that also constitutes the local and the personal 
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of racial and anthropological otherness.  Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
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degeneration of nerves. Thus while Flory’s failure is a result of his inadequate 
appropriation of the masculinist vocabulary specially coded for the colonial contact-
zone, Kurtz’s decline and eventual demise stem from his over-appropriation and 
over-internalization of the same code. Relevant in both narratives are the issues of 
location and agency that correspond to the external environment that in-forms and 
re-forms the constitution of the self. The significance of the surrounding as 
conditioning the making and unmaking of the self is vividly described in Orwell’s 
novel. Flory’s continuous and compulsive envisioning of the perfect future in terms 
of escaping the corruption of the colonial contact-zone and settling down with a 
“civilised girl, not a pukka memsahib” is evocative in its escapist zeal and 
romanticized fecundity: 
 
They would buy a cottage in the country, surround themselves with friends, 
books, their children, animals. They would be free for ever of the smell of 
pukka sahibdom. He would forget Burma, the horrible country that had come 
near ruining him. (BD 70-71) 
 
The passage constructs not only a utopian cosmos that would never be realized (like 
Jimmy Porter’s political ideal in Look Back In Anger that never existed), it also 
connects, at a more medical level, to one of the traits taken up by Adler, in his study 
of the neurotic character subsumed by an inferiority complex. In his analysis, Adler 
argues: 
The gaze of the neurotic, on account of this feeling of uncertainty, is directed 
far into the future. All present experience to him is a preparation. Moreover, 
this circumstance is largely responsible for encouraging his dreaming 
proclivities and estranging him from the world of reality.
53
  
 
Emerging increasingly in the narrative as an embodiment of nervous masculinity in 
the colonial contact-zone, Flory is also characterised by an inferiority complex that 
exists in the same plane of shame with the discourses of degeneration and 
effeminacy in a culture that necessitated compulsory and compulsive performance of 
imperial masculinity and its ideal body.  
 
With his private ideology of self-disgust and hatred of empire, Flory comes 
to embody a secrecy that is variously manifested in his clandestine visits to Dr 
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Veraswami for intellectual comfort and his sexual relationships with colonial 
women, both prohibited by the parameters of the colonizer’s law. Like the ivory in 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, the timber in Orwell’s Burmese Days emerges as a 
signifier of the exploitative potential of imperialism driven by a masculinist 
economy constituting hunting expeditions, horse riding and excesses of drinking. As 
Flory’s attempts to escape Burma are frustrated by the sudden death of three men in 
his firm due to blackwater fever and he is forced to return to his old quarter in 
Burma, he experiences a sudden and sad insight that transforms him internally. On 
seeing his Indian servants busy in their usual chores and on being greeted by the 
same people in a manner akin to the homecoming of a hero, Flory realizes the 
certainty of his location in colonial Burma and the futility of escaping from the same, 
a certainty that is also perceived as decadence. The passage, despite is realist frame, 
is couched in a vocabulary not unlike that of the high-Modernist epiphany: 
 
Something turned over in Flory’s heart. It was one of those moments when 
one becomes conscious of a vast change and deterioration in one’s life. For 
he had realised, suddenly, that in his heart he was glad to be coming back. 
This country which he hated was now his native country, his home. He had 
lived here ten years, and every particle of his body was compounded of 
Burmese soil. Scenes like these—the sallow evening light, the old Indian 
cropping grass, the creak of the cartwheels [. . .] were more native to him 
than England. He had sent deep roots, perhaps his deepest, into a foreign 
country. (BD 71-72)  
 
The thought processes of Flory here extend into the existentialist realm. The 
phenomenological revelation of his location in the colonial contact-zone appears as 
an epistemic moment of change that is internal and private while being directly 
informed by the external and the material environment. It is a moment that perhaps 
connects Flory most closely to Orwell himself who himself was born in Motihari in 
Bengal near the Nepal border and had difficulties situating the ontology of 
nativeness throughout his life, appearing alternately as an uncomfortable outsider to 
the class-conscious patriotism in Britain as well as an over-essentialized Englishman. 
More significantly, the figure of Flory appears as characterized by a political 
determinism (one that makes him painfully aware of his externality to his coveted 
pure-British space) that fixates him like his bodily birthmark. As Keith Alldritt 
contends in an analysis of the passage describing Flory’s recognition of his location, 
“If Burma has set its marks on Flory, so also has heredity; though Orwell’s use of 
 185 
 
this element of naturalistic doctrine is such that it has symbolic force rather than 
meaning in straightforwardly genetic and physiological terms.”54 But although 
couched in symbolic and cultural terms, the nervous and genetic determinism that is 
used to characterise Flory in Burmese Days is never lost sight of, as is his birthmark 
that continues to stay as a signifier of ineradicable shame.  
 
The association of shame with a mark of bodily aberration, and the 
inscription of inferiority related to the same, dramatize the complex discourse of 
difference in Burmese Days. The homosocial white masculinist space of the English 
Club in Kyauktada is continually threatened in the novel not only by external entities 
(the election of an Indian as a member of the club and the mob of angry Burmese 
who gather to attack Ellis) but also by the presence of the uncomfortable Eurasians 
who notionally belong to the breed of the colonizers. The Eurasians who appear in 
Burmese Days embody the problematic state of in-between-ness that induces disgust 
in the Europeans in the colonies, precisely as a bodily reminder of sexual and racial 
degeneration. The Eurasians Francis and Samuel who approach Elizabeth and Flory 
before they enter the club come to represent the degenerate types in Elizabeth’s 
imagination, with their impure skin and inadequate European-ness. Elizabeth’s 
enquires to Flory carry the rhetoric that classified criminology and degeneration 
from late nineteenth-century discourses of racialized pseudo-science: 
 
“They looked awfully degenerate types, didn’t they? So thin and weedy and 
cringing; and they haven’t got al all honest faces. I suppose these Eurasians 
are very degenerate? I’ve heard that half-castes always inherit what’s worst 
in both races. Is that true?” (BD 123) 
 
With her earlier assumptions about the inherent criminal propensities of the Burmese 
men based on the physiognomic feature of their forehead, and with her revulsion on 
seeing the half-breed Eurasians as degenerates, Elizabeth comes to voice the 
vocabulary of bio-political panic that grew out of the popular fin de siècle European 
imagination with its obsession with hygiene, racial and bodily order. This was 
historically manifested perhaps most infamously in the Anti-Semitism that grew out 
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of the Nazi regime.
55
 Thus the collective abhorrence towards the Eurasians Francis 
and Samuel (who ironically exemplify the progeny of English fathers who were 
clergymen in holy orders) constitutes and corroborates the condition which sees 
racial mixing as a threat to haematological purity. The progeny of such racial/sexual 
transgression are characterised by the determinism that informs the retribution of the 
act, as the Eurasians are termed “yellow-bellies” (a term used, interestingly enough, 
by Ellis in his attack against Flory’s perceived proximity to the colonized natives) by 
the British at the colonies and are considered absolute outcasts.  
 
In her work on the politics of disgust, Martha Nussbaum underlines the 
difference between disgust and anger “in that its [disgust’s] thought-content is 
typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and impossible 
aspirations to purity, immortality and nonanimality.” More significantly, as 
Nussbaum goes on to contend, “disgust has been used throughout history to exclude 
and marginalize groups who come to embody the dominant group’s fear and loathing 
of its own animality and mortality.”56 The discursive binary that disgust constructs, 
works by exclusion and segregation, with a structure of sentiments that informs 
xenophobic and political presuppositions. Thus disgust operates viscerally by 
drawing attention to and appearing as a repulsive reminder of the messy corporeality 
of the body as opposed to the perfect functional frame advocated by the logic of 
imperialist control. With its threat of contamination and pathological possibilities, 
disgust often emerges as a nervous and unconditioned reflex-response to the non-
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normative entity and event.
57
 The embodiments of degeneration in Burmese Days 
appear in the form of the mixed-breed Eurasians who, with their bodily markers of 
racial miscegenation, emerge as a shameful and almost pathologized presence before 
Elizabeth who, with her interpellated ideas of racial purity, is overwhelmed by 
revulsion. Such revulsion becomes bewilderment on seeing Flory converse easily 
with the degenerates and revealing the Eurasians’ financial dependence on the 
natives’ charity.  
 
Flory’s connection with the degenerates is not just constituted by his 
shameful birthmark but also by his deviance from the normative imperial ethic in 
Burmese Days. Thus, as he explains to Elizabeth: 
 
“Oh well, I break the rules occasionally. I meant that a pukka sahib probably 
wouldn’t be seen talking to them [the Eurasians]. But you see, I try—just 
sometimes, when I have the pluck—not to be a pukka sahib.” (BD 124) 
 
The discursive domains of the words pukka and pluck are significant in the context 
of the passage. The word pukka had entered English vocabulary from the colonial 
contact-zone in India and its corresponding linguistic traffic. In common Hindi 
parlance, the word pukka means cemented, strongly ascertained and ascertainable.  
Most commonly associated with the vocabulary of construction (of building and 
walls), pukka carried a sense of inherent strength against external attacks as well as 
internal weaknesses. Thus crucially, pukka signified the consummated process of 
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construction that incorporates integration of disparate entities and clinical closure, 
leading on to a final seamless product with no visible loose ends.  
 
It is interesting to read the usage of this metaphor for construction in the 
vocabulary of colonial masculinity, a discourse that was as characterised by 
integrated incorporations and closure as the construction of roads and dams. Apart 
from exhibiting the constructed quality of imperial masculinity, pukka also carried a 
sense of immediacy and integration characterising a code constituted by domination, 
difference and deification.
58
 The word can also be read as a throwback on the 
machineries of masculinity in English schools and scout movements that operated 
along similar constructions of strength and splendour in a cultural climate where 
“manhood was an artificial product coaxed by austere training and testing.”59 
Essentially appropriating the vocabulary of road construction, pukka thus signified a 
model of masculinity that would leave no loose ends of its construction process and 
could thus immediately inform and perpetuate the ontology of privilege. The 
seamlessness of the epistemology of imperial masculinity as exhibited in the colonial 
contact-zone can be seen as an instance of what Shannon Sullivan classifies as the 
surreptitious workings of white privilege that operates precisely where it appears not 
to operate and is most functional precisely where it appears invisible. The ideologies 
of racial supremacy, as Sullivan asserts, “function as if not-existent and actively 
thwart conscious attempt to pinpoint their existence. This unconscious, invisible 
mode of operation is what enables white privileged habits to be increasingly 
effective and pervasive.”60 Likewise the grammar of being the pukka sahib worked 
best when it concealed its constructed epistemologies and instead appeared as an 
expansive ontology of innate and unquestionable supremacy.  
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The irony that is dramatized in Orwell’s Burmese Days constitutes the 
knowledge of the fact that the cemented strength that informs the pukka construct of 
the empire is essentially reliant on alcoholism and mendacity. As Flory asserts this to 
the non-believing Indian doctor Veraswami who embodies absolute loyalty to the 
empire: 
“It’s a tradition to booze together and swap meals and pretend to be friends, 
though we hate each other like poison. [. . .] It’s a political necessity. Of 
course drink is what keeps the machine going. We should all go mad and kill 
one another in a week if it weren’t for that. There’s a subject for one of your 
uplift essayists, doctor. Booze as the cement of empire.” (BD 38-39) 
 
Stimulation and its corresponding simulation inform imperialism and its discontents 
in Flory’s mind and the complexity of Burmese Days is enhanced by the dramatizing 
of the private interrogations of the ideology as well by the showcasing of the 
eventual failure of such attempts. Thus the pluck not to be pukka enacts the private 
deconstruction of the discursive vocabulary that Flory seeks to subvert through his 
ambivalence, if only occasionally. The word pluck is almost always associated with 
masculine machismo and one remembers the boss in Mansfield’s “The Fly” who 
thought admiringly of the struggling fly as a “plucky little devil” with just the right 
attitude to handle crises.
61
 The culture associated with the word corresponded closely 
to the normative masculinity engineered out of Boy Scouts and public schools with 
its stoic indifference to feminine sentimentality and physical bravado (attributes 
embodied extremely and perfectly by Verrall in Burmese Days whose comradeship 
with his horses is stronger than his emotional bonds with any human beings in the 
novel). But in the context in which Flory uses it before Elizabeth, it required real 
pluck to break the discourse of pluckiness that informed normative masculinity in the 
colonial contact-zone, a pluckiness that emerges only as a sporadic sentiment and an 
eventually ineffectual attribute in the nervous narrators in Orwell’s narratives about 
colonial Burma. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, Elizabeth, who embodies the essentialized European-ness in 
the colonial contact-zone, appropriates and largely worships the model of imperial 
masculinity that thrives in hunting, shooting and exhibiting normative masculine 
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machismo. Thus when Flory describes his hunting adventures, her immediate 
interest incorporates a nervous unconditioned reflex-response: 
 
Elizabeth wriggled her shoulder-blades against the chair. It was a movement 
that she made sometimes when she was deeply pleased. She loved Flory, 
really loved him, when he talked like this. The most trivial scrap of 
information about shooting thrilled her. If only he would always talk about 
shooting, instead of about books and Art and that mucky poetry! In a sudden 
burst of admiration she decided that Flory was really quite a handsome man, 
in is way. [. . . ] He was standing with his birth-marked cheek away from her. 
She pressed him to go on talking. (BD 161-62) 
 
The passage is remarkable in the manner in which it incorporates the nervous 
behaviour of the two individuals: Elizabeth’s wriggling emerging as an almost 
unconditioned neural reaction that manifests her (possibly sexual) excitement, and 
Flory’s manoeuvre of hiding away his birthmark at the moment of high-affirmation 
as a conditioned nervous reflex ingrained into his system with time. Both Elizabeth 
as well as Flory exhibit what Horacio Fabrega classifies as the motor behaviour of 
human nerves, a term that is used “to denote patterns of muscular responses which 
are viewed in psychical terms.”62  
 
Fabegra’s enquiry on the neural behaviour of a particular human being 
exposed to a unique environment as breaking off from the original genetic narrative 
is particularly significant in the case of Flory in Burmese Days whose sense of shame 
with his birthmark and the corresponding nervous behaviour may be seen 
particularly accentuated by the cultural code of the colonial contact-zone that 
operates with the notional binaries of masculine/feminine, white/black, 
civilized/uncivilized, and, most significantly, powerful/powerless. Thus while his 
birthmark stands as a signifier of genetic determinism, Flory’s continuous and 
almost unconditioned manoeuvre to conceal the same during moments of assertion 
emerges as nervous reflex naturalized by habit.  Struggling to inscribe himself into 
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the colonial masculinist code, Flory keeps looking back at Britain as a special space 
where freedom of thoughts and speech runs undeterred in his imagination, thus 
assuming a gaze that is both essentializing as well as nostalgic. More interestingly, 
the masculinity of Flory emerges before the imagination of Elizabeth as 
metonymically constructed by the hunting narrative that operates in all effect as a 
strategy of seduction.  
 
As John Mackenzie asserts in his analysis of imperial masculinity and 
hunting narratives, with the turn of the twentieth century, hunting shifted from a 
mode of survival and preservation to an imperial masculinist ritual that increasingly 
reified its class and cultural codes. By the 1920s more and more women were 
participating in the hunting process and partaking of its elite vocabulary.
63
 Flory’s 
interest in books, art and poetry are an anathema to the normative masculinity 
Elizabeth subscribes to and allows herself to be seduced by. Flory’s subsequent and 
almost reluctant shift to a more normative masculinist code in order to impress 
Elizabeth is premised on a strategy of seduction. In it, Flory performs imperial 
masculinity with his hunting trips with Elizabeth as well with his anecdotes about 
personal hunting machismo exhibited earlier: 
 
Flory told it all perfunctorily enough—did not the proverbial Anglo-Indian 
bore always talk about tiger-shooting?—but Elizabeth wriggled her shoulders 
delightedly once more. He did not realize how such talk as this reassured her 
and made up for all the times when he had bored her and disquieted her. (BD 
162) 
 
The recurrence of the word “bore” is significant in the passage as it relates to two 
mutually contradictory epistemologies of boredom that are politically located as well 
as gendered. The first arises from the ritual repetition of the masculinist narrative to 
a male audience already always expected to perform it. The second mode of 
boredom is perceived by a female interlocutor freshly introduced to the machinery of 
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imperialism and eager to consume its normative narratives. Elizabeth’s boredom thus 
results when she is denied the typical masculinist narratives of imperial heroism.
64
  
As Nalin Jayasena argues, Flory “realizes too well the role he is expected to 
play, but he fails to disavow this peculiarly imperial invention for fear of 
disappointing Elizabeth.”65 The discursive correlation between “Shooting an 
Elephant” and Burmese Days situates Elizabeth as well as the Burmese natives in 
similar planes as consumers of the white man’s machismo. Flory’s hesitation and 
private deconstruction of the ideology of imperialism characterise him in a similar 
manner as his reluctance to perform the normative imperial masculinity, and 
highlight his eventual failure to retain the prerogatives of his private self. Thus 
Flory’s betrayal of Veraswami emerges as discursively similar to his betrayal of his 
private conscience in favour of a forced appropriation of the ethic of heroic 
masculinity before Elizabeth. Flory’s attempts to appropriate stereotypical imperial 
masculinity results in a spectacular and pathetic failure as he embarks on tent-
pegging after Verrall in a bid to impress the approaching Elizabeth.   
Unsurprisingly, the libidinal and masculinist economy in the narrative of 
Burmese Days is reconfigured dramatically with the arrival of the military officer 
Verrall who with his “aura of horsemanship and soldiering” seduces Elizabeth 
immediately as the latter sees in Verrall “the splendid panache of a cavalryman’s 
life”(BD 214). As the narrative informs the reader, Flory is reduced in Elizabeth’s 
imagination at this point only to his birthmark and her bond with Verrall is 
exacerbated by their mutual hatred for highbrow culture. In effect, Verrall embodies 
in the novel the hard-core military masculinity that had emerged out of the Boy 
Scouts and public school and his extravagant callousness towards people as well as 
property is a complex combination of abstinence and indulgence. Seen in a more 
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 In her naive consumption of narratives of imperial heroism, Elizabeth may be compared with 
Kurtz’s Intended in Heart of Darkness who would only receive a report on Kurtz that is overly 
couched in romanticized masculine glory. Both Elizabeth and Kurtz’s Intended appear as perfect 
performers in the established economy of eulogy and morning in the imperialist narrative. Likewise, 
both Marlow and Flory appear as discomfited agents of imperialism who must forego their human 
ambivalence and agency and perpetuate the politics of pseudo-glory in the imperial space. The burden 
of masculinity experienced by Marlow and Flory thus appears as an overarching construct that 
consume their independent intentionality and free-will. In depicting the schism between the human 
subject and the imperial agent, Marlow and Flory depict the painful ambivalence that may never be 
respectfully articulated. This constriction of will and agency directly informs their public cynicism 
and moments of private hysteria.  
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epistemological light, Verrall embodied the stereotype of the sporting boy as extolled 
by the Empire Annual for Boys at the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, the first 
volume of the Empire Annual in 1909 contained a celebration of the sporting 
masculinity that was put in the same pedestal as nationalist triumph: 
 
The bond of sport is one of the strongest and most far-reaching in the British 
race. [. . . ] accepted as almost the hallmark of uprightness. ‘To play the 
game’ is constantly quoted as the supreme standard of excellence.66 
 
Crucially, Verrall’s brand of masculinity is characterised not just by the perfect 
nervous and muscular condition advocated by the boys’ manuals – “He exercised 
himself ceaselessly and brutally, rationed his drink and his cigarettes, slept on a 
camp bed (in silk pyjamas) and bathed in cold water in the bitterest winter” (BD 203) 
– but also by manipulative and excessive egotism: “Up and down India wherever he 
was stationed, he left behind him a trail of insulted people, neglected duties and 
unpaid bills” (BD 203).  
 
The perfect comfort and command that Verrall managed to achieve and enjoy 
in the colonial space is based on his perfect appropriation of the dominant and 
desirable code of imperial military masculinity, its associated heroism and non-
emotional constitution. In effect, Verrall embodies in Burmese Days the perfect 
clinical and almost automatically functioning body that Nussbaum studies as the 
desirable construct of imperial and xenophobic masculinity that saw fluidity and 
messy mutability of the body as filthy and subversive signifiers associated with 
women and racial ‘Others’.67 Verrall’s easy and almost constant disgust with all 
around him, including the other Europeans in the colony, stems from his knowledge 
of his own bodily and masculine superiority over others and differs discursively 
from the uneasy and self-loathing disgust that Flory carries within him with the 
existentialist knowledge of the horror and hollowness of the ideology he is forced to 
embody. Thus Verrall’s interest in Elizabeth is purely bodily and erotic without any 
personal emotional attachment: 
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 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, 111-12.  
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He had no intention of mixing himself up with all the petty sahiblog of the 
district. He knew the society of those small Burma stations—a nasty, poodle-
faking, horseless riffraff. He despised them. (BD 202) 
 
The politics of disgust that Flory and Verrall embody with their strands of 
masculinity differ dramatically and constitutionally and although Flory emerges as 
the real hero (he rescues the Europeans from the mob attack of the Burmese by 
swimming to the nearest police station whereas Verrall was nowhere to be seen) 
while Verrall simply the model of one, even Flory is intimidated in his anxiety to 
appropriate the model that Verrall so elegantly embodies with his showy 
horsemanship and military demeanour.  
 
In effect, Flory emerges as a pathetic mimic man trying to incorporate the 
hegemonic discourse of masculinity and it is here that Orwell’s novel becomes most 
political, in its depiction of the stratified realms of power and difference even within 
the seemingly homogenous hermeneutics of colonizers’ laws. Flory’s failure to be 
sufficiently masculine before Elizabeth thus emerges as pathetic as Veraswami’s 
inability to speak English except in stilted phrases and his ultimate failure in 
becoming a member of the Europeans’ Club in Kyauktada. The tension between 
Flory and Verrall around Elizabeth thus emerges as the dialectic between real human 
emotions and mimetic masculinity with the latter overshadowing and overwhelming 
the former in the discursive space of the imperial Europeans in Burma with its pre-
set codes of conduct. Flory’s life thus emerges as well as ends with his anxiety and 
inability to be sufficiently mimetic, what with his discomfited dislocation from the 
imperial ideology in the colonial contact-zone or with his attempted and failed 
representation of the model masculinity that would seduce Elizabeth. The failure to 
be appropriately and adequately mimetic is corroborated by political as well nervous 
conditions in a cultural climate where “When one does get credit in this life, it is 
usually for something that one has not done” (BD 85).  
 
Ironically as well as appropriately, what finishes Flory ultimately and makes 
him an immediate and permanent pariah in the colonizers’ community in Kyauktada 
is a mimetic act of hysteria that is strategically performed by his former Burmese 
mistress Ma Hla May. She makes a spectacle of Flory’s shame (as instructed by the 
Machiavellian gangster U Po Kyin who seeks to destroy Flory in order to destroy 
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Veraswami) during “the six-weekly church service [that] was the great social event 
of their [the Englishmen in Burma] lives” (BD 269). Barging into the service, Ma 
Hla May performs the spectacular and stereotypical act of female hysteria that is 
immediately intimidating yet credible in its disconcerting as well as familiar 
excesses, as she demands the money Flory had supposedly promised her for her 
sexual services:   
She was screaming like a maniac. The people gaped at her too astounded to 
move or speak. Her face was grey with powder, her greasy hair was tumbling 
down, her longyi was ragged at the bottom, she looked like a screaming hag 
of the bazaar. Flory’s bowels seemed to have turned to ice. [. . . ] The 
wretched woman was yelling out a detailed account of what Flory had done 
to her. (BD 273) 
 
The hysteric intrusion into the church service enacted by Ma Hla is as performative 
as the elegant mourning enacted by Kurtz’s innocent European fiancé in the 
domestic space in Heart of Darkness. Both episodes arrest the males – Marlow and 
Flory – in a state of real repression due to their inability to explicate or articulate 
agency in the rigid imperial narrative where masculinity is reified through structures 
of shame and glory. With her carefully engineered hysteric appearance – her 
powdered face and greased hair – and dramatic disruption of the sacred social space 
of the white colonizer, Ma Hla manages to induce the intended disgust and visceral 
shudder that shocks with its sudden violation of social normalcy.
68
  
 
The pseudo-hysteric mimetic act that is politically strategized as well as 
bodily performed emerges immediately as the obverse of the private unarticulated 
nervousness of Flory who sits “staring fixedly at the altar, his face so rigid and so 
bloodless that the birthmark seemed to glow upon it like a streak of blue paint” (BD 
274). The episode is significant in a number of aspects, apart from depicting the 
obvious dramatic contrast between sanctioned spectacular female hysteria and 
forbidden masculine nervousness, strategic mimesis and failed appropriation. On a 
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Nanda, Neither Man nor Woman, 4-5.  
 196 
 
more discursive level, the episode also dramatizes the blurring borderlines between 
the notionally powerful and powerless in Burmese Days. Thus the scheming 
Burmese gangster U Po Kyin wields absolute control by pitting the doubly 
marginalized Burmese woman against the British imperial officer in a deliberate 
drama of disgust that can transcend the codes of notional imperial hierarchy. The 
episode also highlights the difference in mimetic performances that characterises 
Flory and Ma Hla, between the latter’s successful appropriation of spectacular 
feminine hysteria and the former’s failed mimesis of the white man’s masculinity in 
the colonies. Crucially, what emasculates Flory socially and casts him out of the 
white community in Kyauktada is not the illegality of his action but the disgust born 
of it, a disgust that is operative outside the notional parameters of imperial law. This 
disgust is focalized through the physiognomy of Flory that appears in the eyes of 
Elizabeth as an objective correlative of ugliness: 
 
She had not understood a word of what Ma Hla was saying, but the meaning 
of the scene was perfectly clear. The thought that he had been the lover of 
that grey-faced, maniacal creature made her shudder in her bones. But worse 
than that, worse than anything was his ugliness at this moment. His face 
appalled her, it was so ghastly, rigid and old. It was like a skull. Only the 
birthmark seemed alive in it. She hated him now for his birthmark. She had 
never known till this moment how dishonouring, how unforgivable a thing it 
was. (BD 274) 
 
The vocabulary of hysteria that Ma Hla performs through her body requires 
no narrative in the form of understandable language to signify the scandal it seeks to 
communicate. The signifiers through which Flory’s ugliness travel to Elizabeth are 
his skull and his birthmark, both carrying pseudo-scientific suggestions of 
degeneration and disgust in the imperial European imagination in early twentieth 
century. The animated birthmark flickers with Flory’s shame and disfigures him 
permanently in Elizabeth’s eyes after Ma Hla’s hysteric act. The theme of genetic 
determination is returned to here and as the narrative informs the reader, “It was, 
finally, the birthmark that had damned him” (BD 278).   
 
The mark that had informed Flory’s inferiority complex all his life suddenly 
and permanently deforms and decimates him as he realizes the impossibility of 
attaining the mythical piano in his imagined landscape of an ideal future.  The final 
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moment of rupture is narrated in a vocabulary that is symbolic in a high-Modernist 
manner: 
Like a hallucination, painfully clear, he saw again their home as he had 
imagined it, he saw their garden, and Elizabeth feeding Nero and the pigeons 
on the drive [. . .] and the bookshelves, and the black piano. The impossible, 
mythical piano—symbol of everything that that futile accident had wrecked! 
“You should have a piano,” he said despairingly. 
“I don’t play the piano.” 
He let her go. It was no use continuing. (BD 278) 
 
 The mythical piano in Flory’s oneiric landscape beams up as a final reminder of his 
hopeless vision and its destruction.
69
 As the narrative hurries towards closure with 
Flory’s suicide and Elizabeth’s consolidated conversion into being a burra 
memsahib (dominating and intimidating white woman) through her marriage to Mr. 
Macgregor, Burmese Days reveals the rewards of adherence to the imperial code of 
the white man in the colonies and the retribution for deviance from the same. Flory’s 
death is as un-heroic as his life had been and he perpetuates his failure to inscribe 
himself into the masculinist discourse through his suicide. The marker of shame that 
had characterised Flory disappears with his death – “With death, the birthmark had 
faded immediately, so that it was no more than a faint grey stain”(BD 282) – and his 
posthumous ignominy is partially resisted by the doctor Veraswami who spuriously 
certifies that Flory had died accidentally while cleaning his revolver.  
 
While Marlowe’s spurious report of Kurtz’s death in Heart of Darkness 
retains him as a romantic masculinist hero in the European imagination within the 
European space, Flory’s death is too direct not to be derided in the real colonial 
contact-zone where imperialism as a masculinist misadventure emerges as “not a 
pretty thing when you look into it too much” (HD 10). Thus his failure to mime the 
desirable discourse of masculinity haunts Flory even after his death as he is reduced 
to a local legend and a signifier of shame, a “dark chap with a birthmark” a “bloody 
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fool” who shot himself in Kyauktada in 1926 over a girl” (BD 283). Although his 
physical birthmark had disappeared with his bodily death, Flory’s shame continues 
to circulate among the Anglo-Indians and colonial officers in Burma in their drunken 
discourses in homosocial spaces. Orwell’s Burmese Days is a novel, like Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness, about the contingencies of power, performance and privilege that 
characterise as well as problematize the self in the colonial contact-zone, the political 
space where the machinery of imperialism operates with perfectly reducible and 
replaceable human beings. If Kurtz in Heart of Darkness becomes a threat to the 
machinery of imperialism due to his over-identification with the imperial economy 
of power and privilege, Flory in Burmese Days dramatizes the discomfort due to his 
insufficient-identification with the same system. More significantly, like Heart of 
Darkness, Orwell’s narrative is about the nervousness at the heart of the empire and 
the dialectic between private hesitation and public performance within the 
epistemological frame of existentialist awakening.  
 
As the background to this chapter sought to illustrate, masculinity as a 
construct of nerves and narratives emerged less as a homogenous structure of 
suppositions and more “as a historical phenomenon that responded to the economic, 
political, and cultural shifts in the imperial social formation in the late nineteenth 
century.”70 Although ostensibly less medical than Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and 
Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, texts that carry direct bearings with the bio-politics of their 
day, Burmese Days exhibits medico-cultural myths on degeneration, criminology 
and inferiority in a more racialized space of epistemic exchange, despite its flawed 
narrative space where the subaltern never speaks except as a stereotype. Thus Elleke 
Boehmer argues: 
Burmese Days is distinguished from earlier colonial writing by its 
knowingness—its anti-adventure cynicism, its penetrating insights into the 
less than honourable mechanisms of empire. Flory the anti-hero, the little 
man of modernism transplanted to the colonial town, bears the painful self-
consciousness of one aware of imperial wrong-doing yet impotent against 
it.
71
  
The knowledge of ambivalence that Flory carries without articulation marks him as a 
uniquely dislocated figure who informs the narrative about nervous conditions in the 
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imperialist space. More significantly, ironically located in a notional position of 
power, Flory illustrates with his failure the curious and complex convergence of 
structured forms of privilege – medical, cultural and political – and their strategic 
politics of presuppositions. Like Septimus Smith in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway, Flory’s 
suicide emerges not so much as an act of escape as one of the ultimate assertion of 
the self’s impotence under a hegemonic gaze characterized by compulsive 
classification, love of proportions and strategic shaming.  
 The materialist medical science that dislocates Septimus and the political 
ideology that ostracizes Flory are both characterized by crude classifications that 
allow no ambivalence to the agency of the human self, in a culture that demands 
compulsive performances in power. More tragically, both figures are characterised 
by an inability to narrativize their lack and anxiety before their immediate audience, 
a condition that exacerbates the loneliness of their trauma and pushes them to 
becoming “a social pariah of the worst kind: malingerer, liar or lunatic.”72 
Embodying models of fallen and shameful masculinities through their inadequate 
idioms before the dominant masculinist gaze that is as medicalized as politicized, 
both Septimus and Flory come to embody the ambivalence that makes them un-
accommodated outsiders to their contemporary structures of privilege. It is precisely 
through this ambivalence that they arrive at the awakened agency – with its 
existentialist and phenomenological insights – that informs the complex human self 
not reducible to the bio-political definitions of the day.  
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 200 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“Sixteen bacon slices through Baxter’s brain”: Bio-politics, 
Masculinity and the Epistemology of Identity in Ian McEwan’s 
Saturday 
 
 
5.1 Introducing the Chapter  
 
 
Man hands on misery to man 
It deepens like a coastal shelf 
Philip Larkin
1
  
 
 
The final section of this thesis will explore how medical science and metropolitan 
identities in the twenty-first century are revisited with renewed interest in the 
phenomenological description of an existentialist experience. It also looks at the 
interfaces where personal and literary narratives are investigated through a 
hermeneutic turn. It foregrounds questions on empathy and emotional response in the 
face of ultra-Darwinism and genetic determinism that operate on similar principles 
of selection and certainty as that of dominant rational ideologies about identity in 
Western liberal political systems. The bio-political dogma at work in the twenty-first 
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 Philip Larkin, “This be the Verse”, Collected Poems, ed. Anthony Thwaite (London: The Marvell 
Press, 1988) 180. It is interesting to note that McEwan classifies Larkin as the atheist poet who “also 
knew the moment and the nature of transcendence”. Ian McEwan, “End of the World Blues”, The 
Portable Atheist: Essential Readings for the Non-Believer, ed. Christopher Hitchens (London: Da 
Capo Press, 2007) 363. Larkin represents for McEwan the combination of atheism and transcendence 
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combination of the rational and the phenomenological frames.    
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century often constitutes a hyperlogical ideology masquerading as liberalism that 
effaces crucial questions on multiplicity and difference in its promotion of (largely 
capitalist) notions of progress and rationality.
2
  
In a culture of surveillance and bio-political determinism, the resistance that 
the literary narrative can uniquely offer is through its depiction of the 
phenomenological frame that can extend into philosophical knowledge and 
existentialist experience. Such experience highlights the difference between the 
mappable brain and the unmappable mind, between ossified ontology and an 
ambivalent epistemology that is eventually enriched by the self-reflective knowledge 
of its uncertainty. These issues are especially pertinent in the backdrop of recent 
works on cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Also pertinent to such analysis 
are the medical discourses which have produced ambivalent reactions but also 
challenges for a more phenomenological as well as cognitively grounded approach to 
subjective experience in more ‘distributed’ models of understanding of mind and 
brain relations.
3
 These debates are often refracted in the literary narrative about the 
human mind and its unique agency in relation to the cognitive machine infused with 
hard-wired artificial intelligence.
4
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 Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and Leon J. Kamin, Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and 
Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 1984) 8. In this work, the authors argue that the data-centric 
model of modern genetic theory (especially as propounded by Richard Dawkins and E.O.Wilson) 
with its discourse of determinism lends itself easily to other reductionist realms as “Cost benefit 
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3
 Andy Clark, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing 
(Cambridge, MA & London: The MIT Press, 1990). In this work, Clark argues that the spaces 
between the neural connections (Clark compares the synapses with the spaces between music notes) 
hold the key to the understanding of a distributed model of the human mind that sees the human 
thought process as a complex combination of interrelated levels and networks that are mutually 
dependent. In a related work, Clark emphasizes the importance of an integrated model of perception, 
cognition and action, breaking away from the classical distinctions between the modes and describes 
the brain “as an organ of environmentally situated control.” Andy Clark, Mindware: An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 95.    
 
4
 Crucially, literary theorists and novelists such as David Lodge make a strong case for literature and 
the literary narrative to be capable of communicating the qualia, the contingent quotient of the human 
consciousness, more so than any empirically established scientific machine with its coded 
programmes can. Lodge’s own novel Thinks (2001) with its contest between artificial intelligence and 
the human mind, provides a classic case in point of medical science’s arrogant attempt at quantifying 
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This chapter explores the mapping of identities in relation to this turn, 
examining the new psychosocial and medical categories as well as the ambivalences 
in brain sciences. Such ambivalences emerge in relation to a late modern condition 
where liberal politics and the ontology of Western middle-class privilege are almost 
always enmeshed with the cultural logic of late capitalism. Looking at the way the 
tenets of ultra-Darwinism conveniently merge with the war against terrorism and 
how both ultimately uphold the primacy of the status quo, this analysis will explore 
how the bio-political gaze – with its discourse of determinism – is operative across 
the fictional space of the literary novel about an ideological condition where “we 
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom” and phrases such as “‘war on 
terrorism’, ‘democracy and freedom’, ‘human rights’ and so on — are false alarms, 
mystifying our perception of the situation instead of allowing us to think it.”5 In 
tracing the way what may be defined as Neo-Darwinist medicine
6
 (with its easy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
consciousness through a specially simulated machine and the failure it faces at the moment of pure 
perception. Thinks is a narrative about the unique significance of literary narrative itself in describing 
how the human mind perceives and is located at an epistemic excess in relation to the hard-wired 
intelligence. The novel emerges as an exploration of the sensory space that appears to reside at “the 
interface between the virtual machine and the real physical flesh-and-blood machine of the body.” 
David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, 290-91. For a scientific analysis of the content and 
characteristics of the qualia, see Clotilde Calabi, “Emotional Qualia”, Emotions, Qualia, and 
Consciousness, ed. Alfred Kaszniak (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2001) 75-83.  
 
5
 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, 2. Žižek’s contention of the absence of the 
possibility of protest in an apparently benevolent liberal capitalism takes up medical premises in his 
reading of an age heralding “post-political bio-politics.” Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections (London: Profile Books, 2008) 34.  In similar vein, post-9/11 terror for Derrida is an 
enigmatic epistemology that blurs borderlines between liberation movements and attack. See 
Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) 152-53.  
 
6
 Neo-Darwinism is a term commonly used to describe the medical culture that advocates a synthesis 
of Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. First coined by George Romans in 1895, Neo-
Darwinism as a term was originally less connected to the tenets of original Darwinism than to the 
Panselectionist School upheld by Alfred Wallace and August Weisman. Neo-Darwinism rules out the 
Lamarckian idea of soft inheritance (explained in the first chapter on degeneration) that Darwin 
himself had not absolutely rejected and instead proposes a pure randomness of selection that 
highlights the necessity for selfishness. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) 210-20. This term is used in this chapter to refer 
primarily to the zoological and genetic theories of evolution and selection propounded by Richard 
Dawkins whose works – especially The Selfish Gene (1976) and The Blind Watchmaker (1986) – will 
be referred to frequently. Dawkins’s notion of the primacy of the DNA and its innate informative 
quality is coupled with the belief that genes are survival machines gifted with the ability to replicate 
their codes through extended phenotypes. Such ideas are supported by popular science journalists 
such as Matt Ridley who emphasize the “inevitable, algorithmic certainty that genes which cause 
behaviour that enhances the survival of such genes must thrive at the expense of genes that do not.” 
Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (London: Penguin Books, 1997) 18.  This chapter will argue how the 
arrogance in such scientific certainty can be resisted through a phenomenological experience and how 
the literary narrative is uniquely suited – in its self-reflective and meta-fictional use of language – to 
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alliances with the political tenets of Neo-Conservatism) becomes a vehicle for what 
Foucault had classified as “that technical world that is the armed, positive, full form 
of his [man’s] finitude”7, this chapter will also investigate the manner in which the 
finitude of the bio-political realm is interrogated by the non-quantifiable quality of 
the phenomenological agency and its unique intentionality. Taking up the ways in 
which medicine and illness are subjectivized as well as narrativized in the literary 
novel, the study will explore the complex combinations of cognition, empathy and 
affect, while also studying how those operate along the broader narratives of 
masculinity, medical science and terror. The analysis in this chapter seeks to confirm 
the argument that “non-neural factors have an effect on neural factors, and vice-
versa, since the system in question is brain-body-environment and is organized 
dynamically across time.”8   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
enact, embody and extend the convergence of cognitive science, phenomenology and an existentialist 
awakening.  
7
 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, 198.  
8
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5.2 Consciousness, Medical Science and the Literary Narrative in Saturday  
 
Commonly classified as a “neuro-novel”9, McEwan’s Saturday (2005) is a narrative 
that takes as its central theme the ambivalence that the normative medical gaze 
learns through its existentialist enquiry about how matter becomes conscious. 
Saturday, set in post-9/11 attack and pre-Iraq invasion, is a complex literary text 
which examines current ambivalent attitudes in medical science, masculinity and the 
politics of affect and affective identities. A novel “about prejudice, misunderstanding 
and over-interpretation in an increasingly paranoid London,”10 McEwan’s Saturday 
depicts the dual potential of a work of literature to comment profoundly on the 
political condition of its times as well as to probe deep into a more holistic idea of 
human consciousness. The narrative does these by exploring issues around the 
epistemology of emotion, empathy and affect. It juxtaposes historical and 
intertextual axes
11
 along which various models of knowledge are reified, refuted and 
embodied through narratives of conflict, confrontation and cognition.  
The role of medicine in constructing the social subject has a long established 
history. Medical anthropology, in particular, has focussed on the ontology of medical 
science as it has been appropriated by the status quo in informing as well as effacing 
politically motivated discourses on subject formation and coercion.
12
 However, what 
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politics as embedded in everyday culture, one could look at the manner in which medical science was 
appropriated as an excuse for eugenics and racial hygiene, most immediately exemplified during the 
rise of Fascism and Nazism and continued with convenient classifications during colonial conquests 
and control. See John M. Efron, Medicine and the German Jews: A History (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press, 2001), Michael Taussig, The Nervous System (New York & London: 
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is often under-studied in these researches is the manner in which medicine can also 
be gainfully looked at not just in terms of a ‘gaze’ but also as “a medium of 
[phenomenological] experience, a mode of engagement with the world [. . .] [as] a 
dialogical medium, one of encounter, interpretation, conflict, and at times 
transformation.”13 In focalizing its narrative through the middle-class Western-
liberal neurosurgeon Henry Perowne – as he moves from the logical certainties in 
correspondence to his liberal middle-class bio-political privilege to an 
epistemological ambivalence – McEwan’s Saturday extends that tradition of literary 
narrative that seeks to see the human mind in all its cognitive uncertainties and 
indeterminacies. It ends with the existentialist insight into ambivalence and the 
phenomenological epiphany that the only certainty is that of the affective now, which 
is the unique privilege of the self-reflective mind. Saturday does this directly by 
bringing medical science in proximity to the affective power of poetry, at a time of 
ideological indecision in the political scene.
14
  
McEwan’s narrative, which is pitched at a time of political confusion and 
disturbed identity, also explores the problem of how we locate agency, intentionality 
and free will as those emerge at the interfaces of consciousness, political 
presuppositions and the philosophy of biology. Saturday does this through 
orchestrating a convergence of narratives drawn from phenomenology and 
neuroscience. Thus the question regarding what constitutes consciousness emerges in 
McEwan’s novel against a backdrop of a medical narrative that is informed and 
further ironized by its political setting where “consumers of violence as spectacle, 
adepts of proximity without risks, are schooled to be cynical about the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Routledge, 1992). For a direct depiction of how medicine and medical politics were strategically and 
discursively dialogic with the politics of coercion and classification during colonial eras, see David 
Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and Jock McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the 
African mind’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
 
13
 Byron J. Good, Medicine, rationality, and experience: An anthropological perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 86.  
 
14
 The bridge between the literary and the medical is powerfully voiced in McEwan’s Atonement as 
well where Robbie Turner who studies literature before deciding to take up a career in medicine 
acknowledges the privileged position that can be arrived at through a meeting of medical science and 
the literary narrative. Thus Robbie acknowledges that “Birth, death and frailty in between. Rise and 
fall—this was the doctor’s business, and it was literature’s too.” Ian McEwan, Atonement (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2001) 93. 
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sincerity.”15 McEwan’s personal view on the value of poetry and its potential 
influence on science are perhaps best stated in his direct reference to the tenet of 
natural selection that becomes an extended metaphor for scientific certainty:  
Scientific method, scepticism, or rationality in general, has yet to find an 
overarching narrative of sufficient power, simplicity, and wide appeal to 
compete with the old stories that give meaning to people’s lives. Natural 
selection is a powerful, elegant and economic explicator of life on earth in all 
its diversity, and perhaps it contains the seeds of a rival creation myth that 
would have the added power of being true – but it awaits its inspired 
synthesiser, its poet, its Milton.
16
 
In acknowledging the elegance of natural selection, McEwan also emphasizes the 
vital value of the phenomenological frame that is perhaps best voiced in poetry. 
Essentially a novel about the changing human mind, Saturday enacts the move from 
the arrogance of rational scientific certainty
17
 to an affective oriented epistemology 
grounded in the recognition of uncertainty and indeterminacy, where wonder at the 
magnificence of the human mind displaces medical knowledge about the function of 
the brain.
18
 The narrative negotiates between different orders of signification – 
medical, social and political – through the presentation of its protagonist’s attempt to 
arrive at an epistemic reconciliation of the various systems of knowledge. Such 
narrative negotiations offer rich analysis of the self that seeks to bridge scientific and 
philosophical modes of response and interpretation, supporting David Lodge’s view 
                                                          
15
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin Books, 2003) 99.  
16
 McEwan, “End of the World Blues”, 360. 
  
17
 This is evinced in Saturday in Henry Perowne’s assertion of the knowledge of neural nets in the 
hard-wired brain as interchangeable with concepts of mind. The Neo-Darwinist narrative of evolution 
and human system negates any agency in its absolute belief in the system of random selection. 
 
18
 The Neo-Darwinism upheld by the neurosurgeon Perowne as a commonplace in modern medical 
science, is increasingly interrogated by his encounter with the epiphanic experience which seems to 
curiously correspond to the medical notion of epigenetics that sees the relationship between DNA, 
RNA and protein as more dialogic than one-dimensional, as upheld by the proponents of genetic 
determinism. Instead of looking at the human genetic structure as essentially pre-programmed by the 
DNA (which operates by pure random chance and selection), epigenetics corresponds the 
philosopher’s position in biology that gains the knowledge of indeterminacy (one with which 
Perowne ends in McEwan’s Saturday) in the face of “epistemological or methodological pluralism” 
that demonstrates “that there is no unique method for investigating all the many different things there 
are in the world.” John Dupré, Processes of Life: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 5. 
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of the literary novel as “man’s most successful effort to describe the experience of 
individual human beings moving through space and time.”19 
 The protagonist of Saturday is the neurosurgeon Henry Perowne – a man 
who repairs brains and is thus ceaselessly attached to the material world – an 
unreliable observer who believes “that the supernatural was the recourse of an 
insufficient imagination, a dereliction of duty”20 and thus decries magic realism in 
literature as kitsch. McEwan’s novel emerges as a satire of some versions of Neo-
Darwinism and neural determinism that suggest that “we are born selfish,”21 that 
generosity and altruism must be learned through effort to go against the natural 
genetic propensities and that the mind “is packed with high-tech systems each 
contrived to overcome its own obstacles.”22 Instead, what is offered in Saturday is 
the interchange between phenomenology and neuroscience that articulates an 
existentialist ambivalence about the claims and possibilities of scientific knowledge. 
McEwan’s story depicts the slippery mutability of fact and fiction, knowledge and 
faith, and curiously connects personal and political narratives of conflict and 
cognition.  
                                                          
19
 David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, 10.  
 
20
 McEwan, Saturday (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005) 67. Further references to this work will be 
made parenthetically as SD.   
 
21
 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 3. 
Dawkins’s notion of genetic determinism has come under critique from various biologist and medical 
philosophers. Denis Noble, among others, sees Dawkins’s selfish gene more as a metaphor than an 
empirical hypothesis. Taking a stance that is more in correspondence with the contingency principle 
of epigenetics than the deterministic principle of Neo-Darwinist medicine, Noble affirms that the 
DNA determinism is erroneous precisely because genes are functionally informed by the RNA and 
protein and not by the DNA alone. Together the RNA, the DNA and protein constitute what Noble 
classifies as the semantic system within which the DNA code operates like a word. See Noble, The 
Music of Life: Biology Beyond Genes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 17-22. Likewise, 
evolutionary biologists have also criticised the genic selectionism proposed by George Williams and 
Dawkins for its effacement of environmental influences and external changes upon the organism. The 
context-dependent nature of the relationship between genotype and phenotypes is highlighted by these 
thinkers as opposed to the deterministic principle proffered by the Neo-Darwinists. See Marjorie 
Grene and David Depew, The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 247-89.  Dawkins’s view of the non-natural quality of altruism has also 
attracted critique from philosophers such as Thomas Nagel who had contended instead that there can 
be such a thing as pure altruism that is rational as well as intuitive inasmuch as it operates on the 
principle of “direct influence of one person’s interest on the actions of another, simply because in 
itself the interest of the former provides the latter with a reason to act.” Nagel, The Possibility of 
Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) 80. Nagel’s theory throws interesting light on the nature of 
empathy that will be taken up later in this chapter.     
 
22
 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (London: Penguin Books, 1998) 4.  
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With its focalized narrative that is both unreliable and self-reflexive, 
Saturday constitutes a “postmodern work of realist fiction that, focalized through an 
intelligent though at times obtuse character, is concerned with depicting how an 
embodied, socially embedded, story-loving consciousness shapes everyday human 
acts of perception.”23 In looking at the way in which medical science can un-learn its 
privileged knowledge and instead look at the phenomenological space as the site of 
intentionality that is informed by experiential feelings,
24
 Saturday investigates the 
interfaces between physical world and the phenomenological frame, between the 
analytical and the existentialist realms, at a political moment of ideological 
indecision. More significantly, and at a more intertextual level, such an investigation 
locates McEwan in line with the tradition of Modernist writing he so conspicuously 
alludes to thematically as well as stylistically, in his role as “the one contemporary 
literary writer who has most extensively and directly engaged with cognitive 
neuroscience [and] has also tended to perpetuate the myth of the modernist ‘inward 
turn’.”25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Jane F. Thrailkill, “Ian McEwan’s Neurological Novel”, Poetics Today 32.1 (Spring 2011): 171-
210; 176. I owe this reference to Dr Marco Bernini.  
24
 Matthew Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 30-31.  
25
 Patricia Waugh, “Thinking in Literature: Modernism and Contemporary Neuroscience”, The 
Legacies of Modernism: Historicizing Postwar and Contemporary Fiction, ed. David James 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 78.  
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5.3 Saturday and the Irony of Information 
 
Appropriating the high-Modernist architectonics of the one-day structure, McEwan’s 
Saturday incorporates within it several frames of reference and narrative voices. The 
extra-diegetic gaze of the narrator ironically presents the unreliable intra-diegetic 
gaze of Perowne. This narrative frame upholds the ambivalence of Perowne who 
moves from his status as a sure scientist to a more ambivalent location that ironically 
informs the understanding of self-reflective consciousness and agency. This allows 
the narrative overall to synthesize a new position combining phenomenology with 
cognitive science, a possibility only hinted at the end of Saturday rather than 
straightforwardly articulated. The resemblance with earlier Modernist texts is further 
extended by the phenomenological frame that problematizes the politics of 
knowledge whereby characters awaken to the inadequacies of informative and 
cognitive control.
26
 Like the unnamed “boss” in Mansfield’s “The Fly” who begins 
with his firm and robust location in the normative masculinist narrative of health and 
social success and is then increasingly cut down into a pathetic figure who awakens 
to the knowledge of his lack and loss, Perowne in McEwan’s Saturday starts as a 
medical scientist at the peak of his health and career and ends with the 
uncomfortable awareness of the uncertainties of the medical narrative in the face of 
the sheer unmappability of the phenomenological experience of being human. This 
transformation has its immediate political correlates and is achieved through a 
subversively ironic mode that is sustained throughout the course of the narrative, 
from Perowne’s euphoric illusion on seeing the metropolis as a grand success and a 
biological masterpiece, to his final awareness that London is, like Baghdad, a city 
waiting for its bombs.  
 At the diegetic level Saturday carries parallels with Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness which too rehearses questions concerning the poverty and inadequacies of 
logic to know the ‘other’ and is similarly framed by multiple levels of gaze: from 
                                                          
26
 Saturday makes explicit references to Joyce’s “The Dead”, a story which, like Mansfield’s “The 
Fly”, engages with the epistemology of nervous knowledge that emerges as apart from immediate 
information and where the phenomenological moment is subversive inasmuch as it destroys the 
comfort of certainty. Like Gabriel in “The Dead”, Perowne in Saturday starts as a robust social 
success and ends as an awakened character pathetically framed in the irony of his own knowledge of 
lack.   
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that of the unreliable intra-diegetic protagonist to that of the extra-diegetic observer. 
Like Heart of Darkness, Saturday reflects on a political moment where a new 
dominant power seeks to justify its neo-imperial invasions by alluding to 
humanitarian ideas and ideals. Like Conrad’s novella, McEwan’s novel is about the 
cracking up of the ostensible certainties of medical and political science and the 
“loss of narratorial authority undermines any comfortable or simple reading of the 
novel, while capturing the post-9/11 climate if anxiety.”27 As in Heart of Darkness, 
Saturday constitutes the politics of decoding signs through a mode that combines 
collective panic and private hysteria. However, unlike Heart of Darkness where the 
protagonist’s decoding of a shower of arrows occurs through a delay due to the 
dislocation from the normative cognitive culture, Saturday shows such culture itself 
as a traumatophilic condition informed and endorsed by popular media. Such 
condition is a compound of the political and the medical conditions of an age that 
consumes trauma through televised screens where the deluge of images of horror 
paradoxically numbs the necessity to react.
28
  
The unreliability of Perowne’s cognitive framing of events is juxtaposed 
consistently and ironically with the supposed certainty of his medical knowledge and 
social success. Perowne’s god-like gaze on the city as a massive “success, a brilliant 
invention, a biological masterpiece” (SD 5) is almost immediately undermined by his 
mistaken perception of threat. Crucially, the novel opens with Perowne’s Western-
liberal, middle-class and hysterical assumption that the sign of a burning cargo plane 
in the sky is a sign of a terrorist event. Perowne’s assumptions are positioned, post-
9/11:  
It’s already almost eighteen months since half the planet watched, and 
watched again the unseen captives driven through the sky to the slaughter, at 
which time there gathered round the innocent silhouette of any jet plane a 
                                                          
27
 Sebastian Groes, “Ian McEwan and the Modernist Consciousness of the City in Saturday”, Ian 
McEwan: Contemporary Critical Perspectives (London: Continuum, 2009) 104. 
  
28
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 96. It is interesting at this point to read Stephen 
Kern’s historical analysis of the first global catastrophe that was disseminated across the planet with 
live messages, the sinking of the Titanic on 15 April 1912, an event that can be considered as the first 
example of collective consumerist traumatophilia that proceeded with a combination of hysteria and 
sensation as the live updates of the sinking ship was beamed across the Atlantic world with SOS 
messages.  See Kern, The Culture of Time and Place 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003) 314.  
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novel association. Everyone agrees, airliners look different in the sky these 
days, predatory or doomed. (SD 16) 
 
The narrative’s description of the spectacle of terrorism as a consumerist package 
seen repeatedly corresponds closely to Žižek’s analysis of watching the September 
11 attacks as a voyeuristic experience that uncannily and unashamedly appropriates 
the grammar of the postmodern reality TV show operating purely on its selective 
concealment of hyper-reality. Thus Žižek affirms: 
 
When, days after September 11 2001, our gaze was transfixed by the images 
of the plane hitting one of the WTC towers, we were all forced to experience 
what the ‘compulsion to repeat’ and jouissance beyond the pleasure principle 
are: we wanted to see it again and again; the same shots were repeated ad 
nauseam, and the uncanny satisfaction we got from it was jouissance at its 
purest.
29
 
 
The consumption of the spectacle of trauma as commodity creates a cognitive culture 
which operates by association and ascription, whereby the ‘Other’ is focalized 
through fear as well as reified through repetitions. Saturday depicts this cognitive 
principle at work, as the neurosurgeon who decodes the degenerative disease by 
analysing “a muscular restlessness that will one day [. . .] become athetoid, plagued 
by involuntary, uncontrollable movements” (SD 93) makes a mistaken analysis of 
the spectacle in the sky whereby he decodes the sign of the burning cargo plane 
heading towards Heathrow as a terrorist attack. Perowne’s middle-class liberal 
assumptions are in close correspondence to his medical discourse of determinism 
and both are interrogated and rendered inadequate in the course of the novel. Thus 
the burning aeroplane eventually becomes an innocuous accident, despite the alleged 
presence of a copy of the Koran in the cockpit and the neural determinism read by 
Perowne as the inevitable degenerative fate of Baxter is resisted in his implicit claim 
                                                          
29
 Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, 11-12. In her analysis of the images of human beings 
falling from the North Tower of the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001, Susan Lurie studies 
how the ontology of horror shifts from the anonymous victim to that of the spectator who turns to the 
shuddered consumer in “the trauma of spectatorship.” Lurie, “Falling Persons and National 
Embodiment: The Reconstruction of Safe Spectatorship in the Photographic Record of 9/11”, Terror, 
Culture, Politics: Rethinking 9/11, ed. Daniel J. Sherman and Terry Nardin (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006) 46.  
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to life in responding to Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach”, a poem about human and 
cultural uncertainty occupying the original Darwinian threshold-moment of 
liminality and doubt.
30
  
In Saturday the bio-political gaze of optimization and mappable meanings is 
eventually undermined through the subtle counter-narrative of phenomenological 
experience that extends into an existentialist awakening. The opening of McEwan’s 
novel depicts the medical gaze assured of its scientific certainties, embodied most 
immediately by the protagonist Henry Perowne. Thus, Jane Macnaughton argues: 
When we follow Henry Perowne into his workplace, and especially into the 
operating theatre, it seems that we are no longer viewing the world through 
his eyes, but through the eyes of the admiring bystander. The descriptions of 
the operations undertaken are textbook: nothing ever goes wrong, medicine is 
like magic, wonderful and strange.
31
  
 
The fatality of the neurodegenerative condition in the novel – the Huntington’s 
disease that consumes Baxter in the medical eyes of Perowne – is spelt out by the 
rhetoric of neuroscience in all its deterministic logic. Thus Perowne’s thinking voice 
informs the reader:  
The truth, now demonstrated, is that Baxter is a special case – a man who 
believes he has no future and is therefore free of consequences. And that’s 
simply the frame. [. . .] It is written. No amount of love, drugs, Bible classes 
or prison sentencing can cure Baxter or shift him from his course. It’s spelled 
out in fragile proteins, but could be carved in stone, or tempered steel. (SD 
210) 
 
The medical information about the fatal genetic coding that Baxter contains is 
ironically described with metaphors and similes that accord with current theories in 
medical humanities that medicine itself is “infused with metaphor and codes” that 
                                                          
30
 For Arnold’s problematic location as an intellectual and poet in an age of Darwinism, see Joseph 
Carroll, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature and Literature (New York: Routledge, 2004) 
3-14.  
 
31
 Macnaughton, “Literature and the ‘good doctor’ in Ian McEwan’s Saturday”, Journal of Medical 
Ethics: Medical Humanities 33 (2007): 70-74; 72.  
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are structurally similar to the grammar of poetry itself.
32
 The inscription of 
degeneration appears through a genetic alphabetism that Perowne decodes 
immediately and unequivocally through his neuro-scientific gaze. It may be viewed 
as analogous to the Neo-Darwinist notion that “what lies at the heart of every living 
being is not fire, not a warm breath, not a spark of life. It is information, words, 
instructions.”33 However, the complexity of McEwan’s novel lies in the manner in 
which ‘information’ – that DNA code of classic genetics – is ironized through a 
phenomenological process that offers a richer culture of cognition than that of any 
scientifically systematized bio-political gaze. The epistemic emphasis is thus shifted 
from one of scientific or genetic determinism to one of a phenomenologically 
complex affective-cognitive enactment of agency and intentionality. Crucially, the 
genetically degenerate Baxter recognizes something in a nineteenth-century lyric that 
the scientifically trained Perowne cannot, for all his knowledge of the genetic codes 
that determine neural character and behaviour.  
The triumph of Saturday lies precisely in the admission and articulation of 
ambivalence by Perowne “the professional reductionist [who] can’t help thinking it’s 
down to invisible folds and kinks of character, written in code, at the level of 
molecules” (SD 272).  The genetic alphabetism that Perowne initially subscribes to 
in Saturday corresponds to the Neo-Darwinist idea of the extended phenotype of 
“replicating molecules ganged up in cells [. . .] competing with each other for space 
and for the chemical resources needed to build copies of themselves”.34 Perowne’s 
notion that “There is much in human affairs that can be accounted for at the level of 
the complex molecule” (SD 91) also appears analogous to Dawkins’ statement that 
“DNA is ROM. It can be read millions of times over, but only written to once – 
                                                          
32
 Dr Sam Guglani, Poet in the City, http://vimeo.com/60546826. Web.  4
 
March, 2013.  In 
conversation with the poet Jo Shapcott, the oncologist Guglani, (who also is the curator of Medicine 
Unboxed, an NHS initiative in England supported by the Welcome Trust) agrees that poetry allows a 
privileged access into the human mind and gives a truer picture of human emotions and thought 
processes than MRI scans do. In a similar vein, the medical anthropologist Byron J. Good contends 
that “the language of medicine is hardly a simple mirror of the empirical world. It is a rich cultural 
language, linked to a highly specialized version of reality and system of social relations, and when 
employed in medical care, it joins deep moral concerns with its more obvious technical functions.” 
Medicine, Rationality and Experience, 5.  
 
33
 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) 112.  
 
34
 Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as a Unit of Selection (Oxford: 
W.H.Freeman and Company, 1982) 252.   
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when it is first assembled at the birth of the cell in which it resides.”35 However, as 
Patricia Waugh argues, Dawkins’ idea of the self as a combination of endlessly self-
enhancing genes that can be “endlessly written, reprogrammable, downloaded, 
deferred, reiterated and decentred” also contains “the substantial characteristics, plot 
function and unique point of view of a character in a fast-paced novel.”36 The Neo-
Darwinism that Perowne subscribes to is described in all its determinism: 
It’s a commonplace of parenting and modern genetics that parents have little 
or no influence on the characters of their children. You never know what you 
are going to get. [. . .] what really determines the sort of person who’s 
coming to live with you is which sperm finds which egg, how the cards are 
shuffled, halved and spliced at the moment of recombination. (SD 25) 
 
Perowne thus first appears in the novel assuming the Neo-Darwinist position that is 
certain of its randomness principle and its irrefutable genetics of determinism based 
on cellular combination, one that leaves little room for legacy, agency or external 
intervention.
37
 His subsequent move through empathy and epiphany, to an increased 
                                                          
35
 Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 117. The genetic determinism subscribed by Dawkins has been 
attacked by philosophers of biology who contend its mathematical indifference to environmental 
changes and instead propose that, far from being DNA-centric alone, the cellular structure is 
determined by an active interchange among RNA, DNA and protein, a theory that informs the basis of 
epigenetics. Possibly the severest critique has come from Stephen Jay Gould whose publicly 
polemical position in relation to Dawkins’s selectionist idea of the extended phenotype and its 
deterministic behaviour is based on Gould’s notion of evolution as a complex process of assimilation 
and adaptation and not purely on selection alone. For a short yet interesting study of the Dawkins vs. 
Gould debate, see Kim Sterelny, Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest (Cambridge: Icon Books, 
2001).    
   
36
 Waugh, “Science and Fiction in the 1990s”, British Fiction of the 1990s. ed. Nick Bentley (New 
York & London: Routledge, 2005)  61. It is interesting to compare Waugh’s analogy with the idea 
propounded by the medical anthropologist Byron Good who contends that medicine must appropriate 
the discourse of heteroglossia as propounded by the literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin. Medical analysis, 
Good argues, must assume the vocabulary of “the interpretive tradition, conversant with critical 
theory” in order to address the core issues in its discipline. Medicine, Rationality and Experience, 63. 
In a similar vein, John Dupré – classifying himself as a philosopher of biology in his support for 
epigenetics against Neo-Darwinism – rejects the one-dimensionality of Dawkins’s genetic 
determinism and affirms how evolution cannot be reduced to “a sequence of time slices”, advocating 
instead an epistemological plurality that points to “the deep impossibility of separating ‘nature’ from 
‘nurture’ in the explanation of development”. Dupré, Processes of Life: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 16.   
 
37
 Denis Noble critiques Dawkins’s ultra-Darwinist DNA-centric model of genetic evolution and 
affirms instead the infinitude of genetic patterns and how those can be influenced by the experiences 
of previous generations as well as by the organism’s interactions with the immediate environment. 
Noble, The Music of Life, 19. The genetic transfer of the effect of experiences undergone by previous 
generations into their progeny underlines the fundamental argument of epigenetics, which has 
revealed empirical evidence of such genetic inheritance, as evinced in the work done on trauma 
survivors and their grandchildren. Especially pertinent is the medical study done by Marcus Pembrey 
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awareness of the unique epistemology of the mind in relation to the materiality of the 
brain, constitutes the combination of medical science and poetry with the backdrop 
of political changes.  It is this uniqueness of multiple points of view along with the 
epistemology of the cognitive character that emerges in McEwan’s Saturday as 
subversive to the neural determinism and the certainty of scientific logic, in a novel 
that eventually upholds “art’s crucial role as a collective vehicle for self-reflection 
and as a shared source of cultural identity.”38   
In its move from the certainties of neural determinism and degeneration to 
the possibilities of affect, from the brain and its hard-wired neural networks to the 
mind that constitutes a unique self that can respond uniquely to art through an 
heightened awareness of emotion and empathy, Saturday enacts the transition from 
the reductively empirical realms to that of the complexly epistemological. The novel 
also depicts how each realm ought to inform the other in a culture of the complicity   
 
[. . .] between the discourses of ultra-Darwinism, biotechnology and 
postmodernism which, between them, seem to have constructed primal myths 
of the pre- and post-human as a means of both articulating and displacing 
anxieties about who we are at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
39
 
 
In locating the epistemology of the sentient self through its responsiveness to a lyric 
– Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” – that is itself born of the emotional crisis 
wrought by the original Darwinian moment, Saturday showcases how the affective 
identity that Darwin himself had recognized in his last major work which was on 
emotions
40
 can transcend the reductionist discourses of current Neo-Darwinian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in the small Swedish town of Överkalix, as demonstrated in the BBC documentary The Ghosts in 
Your Gene http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehwFVgQ82ZY. Web. 4 March 2013.  
 
38
 Merlin Donald, “Art and Cognitive Evolution”, The Artful Mind: Cognitive Science and the Riddle 
of Human Creativity, ed. Mark Turner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 4-5.  
 
39
 Waugh, “Science and the Fiction of in the 1990s”, 76.  
 
40
 In his 1872 work on emotions in animals, Darwin had delineated three different principles of 
emotions and emotional changes: the principle of associated habits, the principle of antithesis and the 
principle of actions arising directly and corresponding to the function of the nervous system that 
operates, as Darwin affirms, free from the function of free will and inherited habit. However, as 
Darwin goes on to illustrate, these distinctions often blur away in the face of affect and emotions, and 
certain habits which are at first performed consciously, can with habit become a part of the natural 
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science that builds its empire through a mathematical model and a politics of genetic 
combinations.
41
 The movement of Perowne in Saturday from the medical dogma of a 
determined and recordable cellular self to the idea of a unique self that is mutable 
and contingent while being free from the reductionism of science, raises important 
questions about the nature of empathy and agency that perhaps only a literary 
narrative can uphold, through its self-reflexive use of language and its narrative 
capacity for problematization. Crucially, Perowne’s epistemic shift – through 
observing Baxter’s personal reception of Arnold’s lyric – from medical reductionism 
to epistemological ambivalence, seems to endorse the argument that science cannot 
negate the need for contingency and messiness that characterise human 
circumstances and relationships.
42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
nervous reflex, so much so that those are subsequently performed without conscious awareness. 
Under those circumstances, “the sensory nerve cells excite the motor cells, without first 
communicating with those cells on which our consciousness or volition depend.” Charles Darwin, The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 1873) 5.  Cited in Randolph 
R. Cornelius, The Science of Emotion: Research and Tradition in the Psychology of Emotions (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996) 26.   
 
41
 In pitting the phenomenological moment in its resistance against the politics of proportions that is 
readily appropriated by masculinist science and logic, Saturday bears interesting parallels with 
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5.4 Empathy, Agency and Affect in Saturday 
 
The locations of affect and empathy in Saturday correspond closely to the works of 
psychologists who contend that “affective feelings convey, in an embodied form, 
information about the interface between oneself and one’s environment.”43 The 
epistemology of empathy and emotional intelligence in McEwan’s novel is thus 
positioned as one of epistemic excess in relation to the rationale of classic bio-
medical science. Empathy emerges in the novel as a medical as well as a political 
condition, especially given its subtexts of political terrorism and war. McEwan 
himself places a high premium on empathy as a significant quality of humanity, one 
that he locates as a lack in the political context of terrorism. Referring to the 9/11 
attackers, the author of Saturday argues: 
Imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is at the core of 
our humanity. It is the essence of compassion, and it is the beginning of 
morality. The hijackers used fanatical certainty, misplaced religious faith and 
dehumanizing hatred to purge themselves of the human instinct for empathy. 
Among their crimes was a failure of the imagination.
44
  
 
McEwan’s interpretation of empathy as an act of imagination whereby one perceives 
the pain in the other is, however, actually corroborated by the discoveries in social 
neuroscience that confirms that “Finding out how individuals perceive others in pain 
is [. . .] an interesting way to decipher the underlying neural mechanisms of 
empathy.”45 Empathy, which in Saturday is located at the level of literary as well as 
political narrative, is anticipated by Daisy’s emotional reaction on reading Jane Eyre 
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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/15/september11.politicsphilosophyandsociety2.  n.pag. 
Web. 15 Feb. 2013.  McEwan’s notion of empathy is strikingly similar to the one offered by Susan 
Sontag a year later as she analyses the images of war horror in Virginia Woolf’s The Three Guineas 
and affirms that “Our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we have failed to hold this reality in 
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 Jean Decety and Philip L. Jackson, “A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy”, Current 
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as she weeps under a tree by the dovecote “not for the story but because she had 
reached the end and emerged from a dream to grasp that it was all the creation of a 
woman she would never meet” (SD 133).  
In their essay entitled “The Neurology of the Narrative”, Kay Young and 
Jeffrey Salver argue: 
When we choose to be in the company of narrative by reading a novel or 
seeing a film, the narrative sets itself off as narrative, not as part of our lives; 
we stand in relation to it as audience to its “performance” as an aesthetic 
work. However, the storytelling we experience as an event in life can lose its 
appearance as narrative by virtue of its integration in life.
46
 
 
Saturday seems to break the borderlines between the affect inside the ‘story’ 
produced by the literary artefact and the reader’s own understanding of the selves of 
the characters through her empathetic encounter within a phenomenological frame. 
Crucially, Daisy weeps not for the characters or their vital lives in Jane Eyre nor for 
the story the novel contains but for the author who made meaning out of the matter, 
thus anticipating Perowne’s curiosity in the operation theatre to know how matter 
becomes conscious. Like Baxter’s empathy towards the lyrical content in Arnold’s 
“Dover Beach” that arises out of the possibility of re-union, Daisy’s emotional 
response to Jane Eyre is premised on the necessary experience of liminality induced 
by the literary work of art. The emotional response emerges in itself as the ability 
through which the agency of the unique self is subjectivized in a way medical 
science cannot map. In positioning a neurosurgeon at the complex crossroads of 
agency and empathy, McEwan’s novel enacts modern neuroscience’s investigations 
into the epistemology of intentionality, the key quality for the creative writer for 
whom, without any agency or free will, there would be no narrative or storytelling.
47
 
The issue of agency in Saturday is in close yet complex correspondence with the 
structures of empathy in the novel, evinced spectacularly in the political scene by the 
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massive public protests against the Iraq War and privately by Baxter’s affective 
association with Matthew Arnold’s lyric of loss and love.  
McEwan’s reading of terrorism as a failure of imagination is an interpretation 
that operates at several levels: the political, the cultural and the medical. McEwan’s 
argument carries special significance in the scene in Saturday where, moved by 
empathy-inducing effect of Arnold’s poetry, Baxter abandons his original plan of 
attacking Perowne’s family, much to the consternation of his associate Nigel. 
Baxter’s intrusion into the happy familial space of the Perownes and the subsequent 
violence and humiliation that he orchestrates can be interpreted as a metonymic 
substitute for the political act of terrorism that operates on a retribution principle. 
Baxter’s attack of the white middle-class space of the Perownes is thus structurally 
similar to the retaliation of the wronged subject who is essentialized due to his 
fearful ‘Otherness’. However, what disturbs the pure narrative of violence – after 
Baxter had knocked down a bleeding Grammaticus and ordered Daisy to undress at 
knifepoint – is the emergence of empathy through poetry, through Daisy’s reading of 
Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach”. Thus when Baxter admits that he has changed his 
mind, the meaning is metaphorical as well as neurological, thus corroborating the 
close proximity and correspondence between matter and metaphor in McEwan’s 
novel.
48
  
Baxter’s altered emotions and emergence of empathy offers interesting 
readings in relation to the notions of modern neuroscientists and philosophers of 
mind who contend that emotions that move the mind “consist of (mostly 
unconscious) images (layered neurobiological maps) of juxtaposed self and object, 
the latter acquiring affective valence with its association with its affect upon the self 
                                                          
48
 It is interesting to compare Baxter’s transformation under the influence of art in Saturday to that 
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map.”49 McEwan’s narrative challenges the neural determinism of human emotions 
by juxtaposing the sentient subject with the affective object in a way that breaks 
away from the neat narrative of medical decoding. Thus, although the neurosurgeon 
Perowne can medically explain Baxter’s shift of mood as the “essence of a 
degenerating mind, periodically to lose all sense of a continuous self” (SD 223), he 
cannot comprehend the intentionality of the feeling self, and more importantly, how 
the same is moved by the affect that arises from poetry.  In responding to the art of 
poetry and in connecting to a nineteenth century poet’s lyric about human emotions, 
the untutored Baxter shifts from a position of violence to one of empathy. In the 
process, he asserts his claim to life with the ability to enact the dual function of 
consciousness: the urge to assert the concern of the self, and connect to other selves 
while improving the art of life.
50
 It is this condition that the neurosurgeon Henry 
Perowne recognizes, despite his inability to comprehend the manner of Baxter’s 
empathy with Arnold’s poetry, and this constitutes the moment in McEwan’s novel 
when phenomenological insight begins to mix with the medical gaze of 
neuroscience.   
The role of the fictional narrative as inducing empathy in human mind is the 
core issue in the narrative of cognition in Saturday, operating through dual cognitive 
frames: Baxter’s phenomenological association with the emotional reverberation of 
Matthew Arnold’s lyric, and Perowne’s existentialist awareness of ambivalence that 
is born of his experience of witnessing Baxter’s embodied dialogue with poetry. Just 
as Baxter’s phenomenological experience of the lyric re-minds and re-connects him 
to his past, Perowne’s recognition of Baxter’s association provides him with a 
unique insight into the wonder of the human mind whose agency and intentionality 
cannot be explained by the neuroscience he knows and practises.
51
  Empathy in the 
                                                          
49
 Heidi Morrison Ravven, “Spinozistic Approaches to Evolutionary Naturalism: Spinoza's 
Anticipation of Contemporary Affective Neuroscience”, Politics and the Life Sciences 22.1 (March 
2003): 70-74; 73.  
 
50
 These are the two functions that the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio classifies as the simple and 
complex functions of consciousness of the conative self which may be defined as the “irresistible urge 
to stay alive”. The Feeling of What Happens, 5.  
 
51
  As Gillian Beer argues in her analysis of the open fields of epistemic encounters, association 
through language contains the connection with the communal as well as the extension of the unique; 
“Working with, and within, language is to work with a medium inevitably imbued with the communal 
past, drenched with what has been. In language others are always implicit, others who have used the 
same terms in different conditions. [. . .] Science always raises more questions than it contains and 
 221 
 
novel is thus not simply a literary motif or poetic trope but a cognitive response to 
the voice of the other that the sentient self can establish a dialogue with, through the 
moving mind that exists as an epistemic excess to the materiality of the hard-wired 
brain. Poetry in the novel thus emerges as a voice that speaks to the medically 
degenerate, as Baxter – the baddie from the street who happens to embody 
“biological determinism in its purest form” (SD 93) – is moved by Daisy’s reading 
of Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach”, as it makes him think about where he grew up. 
The significance of the lyric as a construct that communicates the qualia of 
consciousness has been corroborated by neuroscientists and literary writers alike. 
The method of the lyric in constructing the qualia has been classified as unique 
inasmuch that is uses “language in such a way that the description of qualia does not 
seem partial, imprecise, and only comprehensible when put in the context of the 
poet’s personal life.”52 The location of the self in language thus emerges through a 
process of empathy, and the lyric renders the process unique by its focalized and 
poetically formalized configuration of language. Baxter’s response to the lyric in 
Saturday is a complex combination of empathy and emotion that facilitates the 
uniqueness of the sentient self and its agency, resisting the reification desired by the 
bio-political gaze.
53
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Mixing the solidity of his medical gaze with his subjective knowledge of the 
phenomenological experience of Baxter that he himself cannot define, Perowne is 
quick to classify it as Baxter’s implicit claim to life, despite his degeneration. Thus 
he comes to realize:  
Some, nineteenth-century poet [. . .] touched off in Baxter a yearning he 
could barely begin to define. That hunger is his claim on life, on a mental 
existence, and because it won’t last much longer, because the door of his 
consciousness is beginning to close, he shouldn’t pursue his claim from a 
cell, waiting for the absurdity of his trial to begin. (SD 278-79) 
This reading of McEwan’s Saturday offers a complex model of consciousness in a 
brain notionally degenerating in the eyes of medical science. It is one that emerges as 
a dual function of the construction of a new order of sentient selfhood (Baxter 
changes his mind on hearing the lyric) as well as an ability to connect to another 
voice through empathy (Arnold’s poem reminds Baxter of the space-time in which 
he grew up).  It is this dialectic of self-ing the poetic image and imaging the poetic 
self that informs Baxter’s unique understanding of Arnold’s lyric, itself a poem 
about the doubt of man in the face of the original Darwinian moment that corroded 
religious faith in the nineteenth century with the new discoveries in natural, 
biological and social science.
54
  
The dialogic location of “Dover Beach” in the political context of Saturday is 
significant, as the Iraq War the novel is set right ahead “can be seen as the moment 
of truth when the ‘official’ political distinctions are blurred”55 and ideological 
expectations are problematized.
56
 The narrative in Saturday evokes the classic 
Arnoldian image of ignorant armies clashing by night with its subtexts of the Taliban 
and the Iraq crisis where the angry youth of the middle-East “are fighting over 
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armies they will never see, about which they know almost nothing” (SD 190). 
Saturday thus offers a complex combination of social, emotional and medical 
situations through which emotions operate. As a fictional narrative about the human 
mind and its complex emotions, McEwan’s novel testifies to the analysis of empathy 
that is agreed upon by some leading tenets in brain science as well as the 
phenomenological study of the human mind. In the process, it asserts that the 
phenomenological frame can fruitfully inform the social neuroscience of cognition 
and also contribute towards a critical theory of communicative action.
57
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5.5 The Politics of Panic in Saturday 
 
The Neo-Darwinism at play in Saturday is in close correspondence to the middle-
class liberal politics of the Western world that effaces difference in favour of 
dominant notions of reason and progress.
58
 Thus the satire against some tenets of 
Neo-Darwinism that Saturday enacts also extends into an exposition of the 
inadequacies of the Western liberal notions of control and containment. McEwan’s 
novel constitutes a subversive frame whereby Baxter the marginalized figure first 
appears to Perowne “on the edge of vision” (SD 83). Perowne half-perceives 
Baxter’s presence after the first confrontation under his main window, lurking as a 
threat to the robust ontology of Perowne’s Western liberal middle-class privilege.59 It 
is important, while analysing the postcolonial presence in Saturday, to look at the 
historical frames it evokes and revisits in its debates on what constitutes culture and 
anarchy. Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach”, a poem that is read out by Daisy to 
Baxter and which enacts the transformation in the latter, is more than a mere sub-
textual presence in Saturday. McEwan’s choice of poem is significant in the light of 
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the debates around Neo-Darwinist medical politics that Saturday depicts with its 
questions about consciousness.  
The Arnoldian notion of culture was an “internal condition” that transcended 
the “animality” of man “in the ever-increasing efficaciousness and in the general 
harmonious expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling that which make the 
peculiar dignity, wealth and happiness of human nature.”60 Such teleology, based on 
the politics of communal and collective harmony and the possibility of the desired 
destination, was immediately subverted by the Darwinian notion of natural selection 
– by which “the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are enabled to struggle 
with each other, and the best adapted to survive”61 – that left little room for free will, 
faith and agency. Indeed Arnold’s “Dover Beach” may be read as the resistance 
offered by poetry against the “bleached-out physical conception of objectivity”.62 
The self-reflexive quality of Arnold’s poem is illustrated in its evocative imagery 
that depicts the corrosion of faith with the rise of Darwinism even as it proclaims the 
possibilities of poetry, empathy and love.
63
  
The drama of scientific certainty and subjective faith that operates along 
political praxis as well as the human body is revisited in McEwan’s Saturday, a 
novel that also depicts contemporary panic of terrorism and the imminence of Iraq-
invasion. The cognitive networks in the novel bridge the personal and the political 
consciousness through mistaken identities – Perowne mistakenly considers the 
Russian cargo plane on fire as a terrorist attack and the Prime Minister Blair takes 
Perowne to be a painter and congratulates him on his art – conflicts, and affective 
reconciliations. Peter Childs underlines this dual concern in McEwan’s novel as he 
argues: 
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From one perspective Saturday is a book about the ‘war on terror’ that, in 
terms of international politics, has replaced the Cold War McEwan looked at 
in his mid-career novels, but from another perspective it is fundamentally and 
principally about consciousness.
64
  
 
The merit of Saturday as a novel lies primarily in the ways in which it brings the two 
perspectives into unison in the fictional space of embodied emotions and real 
political moments. With its probe into the content of consciousness and its curiosity 
about how matter becomes conscious, Saturday is “apologetically anchored [. . .] in 
the material world”65 of real historical events and times. The Modernist ‘one-day’ in 
McEwan’s novel is the historically and politically significant February 15 2003, the 
day when a mass of marchers gathered in London to protest against the war on Iraq, 
emerging as “UK’s biggest ever demonstration with at least 750,000 taking part” 
with contingents arriving “in the capital from about 250 towns and cities in the 
UK.”66 Thus the medical and philosophical debates about what constitutes human 
consciousness and what brings meaning out of matter, exist simultaneously in 
McEwan’s novel with its real political time when the term terror “has become 
shorthand for Islamic fundamentalism, Al-Qaeda, suicide bombers, burkas, uranium 
enrichment, and other threats emanating from the Muslim-majority world.”67 
While Conrad’s The Secret Agent is about the anxiety at the prospect of 
lenient immigration laws and the attempt to address the same through a pseudo-
terroristic act that intends to induce pure fear without human loss, McEwan’s 
Saturday is about the fear of the threat that is operative in the political “elsewhere” 
as embodied by the ‘Other’ (the reader notices how Saddam and Baxter are 
described using similar physiognomic features by Perowne). Like The Secret Agent 
that presents the autistic Stevie as the unmotivated agent of terrorism and the politics 
of violence, Saturday presents Baxter with his Huntington’s disease as the fearful 
figure in whom ‘Otherness’ is embodied through entropy. It is interesting to do a 
comparative study of Baxter and Saddam as these two figures emerge in Perowne’s 
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interpretative frames. Saddam in Perowne’s imagination “gives the impression of an 
overgrown, disappointed boy with a pudgy hangdog look, and dark eyes a little 
baffled by all that he still can’t ordain” (SD 38) thus bringing the notional body of 
terror in an uncanny proximity to the body of confused cognition. Likewise, in his 
“swift transition from one mood to another, without awareness or memory, or 
understanding of how it seems to others” (SD 95), Baxter not only embodies a 
neurodegenerative disease where the narrative of the body is perpetually 
interrupted,
68
 but also appears to appropriate the behaviour of “an ‘irrational’ 
fundamentalist who, unlike the Communists, lacks even an elementary sense of 
survival and respect for his own people”.69 While both embody the ‘Otherness’ that 
is feared in its potential for destruction (Baxter with his threat of violence in the 
street and Saddam with his supposed reign of terror and alleged nuclear missiles), 
they are also connected in their imminent decadence from the same potential through 
interventions from Western hegemonic traditions of power and culture.
70
  
The politics of terror in Saturday inhabits many levels, with the white 
middle-aged Londoner Perowne emerging as nostalgic for the IRA and its cause for 
a united Ireland while describing Islamic fundamentalism as “the purity of nihilism” 
(SD 33). The easy alliances in the middle-class Perowne’s imagination between Al 
Qaeda and Saddam’s regime in Iraq appears to appropriate the conventional Western 
view of relating “al-Qaeda’s militancy to Islamic insurgency in Iraq and elsewhere in 
order to assert that ‘radical Islam’ had spread into a consolidated ‘ideology’ to rival 
that of communism in the Cold War”.71 On a medical level, Saturday is about the 
“wonders it [medical science] performs, the faith it inspires, and against that, its 
slowly diminishing but still vast ignorance of the brain, and the mind, and the 
relation between the two” (SD 85-86). Thus McEwan’s novel is rendered more 
complex by the way evolutionary neuroscience and philosophical ambivalence about 
the content of consciousness mix with “the chaotic confusion of the elite”72 in the 
face of an international war. The vocabulary through which the real political space of 
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the Western metropolis is described is focalized through the gaze of the 
neurosurgeon Perowne “insufficiently alive to his involvement in the world.”73 This 
happens at the beginning of the novel and immediately brings the biological and the 
political realms in close and problematic proximity, ironically cognized by Perowne 
as a grand success of liberal democracy and medical mastery: 
Standing here, as immune to the cold as a marble statue, gazing towards 
Charlotte Street [. . .] Henry thinks the city is a success, a brilliant invention, 
a biological masterpiece – millions teeming around the accumulated and 
layered achievements of the centuries, as though around a coral reef, 
sleeping, working, entertaining themselves, harmonious for the most part, 
nearly everyone wanting it to work. (SD 5) 
The euphoric vision of the Western metropolis as the centre of civilization and a 
grand bio-political masterpiece is echoed also in the lyrics of Theo’s blues-song 
performed at Notting Hill that seeks to seduce the loved ones away from despair and 
invites them to the City Square. Both Theo’s song and Henry’s vision seek to 
recreate “the city as an aestheticized site in which the strictures of modernist 
urbanity give way to a kind of utopian self-fulfillment made possible by 
contemporary life.”74 However, what complicate the political context of the novel 
and make it more directly germane to the issues taken up in this thesis, are the modes 
of deviance and dissident identities that map the mutable metropolis. Thus the 
greyness of London’s Charlotte Street with its ill-fitting windows reminds the 
neurosurgeon Perowne (seated in his silver Mercedes) of Communist Warsaw. In a 
similar cognitive economy, the figure of Saddam evokes parallels with Hitler, Stalin 
and Mao in Perowne’s imagination.  
The metropolis of London appears as an ideational construct in both Heart of 
Darkness and Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway and both Conrad’s Marlow and Woolf’s Peter 
Walsh embody the strategic and masculinist attempts to reify the city through 
dominant notions of progress and civilization.
75
 Both Woolf and Conrad’s novels 
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showcase how such attempts are coded with the cultural and masculinist vocabulary 
of the day. McEwan’s Saturday presents conflicts between differing notions of what 
constitutes civilization and its discontents, and dramatizes different codes of 
masculinity as embodied by Perowne and Baxter. In his privileged position as a 
white middle-class professionally successful Londoner, Perowne appears to enjoy 
immunity from the threats of the “people [who] remember their essential needs and 
how they’re not being met” (SD 62). In her analysis of the postcolonial presence in 
Saturday, Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace suggests that McEwan’s novel emerges as 
“mostly devoid of London’s vibrant multicultural scene, the ongoing legacy of the 
empire whose demise has been much lamented.”76 In presenting the middle-class 
Perowne as someone who appears comfortably cut off from the anxieties of mutable 
identities across the metropolis, McEwan manages to make the novel more 
insidiously political with the ironic insulation of the protagonist, his medical gaze, 
and his inadequate understanding of the human consciousness as well as of the 
contemporary political scene.  
Perowne’s stance on the Iraq-War and the marginalized presence of London’s 
non-white multicultural population in his imagination
77
 are both premised on a desire 
for harmony with a code of life that corresponds most closely to Western liberal 
middle-class values. The international and national discourses of domination that are 
embedded in the novel are synchronised with the political unconscious of fear and 
the strategies of ‘Other’-ing. Writing from post-Iraq War era and commenting on the 
threat of non-white immigrations in the Western metropolis, Vron Ware argues:    
As the military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan become ever more 
questionable and more futile, political discourse in the UK repeatedly directs 
public attention to the potential disruption that “immigrants” represent to 
some imagined harmonious British way of life. Led from above, these 
                                                                                                                                                                    
out of their witnessing of epiphany. Marlow sees Kurtz articulating the horror of imperialism and 
Perowne sees Baxter deconstruct the dogma of rational science and liberal politics in an age of neo-
imperialism, through his empathetic connection with poetry.  
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successive official scoldings, warnings, and threats, combined with ever-
stricter immigration control in the name of “fairness”, only serve to reinforce 
the borders held in place by intransigent racism and the “white fear” it feeds 
off.
78
 
The insidious fear of the attack of the ‘Other’ that Saturday dramatizes is done 
through a complex combination of admission and absence. Thus Perowne sees and is 
aware of the presence of the multicultural populace around him but they almost 
always exist in the margins and never enter the centrality of his symbolic register. 
This is emblematized at a broader political level by the ambivalence around the Iraq 
War and embodied on an immediate level by Baxter “who comes to represent the 
unruly other whom Perowne must restrain for the sake of general order.”79 Baxter’s 
intrusion into the solid Western bourgeois familial space of the Perowne household 
may be interpreted as the retaliation of the social and political ‘Other’, paralleling 
“the looming international threat of Islamist militantism, as demonstrated by the 9/11 
attacks that serve as the novel’s historical backdrop, and which the imminent 
invasion of Iraq in the text is ostensibly meant to contain.”80 The threat that Baxter 
embodies is thus personal as well as political and it is tempting to read him as a 
Caliban figure that is potentially subversive (the analogy is further informed by 
Baxter’s attempted rape of Perowne’s beautiful poet-daughter) but eventually 
overpowered by the machinery of European medical science.
81
  
Embodying an order of masculinity physically as well as discursively 
different from that of Perowne with his short stocky frame, “thick eyebrows and dark 
brown hair razored close to the skull” (SD 87-88), Baxter also contains a “secret 
shame” (SD 94) of the knowledge of his hereditary disease, that, once exposed, 
compromises his masculinity before his cohorts. It threatens exclusion in a way 
similar to the manner in which the birthmark of Flory does in Orwell’s Burmese 
Days. The nervous condition he embodies that is invisible as well as incurable by 
                                                          
78
 Vron Ware, “The White Fear Factor”, 110.  
79
 Lynn Wells, Ian McEwan, 117.  
80
 Lynn Wells, Ian  McEwan, 112.  
81
 The Caliban figure is politically significant in the post-colonial narrative, not only due to the threat 
against colonial hegemony that it embodies but also due to the manner in which the threat is enacted 
through the excess of the earthly body, as against the more intellective presence of the Ariel-
archetype. However, as Gayatri Spivak astutely warns as the critic of post-colonial reason, the 
postcolonial should not take Caliban as the ultimate model of subversion and the desire to become 
Caliban is always characterized by the crisis that stems from the fact that Caliban is “a name in a play, 
an inaccessible blankness circumscribed by an interpretable text.” Spivak, A Critic of Postcolonial 
Reason, 118.  
 
 231 
 
contemporary medical science connects Baxter also to Septimus in Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway whose ‘nervous’ crisis of the self is also and similarly accompanied by an 
increasing inability to feel.
82
  The political menace that Baxter comes to embody in 
Saturday is corroborated in Lee Siegel’s view of the figure as  
[a] kind of echo of the hatred and anger of the disenfranchised, militant, 
impoverished Third World. Certainly he poses to Henry the ethical challenge 
presented by poor, starving countries to the affluent West [. . .] He also poses 
to the suddenly vulnerable Henry a threat of annihilation similar to the threat 
made against the West.
83
 
Baxter is a disturbing post-colonial presence that is perceived by the middle-class 
Perowne through the frame of criminology by default. He drives a series five BMW 
that Perowne “associates for no good reason with criminality, drug-dealing” (SD 83). 
Baxter may thus be interpreted as the threat to the structures of denial – the strategic 
avoidance of conspicuous consumption whereby the professional classes mark 
themselves off from the ‘vulgar’ nouveaux riches – through which Western middle-
class privilege promotes and perpetuates itself. He is the suddenness in the street that 
can subvert the comfortable complacence that Perowne embodies. In shifting 
Perowne’s attention from the brain to the mind, Baxter paradoxically emancipates 
him from his bio-political fixation with empirical matter and educates him in the 
knowledge of his lack. However, as the perceived pathological presence (both 
medically and politically) suited to subvert dominant notions of politeness and 
progress, Baxter is essentially emasculated and overpowered by the machinations of 
medicine and poetry. Even his captivation by Daisy’s recitation of Matthew Arnold’s 
poetry (which is functionally and structurally analogous to Henry’s recitation of 
medical knowledge earlier in the day) is premised on the power to arrest, overwhelm 
and capture. Both Perowne’s medical science and Arnold’s poem recited by the 
Oxford-educated Daisy correspond to the high-points in science and culture through 
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which Baxter may be controlled and coaxed away from deviance and drafted back 
into the dominant order.  
The mode in which Baxter’s mind is eventually contained by the arresting 
powers of the high-British literary tradition and medical rationalism is in close 
correspondence to the desire of imperial control and hegemony in the neo-imperial 
cosmos that is presented and ironized in McEwan’s novel.84 However, what further 
complicates Saturday is the privileged position that Baxter comes to assume in the 
eyes of Perowne at the end of the novel, as he emerges as the subject who awakens 
Perowne to his own subjective intentionality and agentic awareness. Apart from the 
ambivalence about medical and existentialist knowledge Baxter causes in Perowne, 
there is also the associated political shift as London changes in Perowne’s 
imaginative register from a city of promises and biological successes to a space 
waiting for its bombs, like many other cities of the world.   
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5.6 Masculinity and Masculinist Performance in Saturday 
 
The first encounter in Saturday between Perowne and Baxter emerges as a dramatic 
ante bellum that is heavily coded with masculinist vocabulary. The performative 
masculine rituals that immediately set off after the car crash are focalized through 
Perowne’s mind: 
He is cast in a role, and there’s no way out. This, as people like to say, is 
urban drama. A century of movies and half a century of television have 
rendered the matter insincere. It is pure artifice. Here are the guys, the 
strangers, whose self-respect is on the line. Someone is going to have to 
impose his will and win, and the other is going to give way. (SD 86) 
 
Perowne’s awareness of the performative quality and the rituals of the situation that 
demands a drama is strangely close to the imperial masculinist codes that needed to 
be performed by Orwell’s narrators and narrating self in the colonial contact-zone. 
The knowledge, that he cannot escape from the pre-set codes corresponding to the 
culture of confrontation in an urban space, places Perowne in close proximity to the 
narrator in Orwell’s essay “Shooting an Elephant” who realizes, to his horror, that he 
must subordinate his human will and agency to the pre-set imperial identities. The 
colonial codes that inform Orwell’s experiences in Burma appear as structurally and 
functionally analogous to the complex urban rituals in the post-colonial imperial 
metropolis where multiculturalism is simultaneously celebrated and marginalized
85
 
through the “fantasy about the collective mediated by the narratives and discourses 
provided by the state, commerce and mass media.”86  
The event of Perowne’s car crash and the actions following it are carefully 
narrated with detailed delineation of the differences between the Western liberal 
middle-class gentility that Perowne embodies and the deliberate dislocation from the 
same in Baxter, who appears dressed in “trainers, track-suits and hooded tops – the 
currency of the street, so general as to be no style at all” (SD 84-85). The urban 
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drama of anger and assertion contains its unique logic and economy of expectations 
and Perowne finds himself paradoxically inconvenienced by the fact that his car is 
not visibly blemished by the crash as “In immediate, tactical terms, this seems to 
leave him as a disadvantage. He had nothing to show for his anger” (SD 84). Baxter 
meanwhile picks his “BMW’s shorn-off wing mirror, turning it over the way one 
might a dead animal” (SD 84), thus immediately gaining a significant score over 
Perowne in the abruptly erupted urban drama of discontent the two men find 
themselves in. The scoring pattern continues as Baxter offers Perowne a cigarette 
that the latter refuses, thus revealing himself as “not man enough to smoke, or more 
essentially, to offer gifts” (SD 87). Perowne’s assiduous attempt not to emerge as 
passive also fails in the face of Baxter’s brushing away of formal politeness as he 
ignores the “Mr” with which Perowne prefaces his address. Baxter’s “sloping 
shoulders, and the built-up trapezoids suggest time in the gym” and “There’s also 
tightness in the fabric round the biceps” further indicating his masculine muscles 
conducive to confronting the masculinist code of conduct among the ones “who live 
beyond the law”(SD 88). The drama of domination vacillates between the realm of 
the body and that of language as Perowne adds a strategic “indeed” as he attempts to 
inform Baxter of the latter’s careless drive out of the lane without looking. The use 
of ‘indeed’ “entails decisions; he isn’t going to pretend to the language of the street. 
He’s standing on professional dignity” (SD 89). Perowne’s strategy of asserting his 
status through language fails to impress Baxter who gangs up with Nark and Nigel 
and seek physically to dominate Perowne with “manoeuvrings [that] are clumsily 
deliberate, like an ill-rehearsed children’s ballet” (SD 90). The genteel codes of 
insurance exchange and logical argument that Perowne counts on quickly disappear 
at the prospect of physical assault whereby “honour is to be satisfied by a thorough 
beating” (SD 93).    
What rescues Perowne from the certainty of physical domination and defeat 
in the street-fight with Baxter and his cronies is his superior medical knowledge 
through which he cognizes the nervous condition Baxter embodies with “small 
tremors that never quite form an expression” (SD 93). Anticipating the dementia and 
miserable end that Baxter’s sickness will eventually lead him to, Perowne mentally 
visualizes “how the brilliant machinery of being is undone by the tiniest of faulty 
cogs, the insidious whisper of ruin, a single bad idea lodged in every cell, on every 
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chromosome four”(SD 94). In subjecting and scanning Baxter’s body under his 
metonymic medical gaze in which “to be flexible, the body has to be a kind of 
machine”87, Perowne essentially transforms “Baxter the person into Baxter the series 
of symptoms [. . .] which recaptures the pure disruption of Baxter back into the 
ordered, safe world of Perowne.”88 In blurting out his diagnosis of Baxter’s 
Huntington’s disease, Perowne effectively seeks to emasculate him with his medical 
gaze in order to tip the scales back to his side in this ritual battle of masculinist 
power. In voicing the possibility that Baxter’s father carried the degenerative gene 
that has contributed to his current neurological condition, Perowne hits where it hurts 
the most, opening the gap between the male body and its masculinist identity. As the 
secret shame of Baxter is exposed, the scales veer back on Perowne’s side in the 
urban drama of confrontation. The episode is elaborately described using the 
vocabulary of power embodied by Perowne’s privileged medical knowledge with 
which he effectively emasculates Baxter before his mates. In performing his role as 
the medical scientist with privileged vision Perowne “has the impression of himself 
as a witch doctor delivering a curse” (SD 94). He thus merges medical science and 
magic into a discursive construct that constitutes classification, interrogation and 
domination.  
The position of power that Perowne immediately ascends to reveals itself in 
the “vague, febrile movement” that Baxter makes to restrain his companions and the 
exchanges that ensue merge the metaphor of magic with the rationale of medical 
science: 
When Baxter speaks at last, his voice is different, cautious perhaps. 
‘You knew my father?’ 
‘I’m a doctor.’  
‘Like fuck you are, dressed like that.’ 
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‘I’m a doctor. Has someone explained to you what’s going to happen? 
Do you want me to tell you what I think your problem might be?’ 
It works, the shameless blackmail works. Baxter flares suddenly. 
‘What problem?’ 
And before Perowne can reply, he adds ferociously, ‘And you’ll shut 
the fuck up.’ Then, as quickly, he subsides, and turns away. They are 
together, he and Perowne, in a world not of the medical, but of the 
magical. When you’re diseased it is unwise to abuse the shaman. (SD 
94-95) 
 
The positions of power quickly change and Perowne moves toward the dominant 
role in the drama with his combination of medical knowledge and strategic 
exploitation of Baxter’s vulnerability. In combining “modern scientific mastery with 
atavism”89, Perowne holds Baxter in thrall with the sudden and seemingly 
inexplicably acquired information about his family and their genetic disease.  
The spell that Perowne casts on Baxter in this urban drama of masculinist 
domination proceeds with a strategic combination of disclosure and shock appearing 
to appropriate Michael Taussig’s account of the visceral nature of faith and 
scepticism:  
The real skill of the practitioner lies not in skilled concealment but in the 
skilled revelation of skilled concealment. [. . .] The mystery is heightened, 
not dissipated, by unmasking and in various ways, direct and oblique; ritual 
serves as a stage for so many unmaskings. Hence power flows not from 
masking but from unmasking, which masks more than masking.
90
  
 
 Perowne’s medical magic that combines the empirical gaze with uncanny 
knowledge seeks not to mask but unmask to a sudden and startling degree in its bid 
to unnerve Baxter in the urban drama where “nothing can be predicted, but 
everything, as soon as it happens, will seem to fit” (SD 87).  Before long Baxter 
finds himself possessed by the power of Perowne’s medical control that further 
reifies him with his interrogation about his past, family and education. In 
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consolidating his medical gaze with questions about the history of Baxter’s family 
and education, Perowne unleashes an arsenal of ideological apparatus and enacts 
what Foucault describes as the “collective system of hygiene and scientific technique 
of cure made [notionally] available to individual and family demand by a 
professional corps of doctors qualified and, as it were, recommended by the State.”91 
As Baxter accepts “Perowne’s right to interrogate” after “they’ve slipped into their 
roles” (SD 96), the ontology of masculinity shifts from the physical body to that of 
the power embodied by medical knowledge. In offering Baxter the contact of a 
colleague who “could make things easier” (SD 96) for him, Perowne symbolically 
returns Baxter’s earlier masculinist offer of a cigarette. This also attempts to further 
Perowne’s medical spell on the sick with the utopian promise wrought through the 
construct of the clinic that allows an “exact superposition of the ‘body’ of the disease 
and the body of the sick man”92  in the process enacting the “notion that one can 
improve – control – a deviant subpopulation by enumeration and classification.”93  
As the Prospero-figure with his superior magic that can dominate the 
powerfully subversive physicality of the deviant body, Perowne perceives “the 
vaguely ape-like features” (SD 98) of Baxter the Caliban-figure that show signs of 
returning to violence. The spell of medical magic begins to wane and Baxter realizes 
“he’s been cheated of a little violence and the exercise of a little power, and the more 
he considers it, the angrier he becomes” (SD 98). But the emasculation wrought by 
the medical gaze cast by Perowne had nearly completed its course and as Baxter 
seeks to summon his supporters back to gather force and retaliate, they move away, 
thus formally finishing the masculinist drama of power with Baxter’s spectacular and 
humiliating defeat. The description is deliberately couched with metaphors of war 
that bring Baxter close to the imminent fate of Saddam again as the body of 
potentially fearful ‘Other’-ness that is eventually controlled and castrated:  
The general has been indecisive, the troops are deserting, the humiliation is 
complete. Perowne too sees his opportunity to withdraw. [. . .] As he starts 
the engine he sees Baxter in his rear-view mirror, dithering between the 
departing factions, shouting at both. [. . .] He sees his racket on the front seat 
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beside him. This is surely the moment to slip away, while the possibility 
remains that he can still rescue his game. (SD 98-99) 
 
The masculinist energy and unrest that Perowne attracts through his confrontation 
with Baxter stay with him as he walks into the squash game with Jay Strauss, his 
American colleague, “a powerful, earthbound, stocky man, physically affectionate, 
energetic, direct in manner – to some of his English colleagues” (SD 100-01). The 
squash match between the two men becomes an automatic extension of the drama in 
the street with Perowne now assuming the baddy’s role with his illogical arguments 
and abuses. The episode is also significant politically inasmuch as it situates 
Perowne in a more ambivalent position about the Iraq War in relation to the arrogant 
American notion that “Iraq is a rotten state, a natural ally of terrorists, bound to 
cause mischief at some point and may as well be taken out now while the US 
military is feeling perky after Afghanistan” (SD 100). The squash game that emerges 
as another masculinist affair between two men furious to win is a complex extension 
of the urban drama that Perowne had won earlier. Soon the match becomes a war 
that foregrounds the bodily desire and primal urge to dominate:   
 
Both men raise their games. Every point is now a drama, a playlet of sudden 
reversals, and all the seriousness and fury of the third game’s long rally is 
resumed. Oblivious to their protesting hearts, they hurl themselves into every 
corner of the court. [. . . ] There’s nothing at stake – they’re not on the club’s 
squash ladder. There’s only the irreducible urge to win, as biological as thirst. 
(SD 113) 
 
In their biological desire for victory in the squash game that “becomes an extended 
metaphor of character defect” (SD 106), the two men – who, appropriately enough, 
professionally embody the arrogant certainties of medical science – appear to enact 
what the Neo-Darwinian natural scientist defines as “the war of attrition” where 
“both contestants pay the price but only one of them gets the goods.”94 Saturday is 
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remarkable in the way it brings together primal propensities for domination, self-
preservation and victory in the twenty-first century metropolis.  It also problematizes 
the economy of power and masculinity at various political levels of exchange, as 
men fight with each other and as nations prepare to war with ignorant armies and 
weapons of mass destruction that threaten in absentia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Perowne seeks to perpetuate the pleasure by converting the squash game into a war that directly 
involves the body, its functionality and the masculinist prestige associated with the same.  
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5.7 Saturday and the epistemology of the Epiphany 
 
The epiphanic moment in Saturday occurs not in the space of the subconscious but 
amidst the medical materiality of the operating theatre where the brain and the mind 
meet through a combination of medical gaze and phenomenological insight as 
Perowne embarks on operating on the unconscious Baxter:  
For all the recent advances, it’s still not known how this well-protected one 
kilogram or so of cells actually encodes information, how it holds 
experiences, memories, dreams and intentions. He doesn’t doubt that in years 
to come, the coding mechanism will be known, though it might not be in his 
lifetime [. . .] But even when it has, the wonder will remain, that mere wet 
stuff can make this bright inward cinema of thought, of sight and sound and 
touch bound into a vivid illusion of an instantaneous present, with a self, 
another brightly wrought illusion, hovering like a ghost at its centre. Could it 
ever be explained, how matter becomes conscious? (SD 254-55)  
 
Perowne’s phenomenological awareness of the complexity of the human brain, and 
how that connects to the mind that enacts the unique self, breaks away from his 
erstwhile bio-political gaze and anticipates the existentialist ambivalence with which 
Saturday ends. As the ghost in the machine, the human mind transcending the neural 
nets in the brain emerges as essentially unmappable by the medical gaze. The cinema 
of thought enacted by the self-reflective mind is situated at an epistemic excess in 
relation to the cellular reductionism of medical science. The science itself contains 
the possibility of dangerous dogmatism with its deterministic explanations of the 
laws governing human purposes.
95
 Moving away from the determinism of such a 
medical gaze, Perowne’s phenomenological insight into the complexity of 
consciousness and the philosophical enquiry about how matter becomes conscious 
instead connect to a sense of wonder about the majesty of the mind’s unique agency, 
a wonder that he acknowledges will remain, despite the discoveries medical science 
may achieve in the future. 
 In his elucidation of wonder about the human mind as it is born out of the 
neural brain, Perowne, the professional reductionist, comes – unbeknownst to 
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himself – to articulate how existentialist feeling of the highest order is a 
phenomenological category of knowledge.
96
 In realizing the limitation of the strictly 
scientific frame and acknowledging its determinism as a dogma, Perowne moves 
from the physical to the phenomenological, where the epistemic moment informs 
existentialist ambivalence. The ambivalence that he experiences contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the ontology of the human mind and an existentialist 
understanding of human self, agency and intentionality in relation to subjective 
feelings. More significantly, moving away from the ironic unreliability that had 
characterized him as a sure scientist with arrogant medical knowledge throughout 
the narrative, Perowne’s in-sight into an epistemological ambivalence invests him 
with the privileged frame of humility that the philosopher possesses with the 
subjective marks of affective awareness.
97
    
In his ambivalence, Perowne eventually comes to inhabit a dialectic of 
ignorance and understanding that moves away from his previous scientific arrogance 
and looks instead at a deeper philosophical frame that investigates the limits of bio-
scientific knowledge.
98
 The acknowledgement of blank spaces in scientific 
knowledge paradoxically informs Perowne’s increased awareness of the 
epistemology of the sentient self and its intentionality that had been brought to light 
before him by Baxter’s connection with the lyric and his subsequent epiphany in the 
operation theatre. Perowne’s phenomenological in-sight into Baxter’s brain thus 
seeks to look beyond matter in its philosophical questions about human life and 
consciousness.  In the process he realizes that the transition from matter to meaning 
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constitutes not just neural mechanism but the active agency of the feeling and living 
self that is unique in its self-reflexive location in the broader narratives of language 
and culture. The inward cinema that brings meaning out of matter and consciousness 
out of a semi-solid mass is thus invested with a complex self-reflexivity that is 
simultaneously aware of its subjective situatedness and operative presence.
99
 In an 
interesting way, there is thus a structural and functional similarity between the 
epistemology of the self-reflective mind and the unfurling of the literary narrative 
self-reflexively embedded in language.
100
  
As Perowne gazes into the gap between the mind and brain, he inhabits the 
threshold moment where change in knowledge takes place through an epiphany, 
enacting consciousness’ gaze into its own self-revealing interiority. In trying to 
figure how the matter of Baxter’s brain becomes conscious mind, Perowne in 
essence looks into his own. It is at this point that the novel brings together 
intentionality and agency in a cognitive connectedness. In the process, the ‘Other’ 
(as embodied by Baxter) is interiorized through inquisitive empathy that breaks the 
barriers between the material and the phenomenological realms, the empirical and 
the emotional states of being.
101
 In using the medical gaze while evaluating empathy, 
McEwan’s novel approximates what philosophers of mind classify as “POSE, or the 
Problem of the Other’s Subjective Experience, a problem at the heart of novelists’ 
imaginative representations of others’ minds, motivations and sensations.”102 In its 
movements between the aesthetics of affect and social cognition, McEwan’s novel 
underlines the epiphanic quality of existentialist experience and shows how the 
ambivalence born out of the process can inform the humility that characterises true 
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100
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philosophical understanding. The complexity of Saturday lies in its depiction of the 
manner in which such an understanding also extends into an un-learning of 
interpellated political knowledge.  
The smug satisfaction with which Perowne had woken up in the morning and 
seen the city as a biological masterpiece is now permanently disturbed and 
Perowne’s vision of the metropolis that is his home is significantly altered as 
“London, his small part of it, lies wide open, impossible to defend, waiting for its 
bomb, like a hundred other cities” (SD 276). The self-reflexivity of human 
consciousness, like that of the literary narrative itself, is flagged up again as the 
thoughts of the sleepy Perowne are on sleep itself which is cognized as “a material 
things, an ancient means of transport, a softly moving belt, conveying him into 
Sunday”(SD 279).103 McEwan makes unmistakable intertextual references to “The 
Dead” at this point and Perowne’s awareness of his subjective change from the 
position of certainty to contingency – he “feels skinny and frail in his dressing gown, 
facing the morning that’s still dark, still part of yesterday” (SD 275)104 – is not 
dissimilar to Gabriel Conroy’s realization of himself as “a nervous well-meaning 
sentimentalist, orating to vulgarians and idealizing his own clownish lusts, the 
pitiable fellow he had caught a glimpse of in the mirror.”105 The liminal temporal 
zone between yesterday and tomorrow that Perowne perceives himself inhabiting 
symbolically informs his existentialist transition from certainty to ambivalence. The 
elegance in description at this point in Saturday, if suggestive of Perowne’s changed 
consciousness from the metonymic to the metaphoric realm, is also indicative of the 
uniqueness of the commonplace as the perceiving subject ultimately drowns in its 
own stream of senses. In its self-reflective epiphany that situates the epistemology of 
the self within its phenomenological frame, Saturday concludes with “a reminder of 
                                                          
103
 It is interesting to compare Perowne’s sensibility to that of Gabriel in Joyce’s “The Dead” as the 
latter perceives that his “own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world”. Joyce, Dubliners 
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the mind’s capacity to move between many worlds, but where the ordinary, sensory 
world carries the paramount demand for assent to it as the ‘real’.”106   
Saturday ends with a literal stream of consciousness as Perowne savours the 
scent and the warmth of his wife, gets comfort from “her beloved form, and draws 
closer to her”( SD 279), preparing to sleep. As the feeling subject dissolves away to 
sleep with a final affirmation of being alive to emotions, it also concedes the loss of 
another sentient day and the imminent move towards nothingness, thus furthering the 
dialectic of attainment and loss that McEwan’s novel dramatizes. As Saturday ends 
with Perowne’s consciousness, and as language melts into the purity of the senses, 
the narration communicates an awakening of affect that connects to the agency of the 
feeling human self. Thus Perowne metaphorically wakes up to a heightened self-
reflective subjectivity while literally moving into sleep. The only certainty that 
Perowne appears to arrive at with his newly acquired knowledge of (medical and 
political) ambivalence is the affirmation of the affective now, the phenomenological 
moment that occupies and informs the epistemology of the unique feeling self. 
Perowne’s subjective awareness of his own sentience as he drifts into sleep 
corresponds to “a mind with an autobiographical self capable of guiding reflective 
deliberation and gathering knowledge.”107 In his movement from “ignorance and 
innocence to knowingness and self,”108 the neurosurgeon Perowne approximates the 
epistemology of emotions that constitutes the feeling self through a process in which 
the self is embodied, enacted and extended not as “a detached intellectual act but a 
way of cognitively grappling with the world.”109  
Emotions emerge in Saturday, not only as a cognitive quality that cannot be 
mapped by the machines in Perowne’s operation theatre, but also as an evaluator of 
values through which human judgements are made through a process “in which we 
acknowledge our neediness and incompleteness before those elements that we do not 
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fully control.”110 In appearing to move from pure biology to phenomenology (a 
move symbolically signified by the transition from the scientific to the subjective 
realm), the narrative that informs Perowne’s knowledge and subsequent articulation 
of ambivalence also voices the philosophical affiliation of modern cognitive science. 
It is one that reinforces its claim to truth not by an additional baggage of medical 
data but by inhabiting “a sense of reality that is not accessible to the standpoint of 
empirical science.”111 In its depiction of epiphany, McEwan’s Saturday exhibits the 
legacy of the high-Modernist narrative but complicates it further by showing the 
convergence of the medical and the existentialist realms focalized through the 
philosophical awakening of a neuroscientist. Such a convergence offers a fuller 
understanding of human agency and intentionality in a world of political change and 
of the contingent threat of terror. Perhaps Perowne’s final affirmation of feeling as 
he moves into sleep
112
 comes closest to his understanding of the existentialist 
question that he had articulated earlier while looking at Baxter’s brain. It thus posits 
the unique agency of the emotional self as the response to a question born out of a 
philosophical enquiry in the medical operation theatre, about how matter becomes 
conscious. 
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Conclusion 
 
I began my study with a novel about the political moment of the late nineteenth-
century British imperialism and end by looking at a novel about the neo-imperialist 
moment before the 2003 Iraq War. The medical culture with which this thesis began 
was one overdetermined by Darwinism and its political extensions. The final chapter 
investigates the neo-Darwinist culture of twenty-first century medical science, where 
bio-political hegemony enmeshes with capitalist coercion by transforming patients 
into consumers.
1
 Throughout this work, the male body under the bio-political gaze 
has been viewed as a metonymy of the subject and its agency cut down by strictures 
of cultural and corporeal control. I tried to investigate the manners in which the bio-
political realm constructs its irrefutable authority by an apparently seamless logic 
that sanctions privilege and manufactures consent. Such an authority emerges in my 
research as an extension of ideological consistency through which the “specific 
unpredictability of thought and action” is effaced.2  
In essence, I have tried to trace the ontology of the self that metamorphoses 
from being a consumer to becoming an outsider. Such a transformation, enacted by 
the male protagonists in the selected literary texts, has been interpreted as a painful 
process of emotional awakening as well as political un-learning. This thesis has tried 
to show how learnt bio-political knowledge is disrupted in literary texts during 
personal moments of panic that connect to states of self-censorship and auto-
critique.
3
 Such moments reveal the constructed quality of masculinity, socially 
sanctioned emotional behaviour, and political identity, while allowing the feeling 
self to interrogate the schism between ideology and intentionality. This, in turn, 
articulates the disassociations between the agency of individuation and its erstwhile 
intersubjective associations.
4
 I hope to have investigated such disassociations, by 
interpreting subjective experiences in literary texts that foreground masculine selves 
politically and privately changed by emotions, cognitions and affect.     
                                                          
1
 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, 9-40.  
2
 Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. 
Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 1994) 350.  
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4
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As opposed to the seamless structures of control enacted under the auspices 
of a socially sanctioned hegemonic gaze, the literature of bio-political panic is 
constituted by self-reflective introspections, ambivalence and epistemological 
interruptions. Those interruptions, as I have attempted to show, problematize 
representations in language and social performance, in enacted and embodied states. 
The interrupted states can thus trigger processes of un-making which constitute an 
inexpressibility that can potentially extend onto political consequences.
5
 What 
emerges throughout my thesis is the unique cognitive and ethical ability of the self-
reflexive literary narrative in articulating ambivalence, empathy and hermeneutic 
turns that disturb politicized presuppositions of knowledge.
6
 By interpreting textual 
representations of masculinity crisis, and by reading those with certain tenets of 
medical science, this research hopes to have shown how the human subject breaking 
away from the interpellated bio-political identity enacts the active agency of re-
cognized subjectivity. Such a break is best articulated in moments of panic that 
contain inconsistency, incommensurability and incomprehension, in opposition to 
standardized materialized discourses and their economy of expectations. When that 
economy is interrupted through self-doubt and ambivalence, what emerges is a 
human subject who is both unique and an anathema to normative gender, social and 
political performances. The uniqueness of agency, as my research has tried to show, 
is best articulated by experiential moments of subjective change. This has been a 
study of the changing human subject in literature, and of the altered order of 
representation that accompanies the process.     
I hope to have revealed how the borders between internally moving emotions 
and external materiality, between naturalized discourse and its disruption, can be 
best interrogated by the feeling self in nervous conditions. Nervousness has thus 
been analysed as an embodied state that can interrogate, disrupt and deconstruct 
dominant ideologies of social, political and bodily behaviour. Such a deconstruction 
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extends onto the affective politics of representation in language and in embodiment, 
as I have tried to demonstrate in this work. The uncertainty and aporetic quality 
embodied by masculine nervousness have been shown to accommodate the 
ambivalence that straddles private emotional and public political realms, supporting 
the principle thesis of my research that phenomenological and existentialist 
experience can crucially inform political subversion at the subjective level. 
Nervousness, as experienced by Conrad’s melancholic imperialist adventurer, 
Woolf’s traumatized First World War soldier, Orwell’s guilty colonial officer and 
McEwan’s bewildered Neo-Darwinist neurosurgeon, emerges as a self-reflective 
process of subjective enquiry that cannot completely articulate itself in language or 
through the body. Indeed, language and the body emerge as political sites in my 
study in their abilities to accommodate and exhibit the interruptions that challenge 
dominant orders of representation.  
The nervousness experienced by the male protagonists in the selected literary 
texts instantiates an epistemic rupture that situates the subject against inherited 
ideologies of political and bodily behaviour. It thus offers examples of the crisis of 
representation in the realm of language, body and the self. This research on 
masculinity and bio-political identities in literary narratives has further tried to 
corroborate the claim made by current neuroscientists and philosophers of mind 
alike: that the sense of agency contributes towards uniformed embodied experience.
7
 
Agency and embodiment therefore emerge as vital factors in the subjective 
awareness that interrogates dominant political and social behaviour. My study of 
literary narratives of nervousness and nervous conditions has tried to show how 
expected social and political behaviour may be problematized by different orders of 
agency and embodiment. Nervousness thus crucially connects the bodily and 
epistemic realms that are investigated as being dialogic in my research on bio-
political panic. This thesis has looked at medical theories in modern cognitive 
science as well as philosophy of mind, to try to do a fuller study of the complexly 
changing human subject in a politically charged space.  
                                                          
7
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Focusing on European imperialism, masculinity and nervous conditions, I 
have tried to investigate political definitions of illness, power and privilege. The 
political moments investigated in this research include late nineteenth-century 
European imperialism in Africa, First World War, British colonialism in South-East 
Asia, and post-9/11 tension before the Iraq War. Conrad, Woolf, Orwell and 
McEwan are literary writers deeply aware of (and in the case of Orwell, personally 
and politically involved in) the dominant bio-political discourses of their days and 
their writings often exemplify the ambivalences they personally perceived as socially 
situated creative and feeling subjects. This research has been an investigation of such 
situatedness and of how that can be re-configured in complex literary narratives 
through textual representations of subjectively moving experiences constituting guilt, 
shock, shame and affect.
8
 The nervous negotiations in the literary narratives posit 
significant questions about the nature of language and representation, and the self-
reflective literariness of the texts chosen in this study highlights the same through 
their nervous and unreliable male protagonists. The literary representations of the 
emotional experiences that inform embodied subjectivity in Heart of Darkness, Mrs 
Dalloway, Burmese Days, and Saturday, illustrate literature’s unique ability to 
politicize the phenomenological frame and thus depict how the existentialist 
experience can become truer than the facticity of the objectively real. Such 
depictions see the human subject breaking away from consuming grand narratives of 
medical and political knowledge, and instead emerge as a nervous ruptured self, who 
painfully un-learns the ideologies that had earlier interpellated him. The 
representations of these characters in the texts studied thus show how human agency 
may be recovered by the feeling and questioning masculine subject in a changing 
political space.  
By focusing on literary representations of the masculine subject and his body 
of pain under the dominant political and medical gaze, I hope to have affirmed the 
significance of literature for a fuller understanding of freedom and agency, in the 
private as well as political realms. In my interpretations of selected texts, I have tried 
to explore how embodied experience and medical knowledge can be linked through 
literary narratives about rediscovering unique subjective identity. I have attempted to 
                                                          
8
 These appear as the primary emotions that enact the changes experienced by the male protagonists in 
Heart of Darkness, Mrs Dalloway, Burmese Days and Saturday respectively in the chapters studied in 
this thesis.  
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study the subjective ambivalence in the interstitial spaces between hard fact and felt 
knowledge, an ambivalence that extends onto an existentialist and epistemic enquiry. 
I hope to have shown how medical and political ideologies are materially constructed 
as well as experientially interrogated. In my research on how phenomenological and 
existentialist experiences can enact political subversion through re-awakened 
agency, I have tried to study the private changing mind in the public political space. 
My work thus upholds the philosophical idea that “man not only has the capacity of 
beginning but is the beginning himself”9 and has tried to arrive at the thesis that to be 
fully and uniquely human is to be in doubt, ambivalence and pain.
10
  
By focusing on the location and articulation of agency in the literature of bio-
political panic, this study hopes to have contributed in a small way to a deeper 
understanding of subjectivity in a global capitalist world where “ultra-
authoritarianism and Capital are by no means incompatible: [where] internment 
camps and franchise coffee bars co-exist”11, and where neo-liberalism is the 
benevolent face of capitalist realism. In its investigations of intentionality, 
masculinity and political identity in its chosen literary texts, this thesis will hopefully 
find resonance with debates about the dialectical relationships between real emotions 
and affective virtual spaces in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The 
issues of agency and politicized identity are particularly pertinent in political systems 
that appear to celebrate dissent and difference while actually systematising the same, 
where the most elementary position of the human being is as an object of biopolitics, 
with political and citizenship rights as “secondary gestures”.12 In a world of capitalist 
sovereignty and a global society of control,
13
 the haunting melancholia of Conrad’s 
imperial adventurer, the traumatic numbness of Woolf’s shell-shocked soldier, the 
personal purposelessness experienced by Orwell’s colonial officer and the 
existentialist ambivalence of McEwan’s medical practitioner, offer insights which 
emerge with renewed relevance. Likewise, the imperial, military, colonial and 
medical masculinities, as imperfectly enacted and embodied by the protagonists in 
the novels chosen, raise important issues about language, representation, 
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performativity and cognitive mapping of the self in the cultural logic of capitalism 
and its distributed memes.
14
 In my modest philosophical enquiry, I hope to have 
offered a thesis that may connect to the ways we negotiate with our human identities 
in the hegemonic narratives of privilege today.   
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